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ABSTRACT 
 
Reverse the Curse: Colonialist Legacies of the Magic Poem 
by  
Karen Lepri 
Adviser: Professor Wayne Koestenbaum  
 
This dissertation investigates the conceptual relationships between poetry, magic, and 
race and their effects on both intellectual and creative practices from modernism through the 
post-war era. In doing so, this study works cross-disciplinarily, tracing early anthropological and 
sociological characterizations of primitive religion in connection to early-to-mid-twentieth-
century literary study and writing. In working across disciplines at this particularly fungible 
moment in the history of the academy, this dissertation attempts to understand how the 
concurrent colonial global context effects the production and organization of knowledge just 
prior to and during modernism. It ultimately seeks to de-colonize literary thinking about poetry 
by performing a racial critique of the role of magical thinking in its generic conception and 
production. The first chapter establishes the intellectual history of the dissertation’s key problem, 
the presence of primitivism throughout modernist and post-modernish approaches to poetry and 
the desire for this poetry to offer reparation; examines the ethnographic texts, especially Marcel 
Mauss’s General Theory of Magic, that relate poetic language to the language of magic ritual and 
animistic belief systems; considers how these foundational beliefs continued to influence 
modernist critics like Theodor Adorno  and C.L.R. James, and how certain poets and critics 
attempt to subvert these intellectual trends that associate blackness with magic and magic with 
poetry; and lastly questions the ethical implications of assuming that poetry’s “magic” could cure 
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socio-cultural loss. The second and third chapters further develop and test the dissertation’s 
argument that regardless of poets’ intentions, magic operates within their understanding of poetic 
function, and that these understandings stem from racist, colonialist understandings of primitive 
space, time, and culture, while simultaneously attempting to understand their works’ attitude 
toward poetic reparation. In the second chapter, I examine Gertrude Stein’s 1932 Stanzas in 
Meditation in an attempt to understand the text’s relationship to concepts of magical language, 
and its trance-like, reparative effect on readers, an effect complicated by its appropriation of 
primitivist concepts of time. In the final chapter, I turn to Amiri Baraka’s 1969 compilation 
Black Magic to explore this work’s relationship to its titular “magic.” I ultimately demonstrate 
how Baraka’s work re-theorizes a kind of poetic spirituality that eschews white capitalist magic 
and offers a materialist, pragmatic poetics for surviving racism and strengthening Black 
consciousness. In concluding, I look to the contemporary moment and claim that the current 
upswing in the poetry community’s interest in the occult serves as further evidence for one, how 
the role of magic and poetry corresponds to a social desire for reparation, and, two, how the 
racialized thinking at stake in the invocation of magic in poetry continues to merit critical and 
popular examination.  
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Preface 
 
I began this project with two suspicions. First, I suspected that many white modernist 
poets, not seeming to invoke race, often did through their assumptions about the relationship 
between poetry and magic. Furthermore, I suspected that the white modernist poets typically 
studied for invoking occultism, through textual reference or life practice, were not merely 
drawing inspiration from a Eurocentric mythology of a European past, but rather that their 
relationship to a temporal otherwise, the long-past of history, was inextricable from the 
coloniality of their world. In this vein, due to my investment in decolonializing conceptions of 
the poetry genre,1 my study calls itself a study in modernism despite encompassing a period of 
time from the late 1800s through the 1960s. While focusing on one high modernist poet who fits 
squarely in the period, Gertrude Stein, and one Black Arts poet who falls about twenty years 
later, Amiri Baraka, the intellectual formations which I argue influence poetic practice (and vice 
versa) come to fruition through the organization of anthropological knowledge from the 1870s 
through the 1910s. My suspicions about colonialism, modernism, and anti-colonialism’s 
relationships to each other, and my desire to ask how various conceptualizations of magic and 
poetry spill across these periods, force me to consider a rather broad span of time. Temporal 
brackets or categories repeatedly fail my study. 
 However, despite admitting my suspicions about the racialized knowledge formations 
undergirding modernist scholarly and creative practices, I must pause to reflect critically on the 
very positing of said suspicions and to explain that they are not constitutive of this work’s 
methodology. Following Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick’s critique of a kind of criticism that would 
                                               
1 See Walter Mignolo, “Delinking: The Rhetoric of Modernity, the Logic of Coloniality and the Grammar of De-
Coloniality,” Cultural Studies 21, no. 2-3 (April 2007): 449-514. 
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function merely through a hermeneutics of suspicion,2 I seek here in this preface to offer an 
account of my project’s paranoia, the reading methodologies I aspire to, and the reparative aim I 
harbor. I would argue first, that genre, like any category or abstract name, is given to suspicion. 
But my paranoia about poetry’s attachments to a cave aesthetic began just as I was relishing the 
publication of my first collection of poems. These bizarrely abstract, formally playful poems 
(heavily influenced by modernist nonsense) imagined an exchange between my poet self and the 
nineteenth century physicist, thermo-dynamicist, and early glaciologist John Tyndall. People 
would ask, encountering the poems’ mysteriousness, where do they come from? And I would 
facetiously answer, there’s a loose screw in my head—I simply lean on it. Many artists might 
withhold the key to their process, but many others, like me, couldn’t exactly explain what was 
happening to them when their poems happened onto the page. Was this magic? I frequently had 
to ask. I soon realized how common it was for poets all around me to answer, yes.  
 A recent encounter with the poet Anne Waldman in the elevator of the CUNY Graduate 
Center added confirmation. When I told her I was writing about poetry and magic, her eyes lit up 
and she began recounting her most recent shamanistic project. I mumbled something about 
wanting to question this cozy relationship—poetry, magic—but why? Why would I want to 
complicate this connection when so many poets, alive and dead—not just Waldman but Diane Di 
Prima, Barbara Guest, CA Conrad, Jack Spicer and many other poets in community with my 
professed aesthetics—laid claim to some mystical or magical element in their poetry? How did I 
become paranoid that something larger, hidden was at work in this pairing? Or was this paranoia 
                                               
2 See Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, “Paranoid Reading and Reparative Reading, or, You’re so Paranoid, You Probably 
Think This Essay is About You,” Touching Feeling (Chapel Hill, NC: Duke University Press, 2003), 123-151. 
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merely a cover for my deep love3 of poetry or a desire to believe that poetry was magic? 4 Was I 
looking to manifest a strong theory of negative affects or seeking to humiliate my own 
community? I invoke Sedgwick’s idea that on the flip side of a paranoid methodology is often a 
reparative one,5 in order to question, here at the outset, what was I trying to repair through 
unveiling the ways in which poetry and magic’s relationship gets racialized? (This reparative 
reflection is key to my most significant critique of primitivist aesthetic appropriation.) 
 My interest in this project stems from understanding my own whiteness as constituted 
through the black/white and colonizer/colonized binaries, with all their imagined qualities and 
real consequences. I have learned to treat with suspicion cross-racial artistic appropriations for 
their often occluded, yet still to be unpacked, desires and beliefs about the social, the aesthetic, 
and race. It is not that this project is paranoid about magic and poetry, and thereby seeks to 
rationalize poetry or to deny poets ethical access to a poetics of spells and ghosts. It is that this 
project seeks to explore the possibility that the history of these associations is one marked by 
colonial, racialized narratives about ritual practice, language, and power. I aim also to make 
mistakes along the way, because, who can fashion anything but a weak theory about what is 
happening in any given poet’s mind? Believing deeply in the relationship between our 
understanding of history and our daily behavior, I have approached this project hoping not to 
                                               
3 Sedgwick, 131. 
4 Simone White writes, “Poetry isn’t magical or removed from dirty, compromising political and personal acts, 
pettiness, racism, sexism, suffering. Absent the intervention of many other sociopolitical acts, poetry won’t save 
your life. To suggest otherwise is a kind of offense against poetry’s insistence on complexity, the 
multidimensionality of understanding. Taking it seriously as a carrier of information about the real matrix between 
language and power, which is truly upsetting — mind-blowing — when we come near to it, changes the way you 
live. Believe it.” White resists our desire to equate the thing that changes our life with “magic.” See “Exploring the 
Consolations and Sources of Poetry, in Prose,” New York Times, August 4, 2017, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/04/books/review/poetry-will-save-your-life-jill-bialosky-why-poetry-matthew-
zapruder.html 
5 Sedgwick, 128. 
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destroy the magic of poetry but to learn how to invoke its particularities,6 its textured historical 
body, and perhaps for a material magic to re-emerge, fully aware and sensing, from that textual 
body. I want poetry’s relationship to magic to become both more complex and useful through our 
capacity to acknowledge that magic is as much the tricks of occultist outsiders as the power of 
the state as an abstract category used to describe (and disempower) the rituals of colonized 
subjects. I seek not to reveal and destroy, but to closely read poetry and magic as imbricated in 
and inextricable from each other due a history we can perhaps transcend, fleshly, materially, but 
only through study.7 
                                               
6 My desire to de-link without destroying magical thinking in relation to poetry reflects Walter Mignolo’s discussion 
of Aníbal Quijano’s idea of desprendimiento in which he claims that the way to delink modernity and coloniality 
could not be so simple as negation, for that would merely substitute one totality for another. I invoke the possibility 
of seeing and knowing the particularities of this relationship by complicating it rather than forbidding it, departing 
from Mignolo’s interpretation of Quijano’s critique of universalities (such as negation) as calling for 
“pluriversality.” See Walter Mignolo, “Delinking: The Rhetoric of Modernity, the Logic of Coloniality and the 
Grammar of De-Coloniality,” Cultural Studies 21, no. 2-3 (April 2007): 152. 
7 Here I mean study in the sense that Moten studies blackness—study as social way of refusing subjectivity, 
historicity, and the violence of citizenship. Is it possible that poetry’s recuperation of magic (lost but not lost through 
disenchantment) is a gesture toward other ways of living, of world making? I think so, but only if we study this 
making, illuminate its lacunae and enjoin its desires. For Moten and Harney, study is a practice of hoping against 
hope, of a kind of optimism that works in and through a pessimism that can’t be already. See Fred Moten and 
Stefano Harney’s The University and Undercommons (Social Text 22, no. 2 (June 2004)) in which they propose to 
“be skeptical of what one already knows.” 
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Introduction 
 
Colonialism is not satisfied merely with holding a people in its grip 
and emptying the native’s brain of all form and content. By a kind 
of perverse logic, it turns to the past of the oppressed people, and 
distorts it, disfigures and destroys it. 
-Frantz Fanon1 
 
A poem, they may say, has charm, but the word itself suggests 
magic… 
   -Frederick Clarke Prescott2  
 
  In one rather infamous cave scene in the film Dead Poets Society,3 Mr. Keating (Robin 
Williams)’s students rap and dance in a circle as they perform Vachel Lindsay’s 1922 poem 
“The Congo.”4 They chant, “THEN I SAW THE CONGO, CREEPING THROUGH THE 
BLACK, / CUTTING THROUGH THE FOREST WITH A GOLDEN TRACK.” The racial 
ignorance of the scene glares brightly—the all-white, all-boy prep school students “going tribal” 
as a way to “get into” poetry.  While the film was made in 1989, it is staged in 1959, a time we 
could call one of several zeniths of American conservatism. No one on screen questions these 
tactics, and yet it is unclear if the scene’s primitivity should be regarded as completely weird or 
utterly commonplace. Poetry, in Dead Poets, is Keating’s students’ ticket to a revitalized sense 
of self-determination and expression, capacities dampened and hampered by social stodginess—
boarding school, whiteness, and the conservative backlash of the fifties. The students discover 
Lindsay’s poem by reading their poetry-obsessed teacher’s out-of-date anthology from his old 
days as a student. This means of discovery through their rebellious teacher implies that this 
                                               
1 Frantz Fanon, excerpt from The Wretched of the Earth, ed. Bill Ashcroft et al., in The Post-Colonial Studies 
Reader (New York: Routledge, 1995), 120. 
2 Frederick Clarke Prescott, The Poetic Mind (New York: MacMillan, 1922), 1. 
3 Dead Poets Society, directed by Peter Weir (1989; USA; Touchstone Pictures), film. 
4 Vachel Lindsay, “The Congo,” in The Congo and Other Poems (New York: Macmillan, 1914), 3-11. 
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material would have, or should have, otherwise gone unread, that it had fallen out of style by 
time of the boys’ schooling in the 1950s. Yet it likewise seems to imply that the very conditions 
of the school—all-male, all-white, and the taboo on such a “passionate” poem—comprise the 
very structure that keeps the poem, and its racism, alive, read, felt and known. 
But what exactly, the audience might ask, is the poem or poetry’s threat? While poetry 
plays a seemingly reparative role in the film through its capacity to restore individualism, it also 
bodes extremely high stakes. One student, Neil, commits suicide under his parents’ constant 
threat to cut him off from poetry and acting. One wonders why the film would speak to poetry’s 
rareness (and subsequently high demand) without also attending to the racial reasons it is de-
canonized or barred from class. Dead Poets Society was released during a pedagogical turning 
point in U.S. academia, at the brink of the nineties, when (some) professors went from assigning 
their students mostly white dead poets to a more multicultural array of live ones (ones literally 
expected to perform their cultural otherness live5 on the page). One cannot say that Dead Poets 
anticipated this shift, or that its makers cared about its effects, but we might wonder if the boys’ 
easy access to the racial “thrill” of poetry is one object of the film’s imagination.  
This scene from Dead Poets Society and Lindsay’s poem are symptomatic of what I 
consider the pervasive phenomenon of poetry and primitivity’s intimacy. They also crystalize 
this dissertation’s two-fold problem. They point to how representations of poetry’s relationship 
to magic and primitivity fail to acknowledge the racialized dynamics of its relationship, and they 
show how the reparative expectations of poetry are closely associated with a racialized, 
colonialist epistemology of the genre. This rather white way of coming to and receiving poetry 
                                               
5 See José Esteban Muñoz, Disidentifications (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1999), 189, where 
he discusses the “burden of liveness” that minoritarian subjects are expected to perform as artists, a burden that 
exceeds the already burdened experience of real life, off-state, as a minority.  
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imagines its healing powers as having something to do with darkness, the jungle, or even just the 
imagined occult feeling of such things.  
Other scholars’ responses to the relationship between primitivism and modernist 
aesthetics point to a dilemma around exactly how to identify and consider primitivistic influence, 
be it conceptual, formal or discursive. Christopher Bracken examines rhetorical primitivity, what 
he calls “savage philosophy,” in his 2013 study Magical Criticism.6 According to Bracken, the 
presence of the “savage” and forms of magical thinking in the modern philosophical imagination 
enabled Western philosophy to conceive of discursive being, experience defined and made 
possible by language. Many of the thinkers Bracken considers, such as Edward Tylor and Walter 
Benjamin, are central also to this project; however, his consideration of philosophical discourse, 
as opposed to literary genre or form, does not attend to the significance of aesthetics and 
aesthetic experience in the discursive production of being, something this work will attend to 
more closely through formal and material analysis of poetry.  
Marianna Torgovnick’s study of primitivist discourse7 also considers modernist 
intellectual formations, ones that draw their source materials primarily from ethnographies of 
colonial regions,8 but her analysis focuses on the aesthetic ramifications of primitivism on 
                                               
6 See Christopher Bracken, Magical Criticism: The Recourse of Savage Philosophy (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 2007). 
7 See Marianna Torgovnik, Gone Primitive: Savage Intellects, Modern Lives (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago 
Press, 1990) for her analysis of modernists’ production of primitive discourse and its influence on Western popular 
culture. Torgovnik makes an important case for not putting the word primitive in quotation marks: “When we put 
primitive in quotation marks we wish away the heritage of the West’s exploitation of non-Western peoples or at least 
wish to demonstrate that we are politically correct. But the heritage of Western domination cannot be abolished by 
wishing or by typography…In the absence of such ubiquitous marks, treating primitive differently from abstractions 
such as Western implies that the societies traditionally so designated do not, and perhaps never did, exist—are 
simply a figment of the Euro-American imagination” (20). I will follow her lead throughout this work by also not 
putting primitive in quotation marks. 
8 I suggest in the conclusion that this primitivistic intellectual formations continue to exert this influence, and were 
particularly visible in nineties criticism—from Jacques Derrida’s “conjuring” Marx to Barbara Johnson’s discussion 
of the animated fetus. 
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Western popular culture. Similar to my own research, Torgovnik includes philosophy, cultural 
anthropology, sociology, linguistics, and literary criticism in her analysis of cultural objects. 
Across this organization of knowledge, the figure of the primitive takes on broad set of 
meanings: 
Primitives are like children, the tropes say. Primitives are our untamed selves, our 
id forces—libidinous, irrational, violent, dangerous. Primitives are mystics, in 
tune with nature, part of its harmonies. Primitives are free. Primitives exist at the 
“lowest cultural levels;” we occupy the “highest,” in the metaphors of 
stratification and hierarchy commonly used by Malinowski9 and others like him. 
The ensemble of these tropes—however miscellaneous and contradictory—forms 
the basic grammar and vocabulary of what I call primitivist discourse, a discourse 
fundamental to the Western sense of self and Other.10 
In looking at how this conceptualization of the primitive happens at the site of poetic writing, 
reading, and critique, my work departs from both Torgovnick and Bracken’s understandings of 
the coloniality of Western discourse and its profound cultural, aesthetic, and epistemological 
impact. It also extends this work by insisting not on the transfer of intellectual discourse into the 
aesthetic field but in the co-terminous production of knowledge across the realms of academic 
discourse and poetry.   
This project also seeks to extend and complicate previous discussions of occultism and 
modernist aesthetics by examining their colonialist blind spots and their literary inclusions and 
                                               
9 Not only is Malinowski is well known for shifting the field of anthropology toward more ethnography-like 
fieldwork, but he also wrote extensively on magic in the Austral-Asian region in his 1922 The Argonauts of the 
Western Pacific, in which one can find “Chapter XVIII. The power of words in magic — some linguistic data” 
(1125). 
10 Torgovnik, Gone Primitive, 1. 
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exclusions. While such works usefully explore occultism’s aesthetic effects and meanings for 
white modernist poets, particularly occultism’s reparative value, none of these works consider 
either white modernist writers who do not invoke the occult, or black modernists or Black Arts 
writers who do invoke the occult. Leon Surette’s The Birth of Modernism views occultist works 
like Eliot’s “The Wasteland” or Pound’s Cantos as works resisting Enlightenment ideology. 
Surette writes, “The resistance to the Enlightenment places great value on the untutored, 
instinctive, or intuitive, while the Enlightenment places greater value on reason, logic, or 
calculation.”11 Surette’s view of modernist occultist historicism as part of the Enlightenment 
project—a project whose racial production of knowledge I will discuss in chapter one—helpfully 
positions poetry as an important part of how we understand the epistemology of a given 
historical moment and its influence; however, Surette does not question the coloniality of 
Enlightenment-era epistemology. 
 Other critics of modernist occultism examine certain poetries’ modes of speaking or 
imagining, and particularly consider how occultist poetry might help to stabilize a destabilized 
world through a different capacity to imagine that world. Timothy Materer’s Modernist 
Alchemy12 explores the potency of modernist poetic prophecy, while Leigh Wilson’s more recent 
Modernism and Magic13 consider how beliefs about mimetic effects might construe a belief in 
poetry’s capacity to complete a broken world. (These ideas get explored further in chapter two, 
where I discuss Gertrude Stein’s work in the interwar year period.) Nevertheless, these analyses 
                                               
11 Leon Surette, The Birth of Modernism: Ezra Pound, T.S. Eliot, W.B. Yeats, and the Occult (Buffalo, NY: McGill-
Queen’s University Press, 1993), 285. 
12 Timothy Materer, Modernist Alchemy: Poetry and the Occult (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995).  
13 Leigh Wilson, Modernism and Magic: Experiments with Spiritualism, Theosophy, and the Occult (Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh University Press, 2013). 
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consider neither the poem’s epistemic dimensions nor how ideas about magic manifest at the 
formal level of the poem. 
In responding to conversations about both the discursive production of primitivity and the 
occultist bent of modernist works, I critique poetry at the epistemological and the formal level 
and look across criticism, theory, and other disciplines to understand the co-construction of a 
colonial poetic epistemology. Furthermore, this dissertation’s attempt to decolonize the 
relationship between poetry and magic depends on understanding both creative and critical urges 
to depict poetry’s reparative function. Such an understanding, by which I mean criticism, would 
have to take into account poetry’s always suspect position, its apparent, dangerous uselessness, 
except when wielded as propaganda. As such, the genre has continuously operated as a 
placeholder for critical optimism, as seen in the case of Materer and Wilson’s hopeful theories. 
This reparative drive, referenced in my preface via Sedgwick, is particularly strong in the wake 
of trauma. For Sedgwick, it was the AIDS crisis, while for many of the writers and thinkers in 
this study, it was the widespread social trauma of the modernist era: two world wars as well as 
ongoing racial violence in America,14 Europe, and the still-colonized Global South. I argue that 
both the worldness and coloniality of these wars reinscribed the idea that primitivist occultism 
could best cure these social injuries.  
At the heart of this study is a question about the relationship between the belief that 
poetry could change your life, for the better, and the belief in magic and primitivist aesthetics. 
On the other side of this question lies a critique: that if this concept of reparation comes from a 
                                               
14 Not only did the integration of the military during World War II lead to increased political disappointment on the 
part of black servicemen upon their return to a segregated racist home life in America, but Amiri Baraka also served 
in the Air Force just after the Korean War from 1954-1956, an experience partly represented in System of Dante’s 
Hell. I cite this fact mainly to underscore that those who “escaped” direct experience in WWII still underwent its 
dramatic after-effects, not excluding political backlash, rampant militarization, and the Cold War.   
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colonialist epistemology, then it is a weak, ambivalent reparation at best, one that shuttles the 
injuries of war felt by Americans and Europeans onto the invisible landscapes and bodies of the 
subaltern. Imbuing poetic magic with a racialized hierarchy of knowledge would clearly 
diminish poetry’s reparative capacity. This possible knot in both the creative and critical desire 
that poetry ever fix anything, ever “work its magic,” compels this investigation into past trends 
in ethnography that popularized the magical thinking and actual thinking poets perform in their 
poetry during both the height and fall of colonialism. As Moten says, “The logic of reparation is 
grounded on notions of originary wholeness,”15 and we already know that the white Eurocentric 
logic of wholeness forces incongruent pieces of the whole into a violent hierarchy. 
The first chapter of this dissertation establishes the troublesome place that magic holds in 
poetry and the political-epistemological formations around it. In doing so, it explores what it 
considers “the dialectics of magic.” It questions the mechanisms—largely intellectual ones—by 
which magic, poetry and primitivity came to be conceived as interrelated, and how this 
conception of poetry was crucial to the ways people imagined post-war renewal in the first half 
of the twentieth century. The chapter’s analysis does not center on magic as it gets referenced by 
a poem, exemplified by James Weldon Johnson’s “White Witch,” but rather focuses on 
knowledge production about and around poetry. It considers poetry’s status and character as a 
genre from the late nineteenth to the mid-twentieth centuries, including its canonization and 
teachability in the eyes of New Critics Robert Penn Warren and Cleanth Brooks. In tracing the 
intellectual history of this knowledge production about both magic and poetry, I attempt to show 
how the establishment of this relationship depends on colonial, racialized ways of thinking. 
                                               
15 Fred Moten, “B3,” The Poetry Foundation, April 6, 2010, https://www.poetryfoundation.org/harriet/2010/02/b-3. I 
had a conversation with Moten in Providence, RI right around this time when he published this blog, in which he 
was “stressing” about a talk he had to give about reparative poetics. He was worried he just couldn’t “get with it,” 
that poetry couldn’t/shouldn’t be reparative, and he was using Nourbese Philips to figure this out.  
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Through mapping the work of Edward Tylor, Marcel Mauss, and Walter Benjamin, I offer one 
possible view of a long nineteenth century (after Eric Hobswan). This map spans from early, 
Eurocentric ethnography, sociology and anthropology to the manifestation of these ways of 
imagining the world in early twentieth century poetics, physiology, and post-war criticism of 
mystical ideology. I show how at two points during this “long century,” both points occurring 
immediately after the devastation of each of the world wars, the social urge to fix a fragmented 
or broken sense of self and community motivated readers and poets to appropriate primitivistic 
ways of reading and writing poetry. Critics like W.E.B. DuBois, C.L.R. James, and Theodor 
Adorno reject poetic mysticism and attempt, instead, to redirect desperation toward materialism; 
however, I show that James and Adorno’s arguments against magic, mysticism, and poetry 
depend largely on poetry’s anti-dialecticism. I suggest, contrary to Adorno’s warnings, that 
perhaps poetry, under the guise of its conception as magical, could indeed re-attune its war-torn 
readers to a new kind of aesthetic (sensory) rationalism; nevertheless, this poetic antidote is 
endlessly problematized by the racialized epistemology undergirding its possibility. 
 In the second chapter, I read Gertrude Stein’s 1932 poem Stanzas in Meditation through 
contemporaneous ethnographic texts on magic, observing how her poems parallel magic spells. I 
argue that the poem imbues the reader with the sense of a threat, one emotionally tied to the post-
war context, and furthermore has the effect of heightening the reader’s attentiveness to language, 
and perhaps their actual surroundings, as a way to restore sensory capacity to the numb populace. 
However, I seek to demonstrate that the poem’s reparative effects arise through racialized codes 
of poetic performance due to their dependence on Stein’s production of a primitivist sense of 
time and through tropes that resemble racialized depictions of magical practices among colonial 
peoples. Thus, I argue that inaccurate anthropological representations of non-white, not-present 
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cultures, and the desire for these cultures to provide a fix for post-war alienation, co-constitute 
modernist avant-garde whiteness. Through focusing on Stein, not an occultist, I show how such 
magical and racialized forms of thinking poetry are present regardless of intentions or professed 
aesthetics.  In addition to Marcel Mauss’s description of magic spells, this chapter also integrates 
Johannes Fabian and Tony C. Brown’s thinking on how colonial otherness and concepts of 
primitivity effect modern concepts of time. I think through Stanzas in Meditation’s production of 
both non-synchronous temporality and a temporal standstill as two ways in which primitivist 
poetics take shape without direct reference to occultism or race. Ultimately this chapter troubles 
any clear depiction of Stein’s poem as trance or counter-trance; instead, I posit that the 
distracting, numbing, technological effects of Late Capitalism are the initial trance against which 
Stein’s poetics works to repair its readers, bringing readers to an attentive, feeling state.  I show, 
however, that this repair, due to its primitivist premise, must be thought and experienced with 
colonial consciousness, or awareness of its subaltern influence, to retain its trance-like powers. 
 In the third chapter, I attempt to show how the ink bleeds from Modernism into the 
1960s, both with Amiri Baraka’s experimental poetics in his 1969 collection, Black Magic, and 
with the ongoing reproduction of primitivist discourse within black aesthetics. I trace magic’s 
shifting meanings and statuses across this compendium of three chapbooks written throughout 
the sixties, seeking to show how Baraka negotiates the desire both for magic and for a way to 
survive the real, material violence of racism. Baraka uses magic, I argue, as a conceptual to 
backdrop to his metaphysical investigation of black subjectivity. The belief that a poem exceeds 
its textual status, has a certain kind of mana, motivates Baraka’s use of the poem as a site for 
anti-white aggression and the refusal of the white bourgeois status-quo. I consider Baraka’s work 
in conversation with other anti-colonialist and Marxist theorists such as Frantz Fanon, Aimé 
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Cesaire, and C.L.R. James in order to understand the criticality inherent in the poetics of Black 
Magic, as well as a way to understand Baraka’s rhetoric of African nativity. Ultimately, I argue 
that Baraka’s poetics manages to supersede the nostalgic experimentalism of many of his 
contemporaries through its insistence on poetry as an improvisatory, ever-changing praxis. 
Readers may feel understandably curious about this project’s co-consideration of two 
poets who seem to have little to do with each other, and who had no allegiance to occultist 
circles16 in either of the times or spaces where they lived. Nevertheless, both had friends deeply 
immersed in these fascinations: Baraka was lovers with Diane Di Prima; Stein socialized in 
Aleistair Crowley’s circle. Neither is considered an easy poet to write about due to their 
controversial personal politics and their diverse and difficult aesthetics. Both moved between 
writing that “made sense” and writing that didn’t. Both formed affinities with groups 
antagonistic to American ideals: Stein’s fascist friends, Baraka’s Communist organizing. Most 
importantly, Stein and Baraka shared an obsession with the power of the mind, with 
consciousness, with how we sense our world, and with what our attention can do. They are also 
each canonically representative of experimental modernist writing, and yet they write from 
wildly different political positions—Stein, the white, lesbian, Jewish ex-pat, and Baraka the 
Black Nationalist then Maoist-Leninist of New Jersey whose work seems to harbor as much 
homophobia as queer desire.17 Baraka is not technically a modernist poet, and is more typically 
historicized as member of New American poetry and the Black Arts movement. Still this project 
paints Baraka as departing from modernist thinking, particularly due to the strong hold of New 
                                               
16 It is nonetheless important to note that many scholars call the Black Magic phase of Baraka’s career a transitional 
one.  He is exploring various possible spiritual paths throughout the 60s before his Maoist-Leninist turn in the 70s. 
17 While this project centers on Black Magic (1969) which abounds with hateful speech toward gays (and Jews and 
whites generally), Baraka’s novella System of Dante in Hell (1965) and play The Toilet (1964), written across the 
same years, both attend sympathetically to homoerotic scenarios. 
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Criticism and structuralism in the 1950s and 1960s. Both schools of thought borrowed primitivist 
and racialized concepts of language, and centralized this language’s perceived magic (and 
necessary rationalization) in notions of aesthetic practice. 
Invoking even the word magic, let alone the practice, is tricky business. Its definition is 
extremely slippery, perhaps partly due to its intellectual history. French sociologist Marcel 
Mauss claims in 1902 that magic is  
one of those collective customs which cannot be named, described, analysed 
without the fear that one may lose the feeling that they have any reality, form or 
function of their own. Magic is an institution only in the most weak sense; it is a 
kind of totality of actions and beliefs, poorly defined, poorly organized even as far 
as those who practise it and believe in it are concerned.18  
Mauss ultimately relies on Edward Tylor’s understandings of sympathetic magic, magic as a 
kind of contagious effect that allows for substitutions, say, for a doll to stand in for a person, or a 
word for an act.  
My use of the word “magic” stems from Mauss’s likewise vague understanding of mana, 
a kind of unseen force with seen effects. In this sense, magic is not always a one-to-one 
transaction. Magic as force includes extremely disparate dynamics, from the kind of trance I 
imagine readers of Stein’s extremely abstract work entering to the kind of Black consciousness 
Baraka denotes with the power to bring about radical political and material change. For Michael 
Taussig, an important thinker behind my work, colonialism brought about a new magic, a kind of 
magic interdependent between that of the foreign priest and the indigenous one. Taussig went on 
                                               
18 Marcel Mauss, A General Theory of Magic, trans. Robert Brain (New York: Routledge, 1972), 15. 
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to theorize the “magic of the state”19 as the way that the state (the legacy of colonialism) infuses 
the dead with a magical power over the living. Amiri Baraka’s own formulation of magic as the 
life-threatening aura of white supremacy and capitalism also posits magic as a sovereign effect, 
far from the hands of the solitary witch in real time and place. (To the extent that magic may be 
an effect of sovereignty or ultimate decisive power, it bears observing—although my dissertation 
does not explore this fact—that in both Stein and Baraka’s poetics, magic represents a 
particularly masculine affect, not the feminine or feminist one we might associate with magic of 
long ago covens or more contemporary herbalists and astrologists.) 
I often invoke the term mystical in my work, and while I never intend this term as a 
synonym for magical, I do argue that there is a relationship between mystical belief, the belief in 
transcendence or animism, and the belief in Mauss’s version of magic, some unseen “force” 
establishing relationships between what Tylor would call the real and the ideal. Tylor himself 
called magic a kind of epistemic error: “mistaking an ideal for a real connexion.”20 Thus my own 
analysis of magical thinking (literally, not psychologically) interprets the magical in multiple 
ways. On the one hand, I view magic as the singular power to manifest something from nothing, 
from error, from a substitute, from a word. On the other, I see it as the more abstract power of 
certain systems of domination that depend on their subjects holding mystical beliefs. 
While I might frequently refer to magical thinking, I do so to refer to forms of thought 
that unwittingly derive from magic’s discursive legacy, or forms of thought that imbue language 
and poetry with a magical character. This meaning is related to but not the same as what 
psychologists call magical thinking:  
                                               
19 See Michael Taussig, The Magic of the State (New York: Routledge, 1997). 
20 Edward Tylor, Primitive Culture Vol. 1, 116. 
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thinking, similar to a normal stage of childhood development, in which thoughts, 
words or actions assume a magical power, and are able to prevent or cause events 
to happen without a physical action occurring; a conviction that thinking equates 
with doing, accompanied by an unrealistic understanding of cause and effect 
(Examples: dreams in children, in primitive peoples, and in Pts under various 
conditions).21 
It is particularly interesting that there was ever a need to classify, define, or pathologize this kind 
of thinking or to call it primitive. Presumably most people have experienced it. Yet it also comes 
as no surprise. Since its founding, the field of psychology has been using both non-Western 
belief systems and ancient Western narratives to devise a science of the human psyche. 
 Early psychologists and sociologists’ desire to understand the human psyche and human 
behavior in relation to a progressivist narrative led them both to lean upon the same trove of 
ethnographic texts out of which Bracken and Torgovnik theorize “savage,” primitivist discourse. 
These studies, from Frazer’s Golden Bough (1890) to Marcel Mauss’s General Theory of Magic 
(1902), represent colonial peoples’ religion through the lenses of “myth,” “magic,” and “ritual,” 
thereby setting colonial practices (and peoples) apart from Western, Christian ones called 
“history,” “prayer” and “mass.” However, while seeming to separate capital “R” religion from 
“backward” practices like magic, these writers repeatedly invoke poetry as a kind of crossroads 
between the functions of mystical belief at the world’s falsely presumed center and at its 
periphery. For example, Freud’s 1913 theory of moral ambivalence in Totem and Taboo: Some 
Points of Agreement between the Mental Lives of Savages and Neurotics is largely based on 
                                               
21 “magical thinking,” McGraw-Hill Concise Dictionary of Modern Medicine (McGraw-Hill: 2002), CREDO. It 
bears noting that even in 2002 the dictionary definition of magical thinking insists on drawing a racist parallel 
between children and “primitive peoples.” 
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anthropological accounts of Austral-Asian and South Pacific marital rituals and codes. To the 
extent that psychology grew out of historicist, progressivist assumptions about human 
development (despite regressivist tendencies), it not only privileges a hierarchy of the present 
over the past but also draws racist parallels between the childhood stage of development in the 
contemporary Westerner and adult mentality in aboriginals. This racialized conception of 
primitive, and thereby, colonial difference as a difference of maturity and knowledge comes to 
include the poet when this social science overflows into literary criticism.  
Frederick Clarke Prescott,22 a professor of English literature at Cornell from 1897-1957, 
was one of several modernist literary critics who wrote about a relationship between magic, 
poetry, and primitivity. He attempted to use both Jamesian and Freudian theories of 
consciousness to explain poetic creativity in his 1922 book, The Poetic Mind. Prescott applies 
psychology’s typologies of the primitive and the child easily to the poet. “Like the primitive man 
he is,” Prescott claims, “the child through resemblances personifies almost everything with 
which he comes into contact.”23 Examining the similarities between “the poetic mind” and “the 
primitive mind,” he articulates how the emotional and the inspirational (dream-like) qualities 
more easily found in “primitive man,” not the rational qualities found in modern man, lead to 
poetry. In drawing this connection between primitivity and poetry, he reproduces a colonial, 
racial concept of the poetic. As opposed to New Critics who aim to demystify poetry, Prescott 
wants his readers to indulge in the unknown—one not so different from Lindsay’s jungle or 
darkness—and to feel its power, a power which I claim is racialized by its magical depiction:  
                                               
22 Prescott’s scholarship has maintained relevance and popularity beyond his life, having as much of his work appear 
or be reissued in print posthumously as during his career. Mostly recently, his 1912 book Poetry and Dreams was 
reissued in 2010. 
23 Prescott, Frederick Clarke, The Poetic Mind (New York: MacMillan, 1922), 54. The Poetic Mind was re-issued in 
more editions than any other of Clarke’s many scholarly monographs. From 1922-1983, 34 English language 
editions of this book were printed. 
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There is something similarly inexplicable in the action of poetry upon the reader’s 
mind. Lovers of poetry…find a mystery in its effect. A poem, they may say, has 
charm, but the word itself suggests magic; and this test, though as good as any, 
can be applied only by the feelings, never by the reason; and it cannot be 
rationally explained.24  
I cite Prescott at the beginning of my dissertation not to portray him as an Ivy League eccentric 
but as a literary theorist steeped in the zeitgeist of his times, a theorist as obsessed with poetry as 
psycho-analysis as primitivity. Work like his prompted my initial suspicion that a larger 
conceptual relationship between race, poetry, and magic became defined in the first half of the 
twentieth century, and that this relationship needed to be decolonized. Meanwhile, Musgrove’s 
1946 article “Poetry and Magic”25 reproduces many of the same primitivist tropes mentioned 
earlier, including the hierarchical positioning of meaning below the surface of language. This 
trend in literary criticism spanning continents, oceans and decades prompts me not to examine 
poets who deal directly with primitivist reference or magical inspiration in their poetry, but to 
question how poetry is pedagogically positioned and experienced, regardless of poetic intentions, 
through assumptions about its magical, primitive grounds. 
In claiming that poetry is “racialized” through its treatment by modernist critics and 
poets, I must pause here to define what I mean by the terms “race,” “racialize/d” and “racism/t,” 
and to hopefully inspire more clarity throughout. The term “race” rarely appears in this study, 
perhaps reflecting my sense of race as a constructed concept, not a natural one, used to produce a 
hierarchized knowledge about humanity and its forms of apparent difference, a knowledge that 
                                               
24 Ibid, 1. 
25 Sydney Musgrove, “Poetry and Magic,” Australian Quarterly 18, no. 1 (March 1946): 102-114. 
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would enable a wholly unethical willingness to protect the lives of some and kill others. I use 
“racist” to describe thoughts, actions, and representations that devalue or delimit others based on 
assumptions about the meanings of race, whereas “racialized” describes thoughts, actions, or 
representations that betray the presence of race working as a concept. This study also attends to 
the way in which the black-white binary fails to help us imagine the wide, contradictory field of 
human appearance and cultural expression. These terms and their definitions matter in so far as I 
consider race always to be present conceptually in the production of knowledge throughout the 
academy, then and now.26 It is nearly impossible to think what it would take for this not to be the 
case. 
In some ways, Vachel Lindsay’s poem “Congo” seems to know that the racial binary 
won’t hold, that interdependency collapses the binary every time. He both reproduces and 
reverses the same racial hierarchy upon which the separation of the primitive from the civil 
depends. The very “BOOM” of what the speaker perceives to be the threat of magic or “hoo-
doo” in the poem is also the rhythm and touch-point that the poet desires for his own poem. 
According to the logic of appropriation, Lindsay’s poem needs the “BOOM” that isn’t of his 
time in order to succeed, to advance. While “forward progress” is his narrative arc—colonialism, 
                                               
26 For a more complete discussion than this dissertation will undertake of how race became instrumental not only to 
modern knowledge production but also to our concepts of the literary itself, see Toni Morrison, Playing in the Dark: 
Whiteness and the Literary Imagination (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992); Henry Louis Gates Jr., 
Figures in Black: Words, Signs, and the "Racial" Self  (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987); Frantz Fanon, 
Black Skin, White Masks (New York: Grove Press, 1967); Gayatri Spivak, “Race Before Racism: The 
Disappearance of the American,” boundary 2, Vol. 25, No. 2 (Summer, 1998), pp. 35-53; and Eric J. Sundquist, 
Wake the Nations: Race in the Making of American Literature (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1998). For a larger 
framing of how concepts of race structure institutions of knowledge, from the law to the academy, the following 
critical race theory texts also provide a key discursive foundation: Patricia J. Williams, “On Being the Object of 
Property,” 14 SIGNS, Vol. 5 (1988); William F. Tate, "Critical Race Theory and Education: History, Theory, and 
Implications," Review of Research in Education, Vol. 22 (1997), pp. 195–247; and Kimberly Crenshaw et al, 
Critical Race Theory: The Key Writings That Formed the Movement (New York: New Press, 1995); especially 
Kimberly Crenshaw’s “Introduction” and Jane Chong-Soon Lee’s “Race and Post-Modernism: Topologies of Race,” 
pp. 441-448. While I do not discuss the majority of these texts in this dissertation, their thinking about how race 
works conceptually grounds the kind of analysis I attempt here. 
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conversion—the last two sections of the ending make disparate claims. First, Lindsay seems to 
imagine an end to the Congo’s power though this very “progress,” figured by the river’s flow. 
After all, the appearance of the twelve Apostles, a symbol of the success of Christianization, 
makes its waters turn “GOLDEN” and results in “hoo-doo”’s dominion being done: 
Mumbo-Jumbo is dead in the jungle.  
Never again will he hoo-doo you.  
Never again will he hoo-doo you.27  
But the “never again” of hoo-doo is then concluded with a paradox of spoken silence (could we 
say a description of any poem?)  
To cry, in the silence, the Congo tune:—  
“Mumbo-Jumbo will hoo-doo you,  
“Mumbo-Jumbo will hoo-doo you.  
Mumbo ... Jumbo ... will ... hoo-doo ... you.”28 
The poem’s myriad paradoxes—the water that cuts but depends on the land for its form, the 
never again and the still going hoo-doo—act out a theory of alterity, in which being depends on 
opposition. As with Quijano’s dependency theory29 and Michael Taussig’s argument about the 
interdependence of the Christian colonizer’s salvation and the indigenous figure’s paganism,30 so 
too does Lindsay’s tired, sloping river metaphor take shape through binary’s oppositions. 
Likewise, the image’s whiteness (or golden hue) appears through the blackness surrounding it. 
The river Congo conveys cleanliness, refreshment, baptism, and salvation, slicing into the heart, 
                                               
27 Lindsay, “The Congo,” 11. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Mignolo discusses Quijano’s theory in “Delinking,” 450. 
30 See Michael Taussig, Shamanism, Colonialism, and the Wild Man: A Study in Terror and Healing, (Chicago, IL: 
University of Chicago Press, 1986). 
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the hidden, and the dark of Africa, of Congo at-large. Lindsay suspends the poet’s supposed 
linguistic voracity over  
…the well-known tunes of the parrot band 
That trilled on the bushes of that magic land.31 
Lindsay’s The Congo and Other Poems appeared in print in 1914, a year that historians 
of war and poetry alike consider the first bookend to the period called modernism, yet the work 
did not survive into the modernist canon. Popular during his time for his reading style, Lindsay 
performed “The Congo” frequently and for important audiences, including a Poetry magazine 
fundraiser hosted by publisher Harriet Monroe with W.B. Yeats and Carl Sandburg in 
attendance. Yeats and Sandburg could figure as two poles of the aesthetics we expect to find 
expressed in poetry called “modernist”—undeniable mysticism at one end, insistent realism at 
the other, and a host of wild experiments across the trek between.  
In Dead Poets, it is a teacher who attempts to give Lindsay’s “Congo” relevance. Still, in 
a November 2009 podcast, “noncanonical Congo (PoemTalk #26),”32 contemporary poet-critics 
Michelle Taransky, Charles Bernstein, and Aldon Nielsen debate the teachability of Lindsay’s 
indubitably racist poem. Some want to salvage the poem for its emphasis on performance and 
orality. (Lindsay put reading instructions in the margins.) Some think its stark contrast to New 
Critics’ desired image of Modernism marks its importance on a syllabus. They see its inclusion 
as an important reversal, or de-obscuring, of how we think modernism. Nielsen, however, insists 
that there is no “getting past” the poem’s racism in order to find some other reason to teach it, 
such as its musicality or odd form; rather, it is necessary to face the discomfort of its primitivist 
                                               
31 Lindsay, “The Congo,” 6. 
32 Al Filreis, producer, with guests Michelle Taransky, Charles Bernstein, and Aldon Nielsen, “Noncanonical 
Congo: Vachel Lindsay ‘The Congo,’” POEMTALK, https://jacket2.org/podcasts/noncanonical-congo-poemtalk-26. 
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aesthetics, he says, as a way to understand how politics and poetry intersect at this historical 
moment. Moderating their conversation, Al Fireis argues that despite the poem’s racist 
semantics, its direct engagement with race, as opposed to other modernist poetries’ evasion 
thereof, denotes its value.  
 Still, part of the suspicion guiding this dissertation is the belief that these “other” poets, 
the ones considered not to address race, nevertheless do invoke race through their experiments 
with poetic image, figure, and other tropes. To clarify, the idea that race operates in the 
epistemology of poetry is not a suspicion of mine—this study thinks through and beyond this 
idea because I take race as a ground from which these disciplines arose and the modern world 
formed, and upon which people, including the poets in this dissertation, lived. Studies focused on 
Yeatsian mysticism and the like occlude the ways in which supposedly “non-racialized” or 
“white” poetries reach beyond Eurocentric mythology and root down in exactly the primitivist 
curiosity and Afrophiliac appropriation that Lindsay bares on the surface. Through such “race-
less” sleight of hand, these accepted brands of modernist poetry define modernist whiteness 
through its seemingly innocuous abstraction and play—perhaps most apparent in Pound or 
H.D.’s imagism.  
But what about Lindsay’s primitivism barred it from the white modernist canon, or 
rather, the modernist canon that is always, already, white? Surely, it is possible that the poem’s 
obvious racism became unpalatable for critics in the post-World War II rise in consciousness 
around the need for racial integration and civil rights reform. Still, given the very un-integrated 
way in which the American literary canon continued to develop throughout the bulk of the 
twentieth century, it still feels necessary to consider the role of critics and race in shaping our 
expectations of poetry as a genre; and to ask, how did New Critics’ refusal of explicitly 
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primitivistic poetries and acceptance of other more abstract or imagistic ones effect our 
understanding of the genre’s cultural and pedagogical role? 33 How are the two poetries, the 
discarded and the studied, enmeshed in the same socio-political fabric that produces racialized 
and colonial ways of knowing? Contrary to what the critics who sideline poets like Lindsay but 
celebrate poets like Pound and Stein thought, the politics of these poetries are possibly more 
similar than not (despite their aesthetic divergence). Understandings of poetic language as an 
inherently mystical, magical phenomenon, and the manifestations of these understandings in the 
production and reception of the modernist poem force us to rethink the supposed gap between 
the canon and its ousted underlings. This study will therefore cite instances of poetry’s magic-
philia as always potentially infused with Afro- or primitive-philia due to modern colonialist 
modes of thinking about primitivity, barbarism, and linguistic function from Modernism’s 
inception and throughout the first half of the twentieth century.  
Colonial thinking, as we know from Fredric Jameson,34 also spatializes time, such that 
colonial-spatial realms become synonymous with the temporal realm of the past.  As Torgovnick 
says, the primitive functions as the trope of the child, and likewise, obsessions with colonial 
otherness overlap with anachronistic desire. Part of modernists’ failed progressivism derives in 
part from this nostalgic fascination with Victorian ideas and older ones harvested from the 
distant past—what Mignolo calls “the constant reproduction of ‘coloniality.’”35 In addition to 
this colonial dimension, Laura Doyle notes the racial bent of modernists’ obsession with the old. 
                                               
33 See Plato, Ion (380 B.C.E.), trans. Benjamin Jowett, The Internet Classics Archive, MIT, 
http://classics.mit.edu/Plato/ion.html, for his dialogue exploring the pedagogic uses of poetry, underscoring the long 
history of the lyric as a form of social reproduction and control. 
34 See Fredric Jameson, The Modernist Papers (London: Verso Books, 2007). 
35 Mignolo, 450. 
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She contends that this paradox “at the heart of racialism is also the paradox at the heart of 
modernism and modernity: its investment in the past is its ticket to the future.”36  
My references to colonialism largely point to French and British colonies held in Africa, 
the Middle East, and East Asia, what we might call their politico-geographic colonialism; and, 
perhaps more importantly, to the ethnographic studies emanating from French academia (which 
in many cases originate in the South Asia-Pacific region), what Quijano might call the 
colonialism of the imagination.37 However, this study considers the coloniality of the white and 
Eurocentric imagination, as opposed to that of the colonized, of whom Ngūgī wa Thiong’o writes 
in Decolonizing the Mind. For the purposes of considering the Euro-American (Western) 
imagination at the inception of modernism through the 1950s, I use colonial to refer to the 
effects of present or past political, economic and socio-cultural dynamics premised on an 
imperialism and its ideological assumptions about racial, gender, sexual, linguistic, and 
epistemological hierarchies.38  
I therefore approach this work through Walter Mignolo’s condition and question: "If 
coloniality is constitutive of modernity, in the sense that there cannot be modernity without 
coloniality, then the rhetoric of modernity and the logic of coloniality are also two sides of the 
same coin. How are the rhetoric of modernity and the logic of coloniality entangled together?"39 
Thus, my study frames the modernist period with rampant nineteenth-century colonialism on one 
side and widespread anti-colonial revolutions, pan-African movements, and feminist movements 
on the other. This frame, rather than modernism’s traditional one, insists on always thinking the 
                                               
36 Laura Doyle, “The Flat, the Round, and Gertrude Stein: Race and the Shape of Modern(ist) History,” 
Modernism/modernity 7, no. 2 (April 2000): 253. 
37 Aníbal Quijano, “Coloniality and Modernity/Rationality,” Cultural Studies 21, no. 2-3 (April 2007): 169. 
38 Quijano’s call for decolonizing is of nothing less than “being (gender, sexuality, subjectivity, and knowledge” in 
Mignolo, 451. 
36 Mignolo, “Delinking,” 464. 
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modern as colonial, considering the far-reaching rhetorical effects of this linking, and promoting 
its de-linking. It suggests that we decolonize the way we think about aesthetic production of this 
period, rather than simply apply the notion of post- to what is still a deeply entrenched 
epistemological structure. As Mignolo describes, “the analytic of coloniality and the 
programmatic of de-coloniality moves away and beyond the post-colonial.”40 
My opening remarks on Dead Poets Society are meant to suggest that these associations 
between poetic creativity and primitivity, though enmeshed during Modernism, persist 
nostalgically among subsequent and contemporary generations of poets and readers. Perhaps 
these desires for the past persist even more so in the face of surges in conservatism and the rise 
of an even more phantasmagoric technocracy. Furthermore, the relationship between creativity 
and magic today persists as much as the occlusion of its racial dimensions. A recent conference 
called “The Occult Humanities Conference 2017: Contemporary Art and Scholarship on the 
Esoteric Traditions” was held at the university where I teach. Sponsored by NYU’s Steinhardt 
Department of Art and Art Professions and the Phantasmaphile Society, the conference schedule 
included speakers on literary as well as visual arts, as well as the actual art of conjuring. Excited 
by the relevance of this conference to my research, I scanned the schedule, only to find that not a 
single panel would take on the political dimensions of these interlinked fields, one aesthetic, one 
spiritual, one driven by white culture makers like Leonora Carrington, the other steeped in a 
cultural anthropology stained by colonialist history. In part due to the persistence of this 
intellectual trend, I attempt in this dissertation to assess and decolonize the curious linking 
between these concepts so that we might understand the conditions that allow and maintain the 
thinking of poetry through racialized understandings of space, time, and humanity. Throughout 
                                               
40 Ibid., 452. 
                                                                                                                                                                                         23 
this study, I work to determine the possible origins of poetic “cave” scenes and to examine their 
racial underpinnings, given that such scenes, be it on screen or amidst a line in a poem, almost 
always occur in hiding, or, to be more accurate, appear without our noticing. Now is time for the 
invisible ink—the white on white signs—to become visible.  
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Chapter One 
“That Bewitched Spot”: Modernist Dialectics and the Magic of Poetry 
 
When language first entered history, its masters were already priests and sorcerers. 
 
—Adorno and Horkeimer1 
 
 Five poems with the word “witch” in the title, all written in the early part of the twentieth 
century appear in the table of contents of Library of America’s millennial anthology, American 
Poetry: The Twentieth Century, Vol. One: Henry Adams to Dorothy Parker (2000):2 James 
Weldon Johnson’s “The White Witch,” Leonora Speyer’s exclamatory “Witch!,” Robert Frost’s 
“The Witch of CoÆs,” Adelaide Crapsey’s pared down “The Witch,” and Edna St. Vincent 
Millay’s “Witch-Wife.” The witch exemplifies an outsider, a speaker in tongues, and, further, a 
gendered other. She surfaces here as a mark of magic—perhaps the poem’s own. The witch 
draws our attention to the difference between the seen and the unseen, and in the case of James 
Weldon Johnson’s poem, the unseen force embodied by the witch is racism. The speaker warns 
black readers:  
O BROTHERS mine, take care! Take care! 
The great white witch rides out to-night. 
Trust not your prowess nor your strength, 
Your only safety lies in flight; 
For in her glance there is a snare, 
And in her smile there is a blight.3 
 
                                               
1 Theodor Adorno and Max Horkeimer, “The Concept of Enlightenment,” in Dialectic of Enlightenment: 
Philosophical Fragments, ed. Gunzelin Schmid Noerr, trans. Edmund Jephcott (Stanford, Calif: Stanford University 
Press, 2002), 15. 
2 See American Poetry: The Twentieth Century, Vol. One: Henry Adams to Dorothy Parker, compiled by Robert 
Hass, John Hollander, Carolyn Kizer, Nathaniel Mackey and Marjorie Perloff (New York: Library of Congress, 
2000). 
3 James Weldon Johnson, “The White Witch,” in American Poetry: The Twentieth Century, Vol. One: Henry Adams 
to Dorothy Parker, 77. 
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 This witch will not heal black readers’ illnesses or grant their wishes, but rather, is a force to 
flee. Johnson’s poem disassembles the white witch’s danger, which is also her allure: the trap, or 
“snare,” of her eyes’ “glanc[ing]” whites, and the disease, or “blight,” of the white teeth that 
flash in her “smile.” Danger might otherwise pass unseen under this enticing white glare. 
 The witch’s whiteness is monstrous: constructed and cruel. A scene of utter domination, 
barely escaped, ensues:  
My body like a living coal; 
Obeyed the power of those eyes 
As the needle trembles to the pole; 
And did not care although I felt 
The strength go ebbing from my soul.4 
 
The speaker’s own body, rendered black but alive and consumable, “a living coal,” becomes 
bound to “the pole,” at once the magnetic end of earth’s axis and an instrument of subjection. 
Then weakness and apathy comes: he “did not care.” We might say the white witch is out 
thieving black will. Nevertheless, the speaker’s strength, the will to act or care, gets revealed 
later in the poem as something primal:  
She feels the old Antaean strength 
In you, the great dynamic beat  
Of primal passions.5 
 
This “primal” strangely reverberates across two skins—one Herculean, or Greek, and one that is 
“you,” the presumably black “brothers” Johnson addresses. What has the modern witch come 
for? The “great white witch” might not be out riding to murder, like the Ku Klux Klan, but her 
magical power, despite being an ancient “white” one, can only thrive by thieving and 
                                               
4 Ibid. 
5 Ibid. 
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accumulating blackness. In this sense, I cite Johnson’s poem as instantiating a theory6 at the 
heart of this dissertation: that white modernist concepts of magic arise from a racial, colonialist 
view of the world. 
 “The White Witch” first appeared in the 1922 Book of American Negro Poetry, an 
anthology which Johnson himself edited. W.E.B. DuBois’s Dark Water, issued two years 
previously, works with a similar trope, racializing evil as white. In the section called “Souls of 
White Folk,” DuBois criticizes the vast failure of Christianity, “white folk’s” religion: “We have 
seen, —Merciful God! In these wild days and in the name of Civilization, Justice, and 
Motherhood,—what we have not seen, right here in America, of orgy, cruelty, barbarism, and 
murder done to men and women of Negro descent.”7 Speaking paradoxically of seeing the 
unseen, the “wilder, fiercer violence”8 perpetrated by whites against blacks in America, DuBois 
implies a ghostliness, or witchiness, in the mechanisms of whiteness and racism. Calling “white” 
morality barbaric and licentious, DuBois, like later critics C.L.R. James and Theodor Adorno, 
attempts to deconstruct the primitive-civilized binary. It need not matter whether DuBois or 
Johnson wrote at the same time, or if one influenced the other. What matters is that they both 
feature and eschew the magical and the mystical—unseen forces—while also employing tropes 
of whiteness and barbarism to critique racism. Still, what to make of the magical figure in these 
poems, or contemporaneous writings with primitivistic lexicons but less obviously racialized 
audiences? Despite how easy it seems to interpret Johnson’s political narrative, how do 
invocations of magic in other poetries and theories of poetry produce the appropriative white 
                                               
6 Recognizing Johnson’s attunement to the role of the black-white binary in the metaphor of magic, and his 
implication here that whites appropriate black power, adds critical irony to his own 1920 rewriting of the Biblical 
story of creation.  
7 W.E.B. DuBois, “The Souls of White Folk: The Riddle of the Sphix,” in Dark Water (New York: Cosimo Classics, 
2007), 24 
8 Ibid. 
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aesthetic that comes to exemplify modernism? As Johnson warns, the white-witch-effect might 
seem innocuous but is far from it. 
In disparate strokes, this chapter attempts to explore the contentious place of magic (and 
its practitioners) in poetry and the racial politics surrounding its invocation. It further asks how 
the Anglo-American lyric tradition came to presume magic, poetry and primitivity to be 
interrelated, and how that relationship became fundamental to a concept of post-war renewal in 
the 1920s and 30s and again in the late 1940s. Moreover, this exploration of magic and poetry 
focuses not on magic as the content of a poem, for as Johnson’s poem shows, the invocation of 
magic, is rarely in and of itself just that. This chapter then centers on the production of 
knowledge about poetry, the thinking of poetry as a genre in the late nineteenth to the mid-
twentieth centuries. In doing so, I offer one possible framing of a long nineteenth century9 that 
traces the production of colonial anthropology in the late nineteenth century, to its mechanization 
in early twentieth-century poetics, to the criticism of this ideology in the wake of World War II. 
Twice during this period, after both World Wars, the desire to cure war’s social ills, isolation and 
shock, fortifies what I consider an appropriative, primitivistic poetic practice and theory. While 
cultural critics speak against poetic mysticism and offer instead a new materialism, their critique 
of magic largely seems to rest on its inability to work dialectically, or through clear oppositions. 
It seems possible, therefore, that poetry filtered through concurrent beliefs about magic might 
offer shell-shocked readers a way of sensing and knowing anew, albeit of old. And still, this 
                                               
9 Eric Hobswan’s original invocation of this term was meant to refer to the impact of Marx’s thinking on the way we 
can understand historical development from the French Revolution to the “age of empire.” See his historical trilogy: 
The Age of Revolution: Europe 1789–1848 (1962); The Age of Capital: 1848–1875 (1975); and, The Age of Empire: 
1875–1914 (1987). However, this use of the term stems more from efforts among scholars of American, critical 
race, and post-colonial studies to map concepts of race and capital that originate in the nineteenth century but 
continue to operate in entrenched fashion for much of the twentieth century, and even today.  
                                                                                                                                                                                         28 
modernist belief in poetry’s reparative new-old power proves to be laden with racialized 
thinking. 
 
Hacking the Jungle’s Canon 
Johnson’s 1922 Book of American Negro Poetry10 as much works as evidence of a thing 
called “American Negro Poetry,” as it does, like other anthologies, buttress (or dismantle) what 
we know to be the genre of poetry. There were countless poetry anthologies published during 
this time. In Johnson’s anthology, his own poem “White Witch” and others point to the role of 
ideas about magic and primitivity in both the evolution of poetry as a genre and its formation as a 
field of study. Le Gallienne Book of English and American Poetry11 from 1935, another 
formative anthology, included known popular poems like Vachel Lindsay’s “Congo” as well as 
lesser known but just as exotically driven ones like Edna Matilda Thomas’s “Evoe!”12 In these 
anthologies, the Greek obsessed, the nature seeking, and magic wands abound. Out of such 
books as Le Gallienne’s, but not Johnson’s, New Critics like Cleanth Brooks and Robert Penn 
Warren began to carve the canon of poetry that would come to be called “modernist.” In 1938, 
just three years after Le Gallienne’s collection of American verse appeared, Brooks and Warren 
published their first edition of Understanding Poetry.13 The simple title achieves a great deal of 
work in establishing poetry as not merely a genre but a specialized field of study, a body of 
knowledge, a mysterious but teachable system, one that begs us to figure it out, clue by clue. We 
                                               
10 The Book of American Negro Poetry, ed. James Weldon Johnson (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and Co., 1922). 
See Johnson’s preface, in which he offers his theory of African-American creative genius. 
11 Le Gallienne Book of English and American Poetry, ed. Richard Le Gallienne (Garden City, NY: Garden City 
Publishing Company, 1935). 
12 Evoe is an archaic exclamatory term referring to Bacchic frenzy. 
13 Cleanth Brooks and Robert P. Warren, Understanding Poetry: An Anthology for College Students (New York: H. 
Holt and Co, 1938). 
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might ask what about poetry’s subject matter, method, or feeling made the critics want to tame it. 
Or further, we could ask, what is the relationship between the association of poetry with magic 
and the rise of a literary methodology determined to explain the unexplainable, to simplify the 
difficult? And how is such a methodology and discipline always imbued by the ground of 
racialization from which it arises? To put it another way, what does race have to do with the new 
science of poetry? 
New Criticism’s hermeneutic stance has since been criticized by various schools of 
poets—from confessional to conceptual—and recent critics have attuned to the politics 
underlying a hyper-rational approach to literary interpretation.14 Despite this backlash, the New 
Critical method of approaching poetry as an object to be known and deduced through close, 
detective-like reading remains the dominant way that we teach students to interpret poetry today 
(and still my own knee-jerk method for analyzing poetry). Understanding Poetry offers a now-
familiar taxonomy of the poem with sections titled “Narrative Poems,” “Descriptive Poems,” 
“Metrics,” “Tone,” “Imagery,” and “Theme.” Despite their titular aim to understand poetry and 
to do so as empirically as possible, Brooks and Warren ironically begin by emphasizing the 
impractical nature of not just poetic speech but speech in general. They seek to illustrate how 
poetry appears in the structures of ordinary language. (Concurrent theorists of the lyric, from 
Adorno to Jakobson, espoused similar ideas.) Brooks and Warren portray this lyric invasion into 
daily speech as language’s own will or doing, but I understand their representation of this kind of 
linguistic “passion” as already racially coded as “black” and “primal,” and further, I contend that 
this racialized perspective on the character of poetry is the end-product of decades of colonialist 
                                               
14 See Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, “Paranoid Reading and Reparative Reading, or, You’re so Paranoid, You Probably 
Think This Essay is About You,” Touching Feeling (Chapel Hill, NC: Duke University Press, 2003), 123-151, for 
her critique of performing criticism through a hermeneutics of suspicion and her counter-theory of reparative 
reading. 
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representations of magic as poetry. I am curious to what extent an epistemological anxiety—
which is always also a racial anxiety, be it utter disenchantment or honest confusion in a post-
war colonized world—drives this modernist sense of poetic speech.   
 In the preamble to their “Introduction,” Brooks and Warren analyze a “scientific 
statement,” to expose how poetic device infects even the most objective statement of a scientist, 
the Nobel prize-winning physicist, Robert Andrews Millikan:  
For sentimental pacifism is, after all, but a return to the method of the jungle. It is 
in the jungle that emotionalism alone determines conduct, and wherever that is 
true no other than the law of the jungle is possible.15 
Brooks and Warren quickly point out the ironically non-scientific nature of Millikan’s speech 
due to its reliance on metaphor; however, their choice of a statement riven with primitivist 
sentiment, its play on “the jungle,” implies that the sentence’s lack of objectivity is a product not 
just of its reliance on metaphor but the fact that it portrays emotional conduct through racial 
metaphor. A contemporary reader easily notices this metaphor’s primitivism, but the authors, 
rather than speak to this trope, note how word-pairs like “pacifism” and “sentimentalism” make 
meaning. 
 Ultimately, Brooks and Warren show that the poetic “something of most ordinary 
communications involves feelings,” not rationality, though it takes a rational approach to parse 
this kind of “jungle-ish” communication.16 Brooks and Warren rationalize poetry by codifying 
this exaggerated feeling as that which distinguishes poetic speech from ordinary speech. The 
unavoidability of poetic speech inside ordinary speech, as evidenced for them by “jungle” 
emotion, shows how, at the peak of poetry’s formation as a discipline, thinking the feeling of 
                                               
15 Brooks and Warren, Understanding Poetry, 2-3. 
16 Ibid., 5. 
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poetry required simultaneously imagining its supposed primal roots. These modernist critical 
approaches, and founding approaches to poetry as a product of university study, mystify poetry 
in two ways. First, it is mystified for being un-decipherable, then for being special, emotional, 
primitive, and magical. 
Brooks and Warren’s mystification of linguistic art was hardly new. New Critics’ belief 
in the poetic text’s autochthonous ability to make meaning echoes their contemporaries’ 
perspectives on the occult nature of poetry. However, I take issue with the object and 
methodology called Understanding Poetry for behaving like a social science while calling itself 
literary criticism, and for not acknowledging its borrowings from other disciplines, ones more 
obviously imbued with a racialized, colonial approach to knowledge-making. This chapter’s 
attempt to reckon interdisciplinarily with the formation of the discipline of poetry, amidst the 
formation of the social sciences, leads me to read both across disciplines and time to understand 
the effects of this space of the “jungle,” this imagined colonial elsewhere, on how we ever try to 
or do understand poetry: hacking away at a tangle of wild branches or somehow else. Reading 
across these lines is an unavoidably messy approach. But this chapter proceeds with the 
conviction that such messiness allows for the possibility of new perceptions and ideas. This 
itinerant reading led me to many earlier anthropological and ethnographic texts that understand 
and represent not only this primitive space, but also the magical rituals that gave it shape, and 
suggest that this space, and these rituals, became intertwined with American and European 
thinking about poetry. Ultimately, I will demonstrate how early twentieth-century attempts to 
canonize and study modernist poetry construct not only a sense of the poetic as magical, but also 
a belief that this deposed, anarchic cultural framework, revived through poetry, could heal the 
effects of living in a modern “wasteland.”  Of course, Johnson and DuBois would not, could not, 
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share this belief in poetic witchery. They were too keenly already aware of the perils of 
abstraction—the unseen ideology of race having wreaked tragic, visible havoc. 
 
Ethnography’s Leaks 
 Primitivist aesthetics subsumed the cutting edge of white elite circles that surrounded 
intellectual and creative figures like H.D. and Walter Benjamin in his brief but later years. While 
arguably much of the mysticism and spiritualism that fueled modernism drew inspiration, like 
Robert Graves’s The White Goddess,17 from local mythologies and the history of European 
paganism, the prevalence of magic in modernist aesthetics and thought must also be viewed in 
relation to colonialist primitivism. The flow of ethnographic studies of European colonies during 
the second half of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries produced a racialized concept of 
magic, one that treats magic as a mysterious other under the gaze of an ethnographic one. Early 
ethnographies produced during the period focus on systems of religion and language, 
predominately in colonial territories. These ethnographies circulated around departments like 
philosophy, psychology, sociology and linguistics, influencing scholars and critics,18 even 
serving as useable evidence at times for new theories and methodologies.19 Furthermore, many 
of these early ethnographers and anthropologists, from Edward Tylor to Marcel Mauss to James 
Frazer and Bronislaw Malinowski, repeatedly recognize something like poetry in the uses of 
language within religious ritual. The frame for observing rituals as poetic seems to stem from the 
ethnographers’ European understandings of lyric, not from the aesthetic or cultural frame of the 
                                               
17 See Robert Graves’s The White Goddess (New York: Creative Age Press, 1948) for his discussion of the magical 
and regressive roots of poetry.  He writes that “poetry, since it defies scientific analysis, must be rooted in some sort 
of magic, and that magic is disreputable” (3). 
18 This academic influence would come to include post-structuralism which would then undoubtedly, and ironically, 
provide the grounds for certain post-colonial theories. 
19 See Sigmund Freud, Totem and Taboo (New York: Dover Publications, 1998), for his theorization of moral 
ambivalence on the basis of ethnographic accounts of Austral-Asian totemic rules of marriage. 
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subjects observed—in other words, the outside pushed in. However, this qualification does 
nothing to explain why turn-of-the-century cultural recorders and synthesizers coded magical rite 
as poetry. What, we might ask, drove the theorizing of magic as akin to poetry or this recognition 
of the literary in the ritualistic? What would this interrelationship afford their mainly white, 
European, modern readers? 
Both Marcel Mauss and Edward Tylor’s anthropological writings help us to question how 
these correspondences signify for modernist critics and poets. They also show how reading 
cross-disciplinarily helps us to understand thinking on magic and poetry in the years leading up 
to modernism. Tylor and Mauss wrote concurrently with global colonization reaching its apex 
and social sciences arising in universities. This overlapping Victorian historical context makes it 
productive to consider the period’s literary production against this background of ethnography 
and anthropology. Magic became elemental to modern aesthetic practice and poetry criticism 
through these scholars’ simultaneous description, racialization, and classification of colonial 
cultures and their theorization of an unbroken trans-spatial, trans-temporal humanism. 
 Sociologist and anthropologist Marcel Mauss was born in 1872 into a family of social 
scientists. Most notable is his uncle Émile Durkeim.20 Mauss became known for his work on 
gift-exchange, which he conducted after earlier studies of primitive religion, mainly of sacrificial 
rituals and magic. In Mauss’s 1902 A General Theory of Magic, a book exemplary of early 
anthropology, he draws from a mix of ethnographic accounts of Australian, Hindu, and ancient 
Greek cultures, among others, and, in doing so, universalizes the concept of magic despite 
                                               
20 Émile Durkeim (1858-1917), is easily considered a founder of sociology. He taught at the College Normal in Paris 
and authored Les Règles de la méthode sociologique (The Rules of Sociological Method) in 1895, establishing 
sociological methodology, and separating sociology’s interest in rational analysis of observable patterns, different 
from anthropology’s emphasis on observation-driven fieldwork. 
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drawing most of his evidence from colonized realms. By describing the uses of language in 
magical practice, Mauss both connects the idea of magic to that of poetry and eerily predicts 
particular aesthetic markers of poetic experiment in later decades. He insists that “all magic is 
formulaic,” whether it has to do with numeric structures, “[n]ot any number of times, but 
according to sacred and magical numbers,” or certain forms of “archaisms and strange and 
incomprehensible terms.”21 Mauss calls verbal rites “merely an automatic action,”22 like one of 
William James’s writing experiments. While this emphasis on not only formulaic but also 
automatic repetitions reminds us of Joyce or Stein, the near requirement for anarchic twists 
points to Pound and Eliot’s eclectic poetic ethos. Mauss intensifies the correspondence between 
magic and poetry by noting its use of compression: “[I]t is more common for [spells] to shrink in 
size: the onomatopoeic muttering of a phrase, the naming of a person involved.”23 Through 
excessive repetition, even words that mean via their sounds (onomatopoeic ones) may be 
muttered until “the names themselves become unrecognizable.” The prevalent role of names in 
spells, and their curious power in relation to a world of things, resounds clearly in Poundian 
Imagist proclamations and Williams’s concurrent “no ideas but in things.”24  
Mauss seeks a structure, a science, in magic, not unlike the structure New Critics seek in 
the poem. He finds it in the omnipresence of language, be it spoken, written, or merely thought. 
“[T]here is no such thing as a wordless ritual,” Mauss states, while admitting that “an apparent 
silence does not mean that inaudible incantations expressing the magician’s will are not being 
                                               
21 Marcel Mauss, A General Theory of Magic, trans. Robert Brain (New York: Routledge, 1972), 71-72. Mauss 
originally published this work in collaboration with Henri Hubert in Anné sociologique in 1902. 
22 Mauss, 70. 
23 Ibid. 
24 See William Carlos Williams, Paterson (New York: New Directions, 1995), 6, in “Book I,” where he writes, “Say 
it, no ideas but in things— / nothing but the blank faces of the houses / and cylindrical trees / bent, forked by / 
preconception and accident.” 
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made.”25 Importantly, when introducing “spells,” Mauss clarifies, “we do not wish to imply by 
this that it is the only kind of verbal ritual26 in magic,” and further, that “verbal magic…is 
extremely differentiated.”27 This differentiation is critical to Mauss’s proto-structuralist project. 
The prologue begins: “Up to now, the history of religion has consisted of a blurred bundle of 
ideas.”28 Mauss proceeds to explain this disorganization as a product of the lack of “scientific 
terminology” for an anthropology of religion, claiming that “our aim is not only to define words, 
but to set up natural classes of facts”—a crystal-clear proposal to make a science, or a discipline, 
of religion, including magic.29 Curiously, lacking a scientific terminology for magic, Mauss 
turned to a literary one.30 
Despite Mausss’s interest in organizing and defining the knowledge of religion, he 
refuses to offer his reader a finite definition of magic and, in effect, leans heavily on the titular 
“general” and the vagaries of systemic analysis. He calls magic: 
one of those collective customs which cannot be named, described, analysed 
without the fear that one may lose the feeling that they have any reality, form or 
function of their own. Magic is an institution only in the most weak sense; it is a 
kind of totality of actions and beliefs, poorly defined, poorly organized even as far 
as those who practise it and believe in it are concerned…the interest lies in the 
                                               
25 Mauss, 71. 
26 Bronislaw Malinowski, a field-altering expeditionary anthropologist trained by Mauss, details the structure of 
word rituals, or spells, in his Argonauts of the West Pacific (New York: Routledge, 2014, orig. pub. 1922). 
27 Mauss, 67. 
28 Ibid., 9. 
29 The early rumblings of structuralism echoed in these statements reflect noted structuralist and sociologist Émile 
Durkeim’s influence on his student, Marcel Mauss. (Durkeim later would also play a major role in Lévi-Strauss’s 
The Savage Mind (1965).) Mauss also sat in Saussure’s General Course in Linguistics, a foundational series of 
events in the formation of structuralism.  
30 In The Savage Mind, Lévi-Strauss parallels the magician to the bricoleur, or the collage maker.  The magician is 
also one who practices a science of the concrete, of naming. Definite parallels to Mauss’s work on magic exist in 
Savage Mind. 
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beliefs involved in magic, the feelings it provokes and the agents who perform 
it.31 
He emphasizes the behavior of the group instead: “collective customs,” “a kind of totality,” 
“poorly organized.” He also asserts his interest in “beliefs” and “agents,” not facts and 
phenomena. Similarly, my study is concerned less with defining magic than with understanding 
people’s implicit or explicit beliefs about it. In focusing on the agents and believers, he parallels 
the way language depends on social consensus to the way magic works: “And just as words have 
only a distant relationship, or none at all, with the things they describe, between a magical sign 
and the object signified we have very close but very unreal relations—of number, sex or image, 
qualities which in general are quite imaginary, but imagined by a society as a whole.”32 
Mauss fashions a social theory of magic, positing magic as a social system dependent on 
a collective imagination. This social dimension of magic produces immense opportunity for 
collective action: “The whole social body comes alive with the same movement. They all 
become, in a manner of speaking, parts of a machine or, better, spokes of a wheel.”33 The 
mechanistic portrayal of ritual participants, ones who move as if in a trance, seems at once 
extraordinary and ordinary to Mauss. The individual practicing magic appears ambivalent; a 
contemporary magician “is no longer himself,” and at the same time, “magic has tried to cast off 
all collective aspects…it is exploited only by individuals.”34 It seems that Mauss points to magic 
as both a site of opportunity in his fin-de-siècle moment and a site of caution. His analysis of 
magic’s dependence on collective participation sounds both like a theory of mass political 
                                               
31 Mauss, 13. 
32 Ibid., 97-98. 
33 Ibid., 163. 
34 Ibid., 173. 
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consciousness and a warning against bestowing this consciousness too easily on the wrong 
magician.  
Mauss confers upon verbal magic a medicinal power in addition to its social 
ramifications. He categorizes poetic tropes like naming, punning, description, and onomatopoeia 
as “sympathetic magical rites.”35 Mauss uses this language of sympathy and contagion to link the 
magical and the poetic to prevalent understandings of the nervous system and disease. The 
medicinal effect of magic happens through naming: 
It is only a matter of naming the actions or things in order to bring about a 
sympathetic reaction. In a medical spell or in a rite of exorcization, play is made 
on words like “withdraw,” “reject,” words for illness itself or the demon 
responsible for the evil. Puns and onomatopoeic phrases are among the many 
ways of combating sickness verbally through sympathetic magic…[including] the 
mere description of a corresponding non-verbal rite.36 
This description of medicinal rite’s word play bears a striking similarity to poetic experiment. 
Poetic language appears embodied and “combati[ve].” Certain sounds or tropes might literally 
expel disease. Mauss’s use of a “poetry-rich” lexicon to analyze medicinal rites lays a certain 
groundwork for the ways in which I attempt in to understand both the belief in poetry as 
reparative and the ways that this belief gets practiced, theorized, and critiqued.  
 Mauss’s inclination to develop a social theory based on anthropological studies and even 
to define magic through poetry harkens after his British predecessor, the founding social 
anthropologist Edward Tylor (1832-1917). Perhaps the first anthropologist to triangulate poetry, 
                                               
35 Ibid., 68. 
36 Ibid. 
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magic, and primitivity, Tylor is most known for his long, two-volume study, Primitive Culture,37 
an evolutionist, universalist study of animism. Tylor uses a Darwinian, developmental model to 
theorize modern culture’s derivation from primitive roots. Like Mauss, he depicts culture’s 
evolution as one organic system by reorganizing, remixing and restating diverse ethnographic 
reports on colonialized cultural groups along with historical and mythological accounts of 
European antiquity. Tylor teaches his readers to see contemporary culture and ideology as having 
evolved, in stages, from its primeval roots to the present day. However, different from Darwin’s 
“tree of life” or Plato’s “great chain of being,” Tylor refers to a “general scheme of knowledge,” 
an intellectual map that begins with the primitive, not the person, with the history of ideas, not 
creatures. 
 Tylor’s thinking relies on a historicist ideology of development, similar to that which 
motivated Marxist and Darwinian thinkers, a progressive ideology that hierarchizes Western 
ways of knowing and sensing over others. He invents the term “survivals” to name the 
phenomena that conjoin his present to a primitive past. Tylor’s neologism eschews Darwin’s 
sartorial term “vestige,” preferring the more valorous “survival.” Tylor’s theory of survivals 
attempts to rationalize the relationship between primitivity and modernity, and, perhaps, to shock 
readers with the persistence of these “rude,” undefeatable remnants of their own past.38 Tylor 
depicts these lowly survivals as nonetheless forceful and steadfast, as “opinions belonging 
                                               
37 Sir Edward Burnett Tylor, Primitive Culture: Researches Into the Development of Mythology, Philosophy, 
Religion, Language, Art, and Custom, vols. 1 and 2 (London: Murray, 1871). The large focus of this collection is to 
aggregate and analyze the structures of belief in and practice of animism and to theorize its cultural role over time. 
38 See Laura Doyle, “The Flat, the Round, and Gertrude Stein: Race and the Shape of Modern(ist) History,” 
Modernism/modernity 7, no. 2 (April 2000) for her discussion of how not just Victorians, but also (and perhaps 
ironically) modernists clung to the idea that their very future and innovation depended on their nostalgic attachments 
to a concept of the far past. 
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properly to lower intellectual levels, which have held their place into the higher by mere force of 
ancestral tradition.”39  
 Unsurprisingly, Tylor first locates the survival in language and, more importantly, in its 
metaphoric, poetic function. Using language as his primary exhibit of how survivals work, he 
asks rhetorically, “[I]s not a pregnant consideration that the language of civilized men is but the 
language of savages, more or less improved in structure, a good deal extended in vocabulary, 
[and] made more precise in the dictionary definition of words?”40 While Tylor claims that 
contemporary language offers increased variety and precision, his primary point, that civilized 
and “savage” languages are “more or less” the same, rests on language’s synonymously poetic 
and defective function: metaphor.  In Tylor’s opinion, “the vast defect of language as a method 
of utterance” then and now is due to “the fact that speech is a scheme worked out by the rough 
and ready application of material metaphor and imperfect analogy, in ways fitting rather the 
barbaric education of those who formed it, than our own.”41 Tylor critiques language’s failure 
due to its dependence on material comparisons, or metaphoric references, and he further roots 
this failure in its “barbaric” inventors. Tylor strangely casts metaphor as both a failure and a 
survival against the forward prerogative of development. His treatment of metaphor opposes 
philosophy’s traditional view of metaphor as complex and curious for how it skirts away from, 
withholds, and transforms the meaning of words. Certainly, modernists took pleasure in 
amplifying the distance (between words and meaning) that a metaphor could manage.42 
Metaphor’s persistent rudeness, or imperfection, leads Tylor to judge even contemporary poetry 
                                               
39 Tylor, Primitive Culture Vol. 2, 403. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Ibid., 403-404. 
42 Edouard Glissant’s theory of a poetics of distancing speaks to the negotiation across time and space that poetry of 
the colonized or the anti-colonial speaker might effect. This distancing disrupts meaning-making both in the text and 
in the reader’s imagination of the speaker’s identity. It would also disrupt the racially essentializing premise of 
Tylor’s high and low categories of culture. See Poetics of Relation (1997). 
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for being “too little beyond the savage stage…still as it were hacking with stone celts and 
twirling laborious friction-fire.”43 The final image of Stone Age man making fire from friction (a 
kind of mana, or something from nothing) drags the poetic temporally backward toward both the 
incomprehensible and the magical. 
 While it is easy to critique Tylor’s bias anachronistically, his use of poetry to explain the 
savage and the animistic offers a crucial foundation for this study’s query into the forces that 
structure the conceptual relationship between race, magic and poetry. For Tylor, language’s 
figurative or comparative function reflects our most base nature. Due to the similar ways in 
which subsequent anthropologists like Mauss or literary critics like Brooks and Warren continue 
to think about figurative language as both magical and primitive, it is crucial to delve deeply into 
Tylor’s albeit antique and distant (he’s neither poet nor critic) theory of metaphor. 
 Tylor confusedly celebrates and debases the figure of the savage in his discussion of 
poetic language. In one turn, he writes, “Language, appearing as an art in full vigour among rude 
tribes, already displays the adaptation of childlike devices in self-expressive sound and pictorial 
metaphor, to utter thoughts as complex and abstruse as savage minds demand speech for” (403). 
Tylor’s qualification of metaphor and onomatopoeia, or “self-expressive sound,” as “childlike,” 
and his close placement of “complex” and “abstruse” next to “savage,” point to the narrow 
confines into which his contradictory use of the primitive draws him (surely, the invention of fire 
blurs any attempt to divide the miraculous from the material). How can rudimentary language be 
childlike and complex, pictorial and abstruse? Or is it that Tylor points to language as a site of 
intellectual evolution independent of biology, that language develops into a sophisticated form, 
despite its “rude” users? It is as if resorting to poetic gesture—pictorial, metaphoric, 
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onomatopoeic, or mimetic speech—is evidence not even of language’s backwards “jungle” state 
but of the speaker’s own primitivity.  
 Tylor continues to link poetry and savagery while his analysis straddles the long past 
classical “primitive” and the trans-temporal primitive of the present day. Tylor’s blurring 
movement, or indecision, suggests that the root of linguistic wildness resides in between these 
temporalities of past and present, both in myth and in the ongoingness of “savage thought.” 
Poetry is pudding proof of this ongoing “weaker” expression: 
In so far as myth, seriously or sportively meant, is the subject of poetry, and in so 
far as it is couched in language whose characteristic is that wild and rambling 
metaphor which represents the habitual expression of savage thought, the mental 
condition of the lower races is key to poetry—nor is it a small portion of the 
poetic realm which these definitions cover.44 
Tylor sets “the mental condition of lower races” equivalent to the mental condition of poetry. By 
calling this state of mind “lower” and separating it by “race,” he invokes and demotes colonized 
peoples for their “wild” yet “habitual” poetic language. Simultaneously, he deems poetry a 
vestige, a remaining track, a fossil, perhaps, of the beginning of language. Tylor paints poetry not 
as evidence of sophisticated development, but rather as a crude element that persists despite 
evolution; a pinky toe, you could say. 
 What we must take from Tylor’s position on the poetic quality of root language is his 
interrelation of this original speech and the savage, the “lower races,” the colonial other, and the 
“wild.” These categories reflect the various ethnographic sources from which both he and Mauss 
wrote. While Tylor seals poetry and primitivity in relationship, Mauss adds magic to this mix, 
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and further raises questions about the social and aesthetic reasons why people at the start of the 
twentieth century may have craved magical poetry—not just for kicks, but perhaps for a cure. 
Both of these texts highlight the conceptual co-constitution of poetry, magic, and race, and also 
lead us to question the ethical ramifications of early twentieth-century poets’ appropriation, 
practice, and co-theorization of these ideas, be they in the hands of Vachel Lindsay or James 
Weldon Johnson. Particularly, what happens when this vestige, poetic language, becomes a 
crucial site of inquiry for those seeking a solution to post-war isolation? 
 
Antidotal Poem 
 Sydney Musgrove,45 an Australian literary critic, not only carries forward Victorian ideas 
like Tylor’s about the primitivity of poetry, but he also seems to believe that poetry’s magic is 
exactly its ability to offer a social cure to post-war readers. Musgrove begins his 1946 essay 
“Poetry and Magic,”46 much as I might have begun this chapter if I were constructing not 
deconstructing poetry and magic’s relationship:  
The object of this paper is to examine the link between poetry and magic. These 
two activities are among the oldest practised by mankind, and the existence of a 
connection is apparent even on a superficial view. When one considers the 
essentially irrational nature of each, the use of rhythm as an organic component in 
each, the similarity of the relationship of rhapsode and shaman to their respective 
audiences, one feels no surprise that the Romans used the same word—vates—for 
both "seer" and "poet." The connection is clear enough at a primitive cultural 
                                               
45 Sydney Musgrove (1914-1987) was originally from Australia, completed his DPhil. at Oxford, taught in Scotland 
and Australia before settling in New Zealand at the University of Auckland. He authored two major monographs in 
his career, T.S. Eliot and Whitman (1952) and Shakespeare and Jonson (1957). 
46 Sydney Musgrove, “Poetry and Magic,” Australian Quarterly 18, no. 1 (March 1946): 102-114. 
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level; but I wish to suggest that, even on the highest levels of Western civilisation, 
magic in one form or another has been present as a force operating just beneath 
the surface of things and exerting a profound influence on poetry. All poets, in 
some sense, have "drunk the milk of Paradise."47 
Throughout passages like this one, Musgrove simultaneously theorizes magic and poetry’s 
relationship and reproduces a racialized Victorian ideology about both. His hierarchized 
depiction of culture comes as “no surprise” to a post-theory reader today, but what remains 
curious is his swift movement from the parallelism of poetry and magic to his rendition of 
cultural levels. The proximity of Musgrove’s placing “Western civilization” over “a primitive 
cultural level” to his describing magic as “operating just below the surface” of material reality, 
“things,” and language, compels us to ask how these hierarchies relate. Lacanian and structuralist 
theorists have argued how meaning (not just magic) gets ranked beneath the word;48 furthermore, 
critical race theorists like Henry Louis Gates have followed that notions of race itself are 
embedded within such linguistic, structural hierarchies as well as figures of speech.49 Looking 
back to Musgrove’s summary and suspiciously paradisiacal, milky landing, it is hard not to 
notice that even at the “highest level,” the primitive, magical, and poetic meaning is made to play 
bottom. This generic focus on poetry, not literature generally, also raises the question of how 
genre relates to magic’s low ranking. Musgrove’s pun risks not only racial othering and 
demeaning but also generic demotion. In thinking genre and genus, or poetry and race, together, 
such forms of categorization reveal themselves as always both aesthetic and bio-political. 
                                               
47 Musgrove, 102. 
48 See Jacques Lacan’s Écrits, trans. Alan Sheridan (London: Routledge, 1977), 154, for his discussion of how the 
signified slips beneath the signifier. 
49 See Henry Louis Gates, “The ‘Blackness of Blackness’: A Critique of the Sign in the Signifying Monkey,” in 
Figures in Black: Words, Signs, and the "Racial" Self (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), 235-276, for his 
discussion of how blackness becomes synonymous with language’s figurality. 
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 Musgrove was a vanguard of interdisciplinary and cross-regional study, work that would 
connect seemingly separate literary phenomena. He is most known beyond his Australian-New 
Zealand roots as the writer of T.S. Eliot and Whitman (1952), a cross-Atlantic, cross-period study 
that deeply affected such subsequent “crossings” and pairings in Anglo-American scholarship. 
Eliot and Whitman’s shared position as poet-catalogers of war’s destruction—be it physical or 
conceptual—makes “war” the missing keyword in his title “Poetry and Magic.” Musgrove, who 
taught classics, Shakespeare, and modern poetry at University of Auckland, represents not a 
random mid-twentieth century literary critic theorizing magic as linked to poetry, but a key 
indicator of the globalist intellectualism of his time. His literal proximity to the Austral-Asian50 
realm also stands out, as this region was elemental to the endless ethnographic studies on 
primitivity repurposed by Tylor and Mauss.  
 Musgrove’s essay figures significantly for this chapter’s inquiry into magic, poetry and 
primitivity, both for suggesting that the magical quality of poetry could help cure the lost 
generation and for how he justifies this argument. He demonstrates first how poetry resists logic 
(recall Brooks and Warren’s similar belief in the impulsive qualities of poetic speech), and 
second how it combats what he calls social “separation.” He works through James Frazer’s 
classic concept of sympathetic magic, wherein “like produces like” and symbolic correspondence 
gains a medicinal potency; but Mugrove’s interest in magic and poetry extends beyond sympathy 
into what he calls magic’s participatory requisite.51 Participation, for Musgrove, has a double 
                                               
50 The postcolonial framing for this project makes the inclusion of an Australian critic entirely apropos not only as 
evidence of the globalization of English-American literary study but also due to the Asia-Pacific region’s central 
role in the production of racial knowledge during this time period both as the object of ethnographic and aesthetic 
fascination as well as a space of resistive exchange, contacts, and aesthetic counter-production. It is also necessary 
to note the persistence of an American colonial-military-industrial-trade presence throughout the region today. 
51 See Walter Benjamin, “Antitheses Concerning Word and Name,” in Selected Writings Vol. 2, ed. Michael 
Jennings et al., trans. Edmund Jephcott et al. (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 2005), 717, for his description of God’s 
genitive act of naming as a kind of magical, cooperative or participatory rite between God and matter: “In the things 
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meaning. Not only do members of a group participate in a ritual through their prescribed roles, 
but also, according to his theory, cause and effect co-participate in each other during a magical 
ritual. One does not beget the other, he argues, but rather, in magic, cause and effect produce 
each other. Thus, Musgrove reasserts magic as antithetical to scientific logic.52 Cause and effect 
become mixed up, mistaken, and unknown through magic.  
Musgrove translates this mixing of cause and effect into his second key concept, the 
mixing of two modes of being: “personalism” and “non-separation.” Non-separation is how he 
figures the poetic as reparative. We might decode personalism as individualism or singularity, 
and non-separation as spiritual oneness or collectivity. According to Musgrove, the primitive 
Greeks achieved a perfect balance between the two forms of being. Despite Western 
philosophy’s penchant for personalism, or seeing ourselves as utterly singular subjects, 
Musgrove suggests that we notice non-separation’s presence and attraction throughout history: 
the Christian extension of mortal life into eternity or the Romantic attempt to achieve oneness 
with a mere blade of grass. In each of these leaps toward non-separation, a poetic act—say, a 
prayer or the sweep of the composing hand on the page—forms the bridge to this immanent 
plane of being. What is the relationship between Musgrove’s theory that magic could restore 
non-separation and contemporaneous or earlier theories of collectivizing poetics? It had been 
forty years and two world wars since Marcel Mauss depicted magic as a collectivizing system of 
belief.53 
                                               
from which it shines back silently and in the mute magic of nature, God’s word has become the communication of 
matter in magical community.” 
52 This more traditional opposition of magic and science is contradicted both by Frazer’s theory that magic begets 
religion which begets science and by Levi-Strauss insistence on the concrete science of magic. 
53 See Mauss, 13. 
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 It is not hard to understand why Musgrove wouldn’t cite Mauss’s 1902 A General Theory 
of Magic. The book was not translated into English until 1972, seventy years after it first 
appeared in print. Musgrove instead speaks to the work of his literary and British near 
contemporaries, from Yeats to Sitwell: “I do not intend to prophesy, and I do not suggest that we 
should all take a course in practical magic; but I am sure that the general lines on which a poetic 
recovery, and a human recovery, must take place are those of participation in the group and in 
the more-than-group, in whatever form is best suited to our generation.”54 In other words, 
Musgrove calls for less personalism, more non-separation. Referring to his own post-war 
generation, one including survivors of both world wars, Musgrove implies a need to return the 
lost to home, to the familiar, to the group; and he further implies that the poetic, through its 
primitive, illogical magic, could do the trick. 
 Musgrove’s survey and theory of the relationship between poetry and magic (a report 
whose brevity, he remarks, precludes commenting on “black magic”) prompts me to question the 
how and why of his project. Certainly, Musgrove traces a history that evades the racialized 
reality which Johnson and DuBois suggest underscores the poetics of magic. It is natural to 
wonder how Musgrove came to conceive of this particular, reparative poetic magic, one issuing 
from white poets and toward white readers. His proximity to such crucial sites of primitive 
ethnography could have influenced his interest in theorizing literary magic. By the point of 
Musgrove’s essay being published, Frazer’s ever popular Golden Bough had appeared in its 2nd 
abridged edition, and its 1937 Aftermath had already been released. So why interweave poetry, 
magic, and “paradise” at this tragic, post-Hiroshima moment and amidst the rise of New Critical 
and psychoanalytical approaches to literary study?  
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Musgrove’s reference to a “human recovery” implies that the traumas wrought by both 
world wars55 motivate his mystical criticism. And yet the reparative magic he posits in poetry 
depends on an appropriative occultism, one derived like a natural resource from the colonized 
regions over which these very wars were partly fought, these same social injuries sustained.  
World Wars I and II’s global disruption and devastation increased the desire to understand 
sociality and emotion scientifically. This desire in turn placed increased faith in the Social 
Darwinist progressive ideology of human moral development, one which works along two 
vectors: past to present and dark to light. Musgrove himself speculates as to which “primitive 
faculties” were still vibrant in modern post-war culture. He notes that the primitive “group 
faculties of perception and communication” have mostly “atrophied” except for “panic.”56 We 
might easily sense the strength of modern panic (and shell-shock) in the image of a Cubist 
painting or the sound of a joltingly atonal opera.  
 While Musgrove uses the concept of magic to confer a healing power to poetry, 
physiologist Walter Cannon, famous for coining the “flight or fight” response, uses magic to 
understand the damaging effects of war. The introduction of technologized trench warfare had 
brought about the then novel phenomenon of “shell shock,”57 a nervous disorder of varying 
degrees suffered by soldiers who had been near major explosions (an early twentieth century 
version of post-traumatic stress disorder). Doctors in Cannon’s day were mystified by how 
physically unharmed men were dying of systemic shock, or, one might say, prolonged panic. 
Cannon, who taught at the Harvard Medical School during the first half of the twentieth century, 
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56 Musgrove, 103. 
57 See Freud’s Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920) for his study of shell-shock victims’ paradoxical compulsion to 
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began researching and publishing on wound shock immediately following World War I, but not 
until his 1942 article “‘Voodoo’ Death,”58 does he draw a connection between the “primitive 
faculty” of fear and the mystery of shell-shock. While the United States descends into the Second 
World War, Cannon uses medical records of shell-shocked World War I veterans and 
ethnographic accounts of “voodoo” religion to wager that, just like voodoo, fear, albeit invisible, 
can kill you. Cannon’s historic study, despite its unconventional entry via the back door of 
“black magic,”59 proved that fear could kill, that men “might well die from a true state of shock, 
in the surgical sense—a shock induced by prolonged and tense emotion.”60 
 Cannon’s assimilation of voodoo into his analysis of the physiological effects of fear 
offers significant evidence of both the popularity of thinking about magic and the feasibility of 
using magic as a serious framework through which to understand the horrid effects of war. 
Working at the crux between hard science and “soft” culture, Cannon’s use of voodoo also 
renders magic a socio-political phenomenon. Building toward his theory of wound-shock death, 
Cannon casts voodoo death as a social kind of death, or death by isolation. In making this turn, 
Cannon sublimates magic’s mystical or religious effects as socio-political ones. He would seem 
to agree with Musgrove that magical access or susceptibility has more to do with one’s sociality 
than with the invisible power to affect harm. Cannon describes how voodoo manifests isolation: 
“The community contracts…all people who stand in kinship relation with him withdraw…He is 
now viewed as one who is more nearly in the realm of the sacred and tabu than in the world of 
the ordinary where the community finds itself.”61 Strangely, the victim of voodoo becomes 
                                               
58 Walter B. Cannon, “‘Voodoo’ Death,” American Anthropologist 44, no. 2 (1942): 169-181. 
59 I use quotes here since practitioners of voodoo do not consider voodoo a practice for doing only evil, and in fact 
consider it mainly a practice for doing good, for curing, fixing problems, or bestowing luck.  The term “black 
magic” is strictly that magic which intends to harm. See exhibit walls of the Museum of Voodoo in New Orleans, 
Lousisiana. 
60 Cannon, 179. 
61 Cannon, 174. 
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unordinary, outside the community, while the one who handles this power, the magician or priest 
and his followers remain inside, a part of the commons. Cannon’s understanding of magic as 
fundamentally social recalls Musgrove’s concern for post-war isolation or excess personalism. In 
the disorder and aftermath of mechanized warfare, our most primitive affect, fear, becomes a 
modern epidemic, and with it, magic and poetry, come to seem like antidotes. 
But how exactly might a poem soothe wound shock? The mystical-materialist 
philosopher Walter Benjamin offers several corroborating ideas about both the magic of poetry 
and how certain kinds of poetry might serve to protect readers from post-war shock, 
fragmentation and alienation. Benjamin’s thinking on the magic of language seems to echo New 
Critics’ belief in poetry’s autochthonous ability to signify, while his messianic perspective on 
historic ruptures make him a less-scientific interlocutor on the question of how humanity might 
recover from the disastrous effects of technologized warfare and art. Benjamin famously blames 
these modern hazards for objects losing their aura, or put another way, for people losing their 
animism, Tylor’s principal theme in Primitive Culture. In Benjamin’s specific writings on magic, 
he is less concerned with poetry than language generally. Nevertheless, my desire to think amply 
about ideological cross-pollination takes a strong cue from Benjaminian thinking. 
In his 1933 essay “On the Mimetic Faculty,” Benjamin describes language as “a medium 
in which the earlier powers of mimetic production and comprehension have passed without 
residue, to the point where they have liquidated those of magic.”62 1933 was a year of exilic 
movements for him, through Paris and elsewhere, including Brecht’s house. While it is unlikely 
that Benjamin read Marcel Mauss’s General Theory of Magic, never having cited it in his 
notebooks, he, like so many of his contemporaries in Germany, France, Spain and elsewhere, 
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was immersed in primitivist zeitgeist—the Musée de l'Homme,63 shamanistic protocols, 
Picasso’s masks. Modernist concepts of primitive language and its magical properties abounded. 
Benjamin’s concern with mimesis, language, and the primal reflects ideas about magic’s 
sympathetic (and ultimately pathetic) function. In mimesis, like follows like. Like is also the 
vehicle for conferring similarity between words and images in a poem’s most classic trope—the 
simile. And this material likeness, not signification, is, for Benjamin, the stuff of magic, of 
ancient ritual, liquidated, cashed out. In this sense, metaphoric alliance ensues from sympathetic 
magic.  
Benjamin’s drive to inculcate a ready public—one that could perceive the 
imperceptible,64 decode the undetectable, and parse a revolutionary from a dictator—seems to 
undergird his theorization of language’s magical function. Devastation wrought by World War I 
and the rise of totalitarianism provides a crucial backdrop to Benjamin’s theory of poetic 
language’s potency. Why, in this post-war moment, does Benjamin obsess over a mysticism at 
once Jewish and other worldly, European and not European, and why does he equally obsess 
over the specialness of language? What was he hoping to fix with words? In “Antitheses on 
Word and Name,” a poem-like piece, also (re)written in 1933, made up of two columns of 
revised fragments from earlier writings, Benjamin declares that “[t]he magical function of the 
alphabet [is] to provide the nonsensuous similarity with the enduring semiotic ground on which it 
can appear.”65 Magic, in this sense, affords us faith that the sound of the word carries the 
meaning, despite their apparent differences. Magic carries you across this linguistic divide—
                                               
63 A still extent museum of anthropology, the Musée de l’Homme was established in 1937 by Paul Rivet and 
showcased cultural artifacts and history from both Europe and beyond. 
64 See Walter Benjamin, “The Work of Art in the Age of Its Reproducibility,” in Selected Writings Volume 3 1935-
1938, translated by Edmund Jephcott et al (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 2002), 101-133, for his theorization of how 
watching of Charlie Chaplin films could train the masses’ in their perceptibility such that they could potentially 
detect fascist propaganda before it became the rule of law.  
65 Walter Benjamin, “Antitheses Concerning Word and Name,” 717. 
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letter and sound—as metaphor carries you across the semantic one. Magic transcends the letters’ 
ambivalence towards the words they compose. The mystical materiality of language gives us the 
capacity to sense the nonsensuous—a magical feat indeed, and perhaps one that could heal a 
state of shock. 
 Susan Buck-Morss writes that “Benjamin claimed this battlefield experience of shock 
‘has become the norm’ in modern life.”66 She explores his theory of modern numbness in his 
later 1939 essay “On Some Motifs in Baudelaire.” From the loud noises of factories and streets 
to the glare of jolty cinema and highly schematized print, the average urban citizen was believed 
to be rapidly adjusting not only to the trauma of war but also to this new, shocking, fully-
industrialized world. Benjamin writes, “Haptic experiences of this kind [the flash of 
photography] were joined by optic ones, such as are supplied by the advertising pages of a 
newspaper or the traffic of a big city. Moving through this traffic involves the individual in a 
series of shocks and collision.”67 Fears of another world war in addition to anxieties about 
industrial commodity culture were thought to flood and dampen the senses; the modern citizen 
proceeds numbly, his “smiles…function[ing] as a mimetic shock absorber.”68 The iconic flâneur 
floats through city streets aimless, bored, unsensing. One could say the anaesthetized writer or 
reader, like Benjamin’s estranged ambler, is not only separated but also separatist, too good at 
separating cause and effect, too good at staying a “person,” a rationalized individual. But how to 
get non-separated again? How to face the endless shocks of modern life together, at “home,” 
rather than alone or “afar”? A certain kind of poetry (a magical kind?), some say, was necessary. 
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But what are the stakes of advocating that white Anglo-Americans achieve collectivity through a 
belief in poetry and magic’s capacity to produce non-separation? Especially if that very poetry is 
racialized through its associations with magic, and if that magic imagined is to be black, brown 
or colonial as opposed to the magic Johnson imagines to be white? In other words, how does 
some poetry enact the very social separation which its white modernist theorists envision 
collapsing?  
 In the same essay on Baudelaire, Benjamin uses Freud’s “Beyond the Pleasure 
Principle”69 to propose a poetics for the age of shock, or we could also say, the age of separation 
and non-participation. He adopts Freud’s concept of consciousness to explain how the mind can 
protect against trauma in the modern era: “In Freud’s view, consciousness as such receives no 
memory traces whatever, but has another important function: protection against stimuli.”70 In 
other words, modern consciousness is the act of not receiving or imprinting what the senses 
absorb—a non-absorptive, separated (mind over here, sense over there) mode of living. 
Benjamin computes, “The threat posed by these energies [of consciousness’ shield] is the threat 
of shocks. The more readily consciousness registers these shocks, the less likely they are to have 
a traumatic effect;”71 in other words, the mind would register but not remember such effects. For 
Benjamin, poetry with “a large measure of consciousness” could either train readers to skirt such 
trauma or heal these warring traces.72  
A certain mysticism infuses Benjamin’s depiction of a poetic consciousness that could 
protect against the traumas of war. But it is difficult to resolve the tension in Benjamin’s work 
                                               
69 See Sigmund Freud, Beyond the Pleasure Principle, trans. C.M.J. Hubbuck (London: International Pyscho-
Analytical Press, 1922). 
70 Benjamin, “On Some Motifs of Baudelaire,” 317. 
71 Ibid. 
72 Ibid., 318. 
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between his Judaic messianic beliefs and his Frankfurt School training in dialectics.73 If we 
applied dialectical analysis to magic, we would have to ask not just what is magic, but also, what 
is the other of magic? What is not-magic? According to Musgrove, if non-separation is magic, 
then separation would be not magic. Non-separation would allow for relationality, a sense of 
being multiple and immanent. Such integration, Musgrove and Benjamin seem to suggest, would 
also make us capable of perceiving flashes of history and visions of the future, those necessary to 
prevent the recurrence of fascist, exceptional rule.  
 These three thinkers—Musgrove with his representation of poetry as a form of magic that 
could return a war-torn generation to itself, Cannon with his distillation of wound-shock death as 
akin to a voodoo-driven, socially-effected death, and Benjamin with his quest for a poetics that 
could maintain social consciousness in the face of constant shock—form a triangular foundation 
to the idea of the poem as a magical and primitive antidote to post-war trauma. This suggestive 
antidote is already problematic for its intellectual roots in primitivism. Musgrove’s references to 
“primitive panic” and black magic establish how widespread presumptions about poetic 
primitivity were by the end of modernism and how focusing on Western antiquity obscures the 
coloniality of such thinking. Also, Cannon’s dependence on voodoo for a medical theory of 
wound shock underscores the popularity of and ease of access to ethnographic information 
during this period. Lastly, Benjamin’s belief that only a certain kind of poetry could prevent the 
damaging effects of shock suggests that there is another kind of poetry that might do the 
opposite, perhaps induce shock, fear, social isolation, a voodoo-like differentiation of the Other 
                                               
73 See Christopher Bracken, Magical Criticism (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2007) for his 
comprehensive analysis of how philosophy of discourse, particularly the Frankfurt school, depends on the concepts 
of the savage and magic to produce its critique. 
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from the group, and perhaps even death at the hands of totalitarian rule.74 (Chapters two and 
three will consider possible kinds of poetry that might possess such potencies.) The poem’s 
supposed dichotomous effects, that it could possess as much antidotal potential as social evil, 
urges further exploration of how beliefs about the poethics75 of poetry also relate to concepts of 
race and primitivity.  
 
Barbaric Critique and the Other of Dialectics 
 As we have seen, some theorists couch their thinking in primitivist discourse and use the 
notion of the primitive to invoke a temporally-transcendent, racially-other poetic figure. 
Meanwhile, other critics reverse this primitivist rhetoric by replacing it with what we might call a 
rhetoric of the barbaric with a key twist—the modern European is the barbarian. Cultural critics 
like C.L.R. James and Theodor Adorno in the aftermath of World War II and the Weimar 
Republic invoke notions of magic and barbarism not to wax nostalgic about a reparative 
mysticism but to criticize the historical, economic, and cultural conditions that had legitimated 
mass genocide, atomic warfare, and fascist rule, including continued oppression through 
colonialism, one exacerbated by the economic pressures of total, global war. James’s and 
Adorno’s rhetorical barbarian, like “the rhetorical primitive” cited in the introduction, forms part 
of their method for conceiving and articulating difference in the here and now of modernism. As 
a figure born of modernism’s militaristic and political insensibility, this barbarian loses its 
classical clarity as the one whose language cannot be understood, or the one who is utterly 
                                               
74 See Benjamin, “The Work of Art in the Age of Reproduction,” 102, where he speaks of new theories art, “those 
now current in that they are completely useless for the purposes of fascism.” See Chapter 2’s discussion of 
consciousness in Gertrude Stein’s poetry. 
75 See Joan Retallack, The Poethical Wager (Berkeley: UC Press, 2003) in which she defines the term poethics as a 
way of “making art that models how we want to live” (44); in other words, the poetics or dynamics or logics of the 
work inevitably espouse its ethics. I invoke the term here to question what the “we” “wants” in Benjamin’s moment, 
who the “we” is, and how colonial thinking effects the ethics of those desires.   
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foreign, and instead begins to signify imperial, hegemonic rule itself. This rule’s language, and at 
times violent abstraction, is the same that occasions an entirely new poetry. James and Adorno’s 
theorization of the barbarism of mysticism and abstraction and their shared call for dialectical 
materialism raise questions about the part played by poetry and about the kind of poetry which 
might transcend dialectics.     
 In C.L.R. James’ 1947 essay, “Dialectical Materialism and the Fate of Humanity,”76 he 
speaks to the perversity of the West’s rise to global power and its white supremacist assumption 
that, in doing so, it had realized a worldwide moral order. James was not only a Marxist critic but 
also a poet, playwright, and novelist, born in Trinidad in 1901. His diasporic life and work avidly 
crisscrossed generic and political boundaries, including the United States, Britain, Ghana and the 
Caribbean. Such movement mirrors this project’s understanding of geographic, aesthetic, and 
disciplinary boundary-crossing as one characteristic that binds modernism to colonialism. (In a 
sense, my performing a trans-spatial, trans-temporal critique of Atlantic colonialism and 
aesthetic appropriation reflects James’s own trans-Atlanticism.) The interplay of C.L.R. James’s 
root identity formed in postcolonial Trinidad and his relational identity77 formed through living 
and working on both sides of the Atlantic, in worlds labeled not colonial (despite always already 
being so), makes James’s invocation of “barbarian” particularly important. Like Johnson’s 
“White Witch,” in which he pins evil magic on whiteness, James’s poetic injunction against the 
Western barbarian shows how black-white dichotomies overflow and leak. James’s barbarian 
rhetoric does not reverse earlier Western uses of the hierarchizing, exiling term, but rather his 
                                               
76 C.L.R James, “Dialectical Materialism and the Fate of Humanity,” Marxists.org, 
https://www.marxists.org/archive/james-clr/works/diamat/diamat47.htm 
77 See Glissant, Poetics of Relation, cited previously. 
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critique complicates the meaningfulness of racialized and moralistic categories, including the 
primitive.  
Writing in the immediate aftermath of World War II and the detonation of the atomic 
bomb, James assesses the deployment of modern techno-magic in the hands of despotic, 
European rulers and blames their monstrous ethics on civilization’s damaged psychological state, 
one driven by fear. These barbaric magicians are the ones who orchestrated and condoned the 
Holocaust by which entire populations were tabooed. James employs the oxymoronic 
description, “the most achieved stages of barbarism,”78 to highlight both the West’s false 
presumption of continual progress and the actuality of its “backwards” morality, its ruthless 
violence and slaughter. Yet James argues that this barbarism, particularly Germany and Russia’s 
“systematic brutalisation and corruption of their population[s],” issues not from the margins, 
spaces his readers might deem “backward,” undeveloped and primal, but rather from the forces 
of civilization itself.79 He adds, “Only a shallow empiricism can fail to see that such monstrous 
societies are not the product of a national peculiarity…but are part and parcel of our 
civilisation.”80 Importantly, James marks this civilization as “ours,” his and the rest of Europe 
(and America’s), so that Russia and Germany are not scapegoats for the West’s destructive, 
racist legacy. Moreover, by including himself, a Black, Trinidadian, Marxist critic, as part of the 
very civilization that produces a regressive moral order, James further collapses any black-white, 
primitive-modern, colonized-colonializing, binaristic assessment of the state of affairs. Instead, 
he supplants colonial and racial politics with a particularizing, collectivizing materialism.  
                                               
78 James, “Dialectical Materialism and the Fate of Humanity.” 
79 James, ibid. 
80 Ibid. 
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So what then, for James, could counter such untenable, pervasive barbarism? If his 
materialism is not “shallow,” what defines its depth? For James, the masses do. Actual bodies, 
actual collectivities, embody the hope of materialism and foretell the ultimate defeat of the 
barbarians, for, he reasons, the extremity of modern cruelty is evidence of how strong a force the 
masses are, how great a threat they could pose to zealous rulers: 
The unending murders, the destruction of peoples, the bestial passions, the   
 sadism, the cruelties and the lusts, all the manifestations of barbarism of    
 the last thirty years are unparalleled in history. But this barbarism exists    
 only because nothing else can suppress the readiness for sacrifice, the    
 democratic instincts and creative power of the great masses of the people.81   
In other words, barbarism in the form of modern, totalitarian power squashes humans’ usual 
willingness to sacrifice themselves for not only the collective “people” but their “democratic 
instinct” and “creative power.” James implies that democracy itself is primal, first, “instinctual,” 
not a quality of progress over time, and that creativity, too, is not individual as Enlightenment 
thinking would indicate, but a quality of people’s connectedness. Interestingly, James invokes 
sacrifice,82 a ritual most readers would read as Christian or primitive right at the moment when 
he calls us to embrace our utterly material and plural existence as social masses (and matter). 
Despite his materialist grounds, James maneuvers “mass”’s double-meaning, in the religious 
sense, gathering, praying, and coming together to sense the supernatural. Doing so muddies his 
distinctions between material and mystical, empirical and spiritual, barbaric and civil. 
                                               
81 James, ibid. 
82 Mauss’s first published study was on the role of sacrifice in religious practice. 
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Reflecting on the war-shocked masses, James writes, “The dream of progress has become 
the fear of progress. Men shrink with terror at the hint of scientific discoveries.”83 So how to 
restore their faith in empiricism? How to keep them from regressing to the confines of the 
church? James hopes to re-inscribe a better rationalism, one capable of making good on the 
promise of socialism and opposing mysticism’s incapacitating apathy, an apathy that threatens 
democratic instinct and creativity. To James, mysticism is wrong for accepting “the inevitability 
of barbarism…or the hope, the belief, the faith that history will offer some way out of the 
impasse.”84 He portrays apathy as faith in oppression’s unavoidability or the belief in time’s 
fixing capacity. By this logic, apathetic subjects adhere to a certain kind of magic or debilitating 
power, one which escapes empirical comprehension, the magic of both history and state 
sovereignty, in the sense Michael Taussig85 argues. In contradistinction to this form of 
succumbling to power, James proposes using dialectics to rationalize socialism, insisting that 
“the inevitability of socialism is the absolute reverse of religion or mysticism” and that “[t]o hold 
fast the positive in its negative, and the content of presupposition in the result, is the most 
important part of rational cognition.”86 James reverses the colonial order of things (civil: 
barbaric, center: periphery) with this “most important” rationalism, or better said, dialectics. In 
this way, he carves out a starkly secular, Marxist, material dialecticism, one completely split off 
from Hegelian spiritualism.  
                                               
83 James, “Dialectical Materialism and the Fate of Humanity.” 
84 Ibid. 
85 See Michael Taussig, The Magic of the State (New York: Routledge, 1997), for his exploration of how the 
continuance and proliferation of magical belief and ritual in post-colonial Columbia serves to define the absolute 
truth of the state, for example how the images used in these rituals serve to reify the concept of state sovereignty and 
the truth of its history. 
86 James, “Dialectical Materialism and the Fate of Humanity.” 
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James presents several important contradictions that complicate our analysis of how 
magic87 (including mystical belief) gets conceived at this historical moment. First, he points to 
contemporary people’s anachronistic fear of progress due to the horrors wrought by military 
science. Secondly, he claims that belief in the mystical or spiritual, science’s supposed 
counterweight, still cannot subsume science’s moral failures. And thirdly, he paints the 
barbarian88 as ironically not outside but inside the castle walls. James’ contradictory uses of the 
term “barbaric” make it seem intellectually untamable, or untranslatable, and perhaps, like the 
primitive, the poetic, the magical, becomes a category that fails to function dialectically. Instead, 
his invocation of barbarism and mysticism remains tethered to a hierarchical and collapsing 
structure. The barbaric-civil dichotomy’s incapacity to hold (as James himself shows through his 
contradictory uses of barbarism, and Adorno also will) points to just how messy the magical 
turns out to be. Magic emerges as dialecticism’s negative, and as that which can’t be cleanly 
negated. My analysis of Adorno’s own distillation of the barbarism of poetry seems to hint at a 
similar claim, that the poetic and the magical fail to function dialectically, resulting in the 
possibility of a different kind of sensing. 
 Like James, Adorno also warns against the barbarism of the West. He narrows his 
critique, however, from mysticism or spiritualism writ broadly, to the conceptual frame of 
abstraction, and in doing so, takes aim at poetry. In 1949, Adorno remarked blankly: “To write 
poetry after Auschwitz is barbaric.”89 (This dictum is still a rallying call among contemporary 
poets pushing each other to consider the politics and ethics of their poetry, despite the fact that 
                                               
87 I acknowledge that mysticism and magic are different concepts, yet for the purposes of this study I group together 
these forms of belief in so far as they both adopt an animistic view of the material world. 
88 Ancient Greeks termed barbaros anyone who did not speak Greek, in other words, anyone of a different cultural, 
linguistic group. In this sense, “barbaric” signal first and foremost difference, and secondly a difference according to 
language. To this degree, “barbarian” bore the stereotype of one less civilized. 
89 Theodor Adorno, “Cultural Criticism and Society,” in Prisms, trans. Samuel and Sherry Weber (Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press, 1983), 34. 
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Adorno later changed his mind.) Adorno corresponded closely and argued often with Benjamin; 
they disagreed on matters mystical. Adorno wrote to Benjamin in 1938, “If one wished to put it 
very drastically, one could say that your study is located at the crossroads of magic and 
positivism. That spot is bewitched. Only theory could break the spell.”90 Adorno worked 
tirelessly to theorize the nexus of art and politics, and to excavate any dregs of what he 
considered the dangers of magical thinking, or barbaric thought. He sought to “make sense” of 
the travesties of the Third Reich and the role aesthetics played. Writing from the position of 
political asylum in the United States, Adorno made his famous declaration against poetry in 
“Cultural Criticism and Society,” which appeared in 1949, just two years after James’ own 
critique of totalitarian barbarism. I wish not just to question the similarity of James’s and 
Adorno’s rhetoric of the barbaric but also to examine Adorno’s shift from censoring “barbaric” 
poetry in the post-war moment to later articulating a role for poetry in delivering us from the 
universal to the particular. In his 1957 “Lyric Poetry and Society,” Adorno recants his earlier 
proclamation and grants a critical, aesthetic role to poetry’s ability to re-attune us to the 
particulars of experience  
First, let’s consider the fuller context of Adorno’s Platonic, anti-poetry ruling eight years 
earlier in order to better understand his use of the term “barbaric”: 
 Cultural criticism finds itself faced with the final stage of the dialectic of culture 
and barbarism. To write poetry after Auschwitz is barbaric. And this corrodes 
even the knowledge of why it has become impossible to write poetry today. 
Absolute reification, which presupposed intellectual progress as one of its 
elements, is now preparing to absorb the mind entirely. Critical intelligence 
                                               
90 Theodor Adorno, “Letters to Benjamin 1935-1938”, trans. Harry Zohn, in Theordo Adorno, Walter Benjamin, 
Ernst Bloch, Bertolt Brecht, and George Lukács, Aesthetics and Politics (London: Verso Books, 1980), 129. 
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cannot be equal to this challenge as long as it confines itself to self-satisfied 
contemplation.91 
For Adorno, the division between culture and barbarism no longer functions. As in James’s 
critique, this particular dialectic proves to be collapsing. Adorno blames the failure to recognize 
this collapse on the reification of the mind’s intellectual and cultural activity, including 
aesthetics. He further attributes the ethical failures of world war—what Hannah Arendt would 
call how it became possible to do without thinking92—to this miscalculated risk, the risk of total 
abstraction. “Absolute reification” of language, made evident in modernist poetry, makes poetry 
barbaric, and therefore un-writeable. The only poetry worth writing would require the “self-
satisfied,” reified minds of post-war readers to possess a kind of perception and penchant for 
inquiry which they had lost. But what did Adorno mean exactly by poetry? Myth, mimesis, 
metaphor, lyric form, image? And what quality of the poetic which had accumulated up to 
Adorno’s moment, from Baudelaire through Mallarmé, H.D. and Pound, other than the 
doubleness of language or the usual remove of words from their meaning, made poetry worth 
exiling or being deemed barbarous, indeed, of another language? 
 Our consideration of the poem’s barbarism finds further context in Adorno’s Dialectic of 
Enlightenment,93 which he co-wrote with sociologist and fellow Frankfurt Schooler Max 
Horkeimer, and published in 1944, just before “Criticism.” Adorno and Horkeimer take aim at 
                                               
91 Theodor Adorno, “Cultural Criticism and Society,” in Prisms, trans. Samuel and Sherry Weber (Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press, 1983), 34.  
92 See Hannah Arendt, “The Disclosure of the Agent in Speech and Action,” in The Human Condition (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1998), 175-180, where Arendt distinguishes ethical contemplation from thought or 
knowledge, as knowing-how versus knowing-that. Her thinking could be seen as following Adorno’s critique of 
contemplation with her own writing on ethics’ necessary partners, thought and action. This thought in action, in 
constant movement, would perhaps avoid what Adorno calls “absolute reification.” 
93 Theodor Adorno and Max Horkeimer, “The Concept of Enlightenment,” in Dialectic of Enlightenment: 
Philosophical Fragments, ed. Gunzelin Schmid Noerr, trans. Edmund Jephcott (Stanford, Calif: Stanford University 
Press, 2002), 1-34. 
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the notion of “intellectual progress” captured by the highly metaphorical term enlightenment.94 It 
seems utterly fitting that a book deconstructing the concept of this historical period appears in 
the final years of the period critics call modernism (as if Adorno were wetting the reed for a 
similarly atonal song on a period in the making). One might say the global disasters of 
modernism comprise the ironic bookend of this long trail of presupposed “intellectual progress,” 
one indivisible from technological and capitalistic development, from the eighteenth century to 
the early-twentieth century. Whereas James reveals the barbarism of civilization, Adorno and 
Horkeimer point to the equally paradoxical magic of logic. By drawing parallels between 
mysticism and Enlightenment-era secularism and rationality, Adorno and Horkeimer reveal the 
concept of the Enlightenment to be merely that, an idea, not a major epistemological shift. 
Adorno and Horkeimer lead me to think that (un)thinking the relationship between magic, 
barbarism, and poetry could further destabilize such staid categories as the mystical and the 
rational, and their inherent epistemology and morality.  
 Adorno and Horkeimer paint the close association of language and logos as essential to 
how the Enlightenment project intertwined the magical with the rational, heaven with hell, and 
any object with its opposite. In a sense, they present language, through its poeticism, as non-
dialectical. On language’s referentiality, they write, “Even the division of subject and object is 
prefigured in it. If the tree is addressed no longer as simply a tree but as evidence of something 
else, a location of mana, language expresses the contradiction that it is at the same time itself and 
something other than itself, identical and not identical.”95 Language here prefigures a split but 
                                               
94 The “light” in “enlightenment” registers metaphorically and spiritually as the light of thinking or the brain and the 
light of God. See Paul de Man’s essay “Epistemology of Metaphor” (1978), in which he uses Locke’s Essay 
Concerning Human Understanding to expose the ultimate metaphoricity of language. In the example, light is the 
third word in Locke’s attempt to produce a definition that does not collapse upon, or refer back to, itself.  
95 Adorno and Horkeimer, “The Concept of Enlightenment,” 11. This idea of the word’s inherently mimetic and 
metaphoric qualities is a key concept for structuralist and post-structuralist thinkers on linguistic figurality, including 
de Man and Culler. 
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contained self, subject and object, as well as an inner dialogue or addressable self, resembling 
Adorno’s feared “self-satisfied contemplation” of the reified mind. Albeit animistically, Adorno 
and Horkeimer also apostrophize language as issuing passively from an invisible speaker: the 
tree “is addressed.” The speaker who names the inanimate object “tree” triangulates a third 
meaning, an elsewhere, a “something else” that language embodies apart from objects. It rules 
from a distance, abstractly, detached from material. Referring to “something other than itself,” 
language’s positivistic metaphoricity and, per Musgrove, its non-separation of word and meaning 
make it magical.  
It is strange how Adorno and Horkeimer seem to suggest that language refuses 
dialecticism, that it cannot be defined negatively, for it contains its negative. It is itself and its 
other. In this way, language seems to pose a threat to dialecticians.96 Recalling Musgrove’s own 
assessment of magic (and poetry) as that which confuses cause and effect, it could be said here 
that language confuses positive and negative. Furthermore, their work suggests that poetry’s 
magic lies with its inherent positivity—one not unrelated to Benjamin’s sensuous alphabet—a 
positivity that is barbarous, foreign, outside, other to dialectics itself. (If what you say, therefore, 
is, then we are working with delusion, not dialectics. However, for Benjamin this was not 
delusion but a deitic logos—for him, names are positivism’s most quotidian product, the “mute 
magic of nature.”97) 
Not only do Adorno and Horkeimer fail to name the epistemological threat seemingly 
attached to magic and poetry, that which would destabilize the dialectical tradition, they also 
imbue their own criticism with repeated traces of primitivist rhetoric. Adorno and Horkeimer 
                                               
96 Abstraction in this sense is also always a reflection of Marx’s description of man’s alienation from labor, and thus 
capital as archetypal abstraction. In this sense, abstraction garners skepticism and animosity from adherents to 
Marxism.  
97 Benjamin, “Antithesis of Word and Name,” 717. 
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themselves animate language through address, personifying “tree,” and invoke invisible actors 
and mana, the common term for magical force. They perform magical criticism, to use 
Christopher Bracken's term.98 They trace language’s doubleness as a tool of domination back to 
priests and magicians.99 Not so differently from James, the two draw a clear line from animistic 
primitive cultures to post-animistic industrial ones, recalling, “When language first entered 
history, its masters were already priests and sorcerers.”100 Freud’s theory on taboo, Mauss’s work 
on magic, and Durkeim’s on primitive religion all fuel Adorno and Horkeimer’s attempt to close 
the distance between the European “enlightened” world and the colonized worlds from which 
these social theories arose. Co-opting this primitivist rhetoric, Adorno and Horkeimer argue that 
rationality “tabooed the knowledge which really apprehends the object.”101 In other words, it 
barred thought from what James would call deep empiricism. They reveal Enlightenment 
positivism to be a totalizing trope, or “universal taboo.”102 Accordingly, language’s domination 
of the masses (the horde) is a function of its universalism, its complete occlusion of any 
outside—no reality exists beyond the logic of logos. The Enlightenment’s own taboo on magic 
and its insistence on logic produce its own “white witch”-like glare and spell-like effect on the 
vulnerable masses. For Adorno, only a return to negative dialectics could make it possible for 
people to sense what they epically had failed to sense: the rise of totalitarian rule. 
“The Concept of Enlightenment” usefully complicates our understanding of Adorno’s 
1949 banishment of poetry, for clearly poetry has the capacity to make its readers reconsider the 
distance between apprehender and apprehended object, what Kant would consider the ideal space 
                                               
98 See Bracken, Magical Criticism. 
99 Interestingly, William Blake’s opening poem in Marriage of Heaven in Hell declares that priests have ruined 
poetry by using it as a tool for domination, a position that seems to drive his hyper-materialist process of writing by 
inscribing waxed metal plates. 
100 Adorno and Horkeimer, 15. 
101 Ibid., 10. 
102 Ibid., 11. 
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for play. Drawing these two works together makes it possible to understand what Adorno 
considers the reified intellect at play within a poem: a closed, self-referential, universal, singular 
system. Additionally, “The Concept of Enlightenment” allows us to realize that Adorno calls for 
an exogamy of mind, a perception of particularity and difference from the outside, that in and of 
itself depends on thinking totemically.103 I point this out not to criticize Adorno but to illuminate 
how anthropological structures of perceiving difference breach his thinking even when his 
critical eye is turned on Europe itself. Adorno’s description of poetry’s barbaric abstraction 
communicates through ethnographic belief and practice. His invocation of “wildness” in his 
Aesthetics,104 “barbarism” in “Criticism,” and “taboo” in Dialectic of Enlightenment illustrates 
primitivism’s centrality to modernist aesthetic philosophy. Given that Adorno’s life-work 
continually examines how aesthetics sits at the crossroads of the political and the social, his 
rhetorical barbarism makes it possible to question how magic’s attachment to poetry also 
proffers an aesthetic-epistemological hierarchy, a set of beliefs about knowledge and genre that 
is racialized and colonialized through its rhetoric of primitivity. Through his obsessions with 
Enlightenment formations of knowledge, formations inseparable from the colonization of North 
and South America, Adorno demonstrates how modernism produces itself (aesthetically and 
racially) through these colonial, primitive foils.  
                                               
103 In other words, dialectical thinking driven by negation parallels Freud’s concept of the systematic organization of 
reproduction in Totem and Taboo. Like dialectics, totemic identification works through thinking the negative, the 
opposition of the positive: family or not family, marriageable or not marriageable. The question remains, is 
dialectics totemic or is the description of totemism a product of dialecticism? To the extent that a poem produces 
itself dialectically, how is it generically embedded in these social theories? 
104 See Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, ed. Greta Adorno and Rolf Tiedemann, trans. Robert Hullot-Kentor (New York: 
Bloomsbury Academic, 2013), 14, for his discussion of Kant’s theory of aesthetics, in which he claims that a taboo 
controls how we perceive a work of art, that it restrains us from animalistically devouring it. He further claims that a 
“wildest interest” is the other side of Kant’s “no interest,” implying that the binary of primitive/civil, and the binary 
of taboo (ok, not okay) pervades his own aesthetic theory.  
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 Tracking the correspondences between the Victorian anthropology of magic, the rise of 
cultural criticism centered on barbarism and poetry, and the proliferation of poetry criticism 
driven by magical thinking, reveals several possible camps of understanding this modernist 
cultural formation premised on primitivity. On the one hand, poetry can be seen as a vestige of a 
primitivistic take on language—its base function, to name, to draw onomatopoeic parallels—one 
best left to this “crude” function.  On the other hand, through both Musgrove and Benjamin, 
poetry’s very primitivity is seen to offer a possible antidote to the numbing effects of modern 
warfare. The ensuing critical debate focuses our attention on the central problem of perception, 
our capacity to sense the concrete in a world turned so abstract. But my sense of the frailty of 
Adorno’s dialectical critique makes me wonder what role poetry plays in either reproducing or 
rebuking these dialectics. What kind of poem could avoid becoming totalizing? What poem 
could speak to James and Adorno’s masses without dominating them with either-or choices—are 
you with us or against us? How might magic’s positivism become an attractive ethos for a poem 
responding to a crisis? This poem might have to administer a counter-shock,105 as Benjamin 
argues Baudelaire’s poems do, a shock that startled its readers to attend to the present.  
James, Adorno and Horkeimer each express concerns about the masses’ inability to 
perceive accurately due to their mystical attachments or what Adorno and Horkeimer call the 
spell of animism. They write, “The regression of the masses today lies in their inability to hear 
with their own ears what has not already been heard, to touch with their hands what has not 
previously been grasped.”106 As Benjamin asks what kind of poetry would be perceivable by our 
shocked consciousness, Adorno and Horkeimer might respond, what kind of poetry would make 
possible hearing “what has not already been heard” or even grasping “what has not previously 
                                               
105 See Benjamin, “On Some Motifs of Baudelaire.”  
106 Adorno and Horkeimer, 28. 
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been grasped”? Even a purely dialectical poem, a poem of perfect correspondence, would always 
echo back to its tabooed other, the mess of mana, the saying that is doing, the saying that is 
making, the bewitched spot. 
 In the next chapter, I will explore Gertrude Stein’s extremely long, extremely abstract 
poem, Stanzas in Meditation, and propose that the experience of this poem might make it that 
“certain kind of poetry” that Benjamin believed would return readers to their senses, albeit still 
through a feeling of poetic time that depends on thinking the primitive.
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Chapter Two 
“To Spell and Not Spell Well”: The Ghost of Race in Gertrude Stein’s Poetic Experiment 
 
 
It is always not only not foolish  
To think how birds spell and do not spell well  
And how could it do birds and words 
I often say so not at all amount 
 
—Gertrude Stein, Stanzas in Meditation, 
1932 
 
If one wished to put it very drastically, one could 
say that your study is located at the crossroads of 
magic and positivism. That spot is bewitched. Only 
theory could break the spell. 
 
—Adorno, a letter to Benjamin, 1938 
 
All About War 
In a letter postmarked November 15, 1933, Gertrude Stein writes to Carl Van Vechten, 
friend, music critic and Harlem Renaissance “cataloguer”: 
I had a rather amusing time today, we were lunching with…a retired army general 
and it would appear that he had in his division at the front two American Negro 
regiments, he was very interesting about them and more than that he reads all the 
books that he can get hold [of] translated from the American about anything to do 
with Negroes. He has all of Seabrook’s and was very xcited [sic] about hearing 
about your Paradis de Negres and I am sending it to him as soon as we get to 
Paris.1 
                                               
1 Gertrude Stein, The Letters of Gertrude Stein and Carl Van Vechten 1913-1946, vol. 1., ed. Edward Burns (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1986), 285-286. Stein and Van Vechten corresponded and collaborated intensely 
throughout their lives. Van Vechten helped to get Making of Americans published and her opera Four Saints in 
Three Acts produced. He also critically introduced her first edition of selected writings. 
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Van Vechten had been a central albeit problematic white critic and writer on the Harlem 
Renaissance, lauded for popularizing black writers with white audiences while criticized for 
assuming an unwarranted place of belonging in the black community. Stein likewise was a 
cynosure for the writers and artists of a chosen not given locale, Paris. Much has been written 
about her centrality as a figure of Parisian modernism and beyond; she was the one who hosted 
the salon in which almost every major figure of the period appeared at one point or another. She 
famously sat for Picasso and edited Hemingway. In this brief letter, however, Stein not only 
plays the familiar roles of friend and promoter of modernist artists and writers but also that of 
maker and passer-on of books that represent black lives through racist stereotype. Stein’s 
familiar reference to William Seabrook draws attention to not only the fact that modernist poets 
read ethnographies but also the colonial, racial, and magical aspect of these readings. Seabrook 
was a noted American travel writer and contemporary cannibal. His book on Haitian voodoo, 
Magic Island, was published in 1929 and translated into French the same year, reflecting both 
the primitivist zeitgeist of the era and France’s colonial ties to Haiti. Seabrook also wrote Jungle 
Ways (1930), a record of his immersion in West African ritualistic life. Stein’s response to the 
general’s interest in Seabrook is that he must read Van Vechten’s Paradis de Nègres, a book 
whose English title’s racial slur even Van Vechten’s father counseled against. 
This fragment of correspondence quickly constellates Stein’s interest in racial otherness, 
primitivism, magic and war—topics whose relationship I will deepen and complicate by reading 
Stein’s 1932 poem, Stanzas in Meditation.2 Stein wrote this most abstract, difficult, book-length 
                                               
2 Gertrude Stein, Stanzas in Meditation: The Corrected Edition, eds. Susannah Hollister and Emily Setin (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 2012). All subsequent references to this text of primary focus will refer 
parenthetically to the page number. Stein divided Stanzas into several books composed of numbered stanzas; 
however, since my reading of the book-length poem does not pertain to the formal qualities of its division, I will cite 
passage merely by page number. 
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poem the same year that her most popular and accessible book, The Autobiography of Alice B. 
Toklas, appeared in print. Stein’s extensive accounts of war in both The Autobiography and her 
1945 memoir, Wars I Have Seen, prompts a consideration of how Stein’s writing responds to the 
“shock of modernity” wrought by both world wars. In her fifty-page chapter “The War,” in The 
Autobiography, Toklas narrates various war adventures, like delivering supplies to French 
hospitals in Stein’s Ford truck, as well as intimate, fearful scenes at home. In one such scene, 
Toklas describes a nighttime air-raid alarm:  
Well I too said when she woke me, is it a revolution and are there soldiers…I 
don’t quite know, she answered, but there has been an alarm. Anyway you had 
better come. I started to turn on the light. No, she said, you had better not. Give 
me your hand and I will get you down.3 
Writing Wars I Have Seen during World War II, Stein paints her life as endlessly infused with 
war and enemies, if not by experience then by books.4 She paints a direct relationship between 
the constant state of war and human emotional life: “What is there inside,” Stein both states and 
asks, “that makes one know all about war.”4 Modernists seemed to think poetry could ease this 
pain of overabundant knowing. Yet, what could a formidably abstract book like Stanzas in 
Meditation do to affect the social ills wrought by war?  What kind of poetics could restore faith 
that it is okay to turn the lights back on?5  
                                               
3 Gertrude Stein, The Autobiography of Alice B. Toklas (New York: Vintage, 1990), 157. Stein’s narration through 
Toklas might read more syntactically straightforward than her other writing, however the contents of the chapters, 
including “The War,” chronologically scramble, repeat, and overflow the years noted in chapter titles. In other 
words, the book performs a non-linear sense of time, and repeatedly returns to accounts of Stein and Toklas’ 
experience of World War I. 
4 Gertrude Stein, Wars I Have Seen (London: Brilliance Books/Plain Edition, 1984), 9. 
5 Stein interestingly also wrote a libretto Dr. Faustus Lights the Lights, which ironically features the classic narrative 
of human who wants the magical power to defy death, but in Stein’s version, the doctor expresses her classic 
ambivalence: “The devil what the devil what do I care if the devil is there.” 
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Stein’s position as a war writer6 underscores my interest in the role of magic in her work. 
Susan Buck-Morss’s writing on the role of aesthetics in this numbed-out post-war period helps to 
refine one way I conceive of magic—ultimately a phenomenon that restores our senses and 
circumvents shock. Buck-Morss’s consideration of World War I’s dulling effects, the rise of 
anaesthetics, and Benjamin’s “Work of Art in the Age of Technological Reproduction” point to 
the possibility that a poetry like Stanzas in Meditation could indeed help such a senseless age.7 
Specifically, Buck-Morss rereads Benjamin’s artwork essay as proposing a new kind of 
perception for modern times, one brought about through poetry and capable of countering the 
post-war culture of shock. Benjamin suggests a primal link between the illusion of the 
technocratic state and magic: “Tradition henceforth assumes the character of the phantasmagoria 
in which primal history enters the scene in ultramodern get-up.”8 But how to face this 
“ultramodern” technocracy? Benjamin wonders “how lyric poetry can be grounded in experience 
for which exposure to shock has become the norm. One would expect such poetry to have a large 
measure of consciousness.”9 Stanzas in Meditation certainly offers a rather different “measure of 
consciousness” or form of meditation. This kind of poem, read this way, might stall the effects of 
modern technological excess by heightening the reader’s consciousness. Stein’s use of puns, 
names, onomatopoeia, repetition, numbers and a temporal standstill might offer a coping strategy 
                                               
6 See “Gertrude Stein's War Years: Setting the Record Straight: A dossier” edited by Charles Bernstein, on Jacket 2 
(https://jacket2.org/feature/gertrude-steins-war-years-setting-record-straight), for a selection of essays and 
documents discussing Stein’s relationships to fascist leaders and sympathizers under Vichy rule and exploring the 
nuances of her position as a Jewish, lesbian, American writer living in France during that time. 
7 Susan Buck-Morss, “Aesthetics and Anaesthetics: Walter’s Benjamin’s Artwork Essay Reconsidered,” October 26 
(Autumn 1992): 3-41. Buck-Morss examines the rise of the use of anesthesia in surgery rooms, contemporaneous 
with post-World War I wound-shock culture, and uses this context to put forth a new argument about Benjamin’s 
claims on how cinema might afford a keener form of perception, one necessary to detect fascist politics and art. 
8 Walter Benjamin, The Arcades Project, trans. Howard Eiland and Kevin McLaughlin (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 
1999), 116. 
9 Benjamin, “On Some Motifs of Baudelaire,” eds. Howard Eiland and Michael Jennings, trans. Edmund Jephcott et 
al., Selected Writings Vol. 4 (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 2006), 318. 
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for loss, the shock of war, self-estrangement and socio-political liminality. Both Buck-Morss’s 
critique of social anaesthetization and Benjamin’s depiction of a poetic consciousness that could 
re-aestheticize, or re-instate a sensing, perceptive social body, help to frame this analysis of 
Stein’s Stanzas in Mediation as an aesthetic poem and a counter-spell to disenchantment,10 one 
that could restore feeling to modern aesthetics. 
Yet, what kind of new or borrowed ways of sensing or thinking would this belief in 
poetry require? In Christopher Bracken’s Magical Criticism (2013), he argues that such 
Benjaminian thinking, particularly the mana Benjamin posits in language, harbors a racialized 
figure, and that this holds true for much of the Frankfurt School.11 Recent studies like Bracken’s 
attempting to rethink modernity in terms of its entrenched coloniality prompt me to reevaluate 
the effects of Stein’s spell-like writing on its readers. Therefore, to think critically about the 
poem’s trance-like, meditative qualities and its primitivistic performance, I read Stanzas in 
Meditation through contemporaneous texts interested in magic, such as Marcel Mauss’s A 
General Theory of Magic,12 Walter Cannon’s “‘Voodoo’ Death,”13 and Benjamin’s essays on the 
magic of words and the dialectical image.14 Through this contextual analysis, I demonstrate that 
Stanzas’ perceptual reparation (achieved by its sense of language and time) depends on 
                                               
10 Max Weber mobilizes the concept of “disenchantment” in his 1918 lecture, “Science as Vocation” (in German, 
“Wissenschaft als Beruf”) at Munich University 1918. Weber argues that industrialization culminates in dispelling a 
culture’s belief in the supernatural. See Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, ed. and trans. H.H. Gerth and C. Wright 
Mills (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946) 129-156. 
11 Christopher Bracken, Magical Criticism: The Recourse of Savage Philosophy (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 2007), 95-137. 
12 Marcel Mauss, A General Theory of Magic, trans. Robert Brain (New York: Routledge, 1972), 49. Originally co-
authored with Henri Hubert in French, Mauss reissued the book in 1950. It did not appear in English until Brain’s 
1972 translation. 
13 Walter B. Cannon, “‘Voodoo’ Death,” American Anthropologist 44, no. 2 (1942): 169-181. Cannon, the Harvard 
physiologist who dubbed the “fight-flight” response, sought to explain “death by fear,” or wound shock, during 
World War I through concurrent anthropological studies of voodoo. 
14 Benjamin wrote on repeated occasions of the mystical nature of word and image. See his pieces titled “Antitheses 
Concerning Word and Name” and “On the Mimetic Faculty” in Selected Writings Vol. 2 (Cambridge: Belknap 
Press, 2005), as well as “On Some Motifs in Baudelaire” and “On the Concept of History” in Selected Writings Vol. 
4 (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 2006). 
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racialized, colonialist concepts of primitivity and magic. The correlations between the 
characteristics of magic spells and those of Stein’s poem as well as the poem’s construction of 
what Johannes Fabian calls “the time of the Other” reveal the conceptual mechanization of race 
in modernist poetry.15 By invoking racialized concepts of time and magical ritual, Stanzas 
obscures the whiteness of avant-gardism and codifies the mechanization of racialized otherness 
in how we read experimental poems. Furthermore, the production of a poetic antidote to 
modernity through the presupposition and appropriation of its supposed opposite, primitivity, 
underscores the ethical contradictions within early twentieth century white avant-garde 
aesthetics.16 Not only are these aesthetics constituted through binaric concepts of race, space and 
time (the here and now of whiteness, and then and there of blackness), but they also blur the 
categories of rationality and mysticism, science and poetry.  
 
Stein & Race 
In performing a critical race study of Stein’s Stanzas in Meditation, I investigate how 
concepts of magic become enmeshed in this construction of white avant-garde aesthetics, even 
when not explicitly representing the occult or the racial other. Scholars such as Laura Doyle have 
shown helpfully how ideologies of modernist racialism work not just through representation but 
also through form, and particularly through “nostalgic experimentalism,” or an ironic 
“investment in the past.”17 In her analysis of Stein’s Making of Americans, Doyle usefully thinks 
through the racial implications of the book’s dual emphasis on reproduction and progress, 
                                               
15 Johannes Fabian, Time and the Other: How Anthropology Makes its Object (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1983). 
16 See Cathy Park Hong’s essay “Delusions of Whiteness in the Avant-Garde” in Lana Turner Journal 7 (2015) for 
her discussion of how the avant-garde of modernism and throughout the twentieth century mechanized whiteness to 
produce a “new” aesthetics. 
17 Laura Doyle, “The Flat, the Round, and Gertrude Stein: Race and the Shape of Modern(ist) History,” 
Modernism/modernity 7.2 (April 2000): 253. 
  
 
74 
working not simply to acknowledge Stein’s racism but “to understand it: not in order to deny the 
problem but in order to move into it, as a step toward moving ourselves historically through it.”18 
Similarly, this study seeks to move into the function of racialized concepts in Stein’s Stanzas in 
Meditation in order to more deeply understand how even an innovatively reparative poem, a 
poem that returns us to our senses, also underscores ideologies of inequality.  
Though written in 1932, Stanzas in Meditation was published posthumously in 1956 and 
reissued in a corrected edition in 2012. After a flurry of Stein scholarship in the eighties and 
nineties on representational works like Three Lives and abstract works like Tender Buttons, 
including criticism on Stein’s relationships to race, gender, sexuality and history, I question, in 
part, what the publication of a corrected version of Stanzas in Meditation in 2012 should or could 
yield. Renewed attention to an extremely abstract work by Stein might seek to rescue her, again 
(first as a woman poet, then as a white one), from a canon of white modernists at risk of 
contemporary academic irrelevance. As Sonia Saldívar-Hull argues, critical focus on Stein’s 
radical style distracts attention from her racism and classism.19 She writes, “The reader who has 
been mesmerized by Stein’s radical writing style may overlook the ‘negro’ next to the earthworm 
in Stein’s great chain of being.”20 Re-centering Stein studies on an extremely abstract work like 
Stanzas risks blinding readers to the relationship between aesthetic radicalism and the politics of 
race. Expanding on decades of criticism on Three Lives’s representational racism, I make an 
epistemological and formal argument about how even non-representational modernist poetry gets 
racialized. This argument synthesizes Christine Ferguson’s21 theory of the interrelationship 
                                               
18 Doyle, 256. 
19 Sonia Saldívar-Hull, “Wrestling Your Ally: Stein, Racism, and Feminist Critical Practice,” eds. Mary Lynn Broe 
and Angela Ingram, Women’s Writing in Exile (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1989) 192. 
20 Saldívar-Hull, 189. 
21 See Christine Ferguson, “Eugenics and the Afterlife: Lombroso, Doyle, and the Spiritualist Purification of the 
Race,” Journal of Victorian Culture 12.1 (January 2007): 64-85. Ferguson links the eugenicist concern for the future 
  
 
75 
between the rationalist character of eugenics and the mysticism of spiritualism with the supposed 
irrationalism of abstract, non-sensible poetry like Stein’s Stanzas in Meditation. It also departs 
from Daylanne K. English’s22 analysis of Stein’s pathologization of racialized characters in 
Three Lives to think more about how the avant-garde white text achieves its reparative or healing 
effects through racialized concepts of lived experience. My analysis of an extremely abstract 
work seeks to think how race is still at work in a text without the use of racialized characters, 
dialect or words with nonsensical racial diction, adapting Lorna Smedman’s thinking on the 
formal appearance of race in an abstract text like Tender Buttons to Stanzas.23 Despite this 
difference in my textual focus, I continue to explore what Michael North sees in modernists’ use 
of racial dialect: “the deeply contradictory response of Europe to the cultures it was 
colonizing.”24 North contends, “Stein and Picasso found African art to be both elemental and 
intriguingly artificial: modernism is, at least in part, what they made of this contradiction.”25 
Indeed, the production of white modernism through colonialist aesthetics and thought 
underscores the contradictory status of Stanzas in Meditation—appropriative magic, reparative 
experimental lyric, or both?   
 
Modernist Occultism 
                                               
of racial purity with the spiritualists’ belief in the afterlife of human spirits.  Importantly, she interprets the junction 
of these two movements as a basis for racialized concepts of criminality and pursuant justifications of the death 
penalty. 
22 See Daylanne K. English, “The Making and Delivering of Americans in Gertrude Stein’s Early Writings, 1903-
1925,” Unnatural Selections: Eugenics in American Modernism and the Harlem Renaissance (Chapel Hill, NC: 
University of North Carolina Press, 2004) 93-116. 
23 See Lorna J. Smedman, “‘Cousin to Cooning’: Relation, Difference, and Racialized Language in Stein’s 
Nonrepresentational Texts,” Modern Fiction Studies 42.3 (Fall 1996): 569-585. 
24 Michael North, The Dialect of Modernism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 65. 
25 Ibid. 
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One might ask, why pursue an inquiry about magical reparation through Gertrude Stein? 
True, despite B.F. Skinner’s claims to the contrary, Stein swore that she didn’t practice automatic 
writing or other mystical acts of consciousness. The surrealists were her friends, not her method. 
Stein made faster friends with mathematicians, cognitive scientists, and analytical philosophers 
than occultists or mystics. She did not collude with notable occultist writers like H.D., Eliot, and 
Pound despite their common American roots. Because she was not explicitly of the occultist 
camp and not not of it, it is useful to ask how mystical, racialized concepts of language and 
experience might have influenced her poetry, and perhaps modernists’ poetry more generally. 
While Stanzas in Meditation certainly represents the modernist canon more generally for its play 
on form (the stanza), long length, and unpopular difficulty, Stein’s work is not emblematic of 
occultist modernism. 
Accordingly, Gertrude Stein is absent from studies of modernist occultism. 
Notwithstanding Stein’s social entrenchment in Paris and her absence from occultist spaces like 
Quest Society meetings in Kensington, it is nevertheless difficult to understand why she escapes 
reference. Various scholarly understandings of the relationship between occultism and 
modernism speak directly to stylistic and conceptual concerns relevant to Stein’s work, such as 
history, prophecy, mimesis and the uncanny. Foundational among these studies, Leon Surette’s 
The Birth of Modernism (1993) links occultist works like Eliot’s “The Wasteland” or Pound’s 
Cantos to historicism, philosophy, and metahistory, but not anthropology.26 Rooting this 
interpretation in Enlightenment debates about knowledge, he posits modernist occultism as a 
desire to complicate the Enlightenment’s bifurcation of body and mind, intuition and reason.27 
                                               
26 Leon Surette, The Birth of Modernism: Ezra Pound, T.S. Eliot, W.B. Yeats, and the Occult (Buffalo, NY: McGill-
Queen’s University Press, 1993), 36. 
27 Surette, 76. 
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Yet Surette does not acknowledge the other, racial hierarchy informing this “Enlightened” 
division of thinking and feeling, nor does he recognize the Enlightenment project as the 
production of racial knowledge and its pursuant eugenics. Despite Surette’s misrecognition, his 
discussion of occultist creative practice as history writing brings to mind Stein’s own meta-
histories such as The Making of Americans (1911) and her three autobiographies. Stein remarks 
in Stanzas in Meditation, “This is her autobiography one of two / But which it is no one which it 
is can know” (152).  
Timothy Materer, a contemporary of Surette, examines the same poets plus some women 
and younger writers, H.D., Robert Duncan, Sylvia Plath and Ted Hughes, in his Modernist 
Alchemy.28 Materer assesses the occultist effect on a poet’s work by the poet’s degree of mystical 
belief and practice. He also attributes modernist interest in the uncanny to occultist fascination. 
Materer further argues that, despite the typical perspective that the modern lyric self speaks from 
a decentered, turbulent “I,” the occultist poet harnesses the voice of prophecy and wisdom during 
an uncertain time. Occultism, for Materer, shapes modernist poets’ concept of poetry, technique, 
and vision. Materer raises useful questions, regarding H.D.’s work, about whether poetry in this 
moment attempts to unify art, religious belief, and science. This question echoes Sydney 
Musgrove’s indication that “magic poetry” could bring about non-separation, a fix to the 
separation wrought by the trauma of war. Secondly, Materer’s distinguishing between the 
unsettled lyric self and the prophetic one highlights the potential of the latter. Might the 
prophetic poet heal the fragmented poet, or might she be the same poet? Does Stein’s synthesis 
                                               
28 See Timothy Materer, Modernist Alchemy: Poetry and the Occult (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995).  
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of thesis and antithesis (her constant self-contradiction and exhausted over-rationalization) 
reflect H.D.’s synthesis of science, religion and art?29 
According to Leigh Wilson’s more recent study, Modernism and Magic: Experiments 
with Spiritualism, Theosophy, and the Occult (2013),30 modernists practiced magic as a means to 
achieve a new understanding of artistic mimesis, one that accepts the primacy of artificiality. 
Therefore, magic concerns itself with the material world as we experience and reproduce it for 
others—magic does aesthetics. Overall, Wilson argues that modernist attempts “to challenge 
representational practices in order to remake the world” depend on a belief in magic31—I 
contend that they also depend on a belief in poetic reparation. If we accept that industrialization 
and the terrors of war cast their own disenchanting spell, it seems that Wilson’s version of 
magical art works as a counter-spell by envisioning a better world. She uses Philippe Lacoue-
Labarthe’s notion of a general mimesis that sees itself as “‘the realization of a still unfinished 
reality’” to argue that modernist magic could occasion this form of mimesis.32 The question 
remains, how does this social function of poetry, the responsibility for world-making or world-
completion, work when we bring the racialized underpinnings of this belief in magic to the 
surface? Can we still consider such a poetry prophetic or healing? 
 
Colonial Stein 
 Past conversations about Stein’s poetry and race, and about modernist poetry and magic, 
prompt further questions about the global, colonial, and historical context in which modernists 
                                               
29 See Rachel Blau DuPlessis’ Genders, Races, and Religious Cultures in Modern American Poetry, 1908-
1934 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001) for further discussion of the intersection of high modernism, 
women’s writing, and the esoteric. 
30 Leigh Wilson, Modernism and Magic: Experiments with Spiritualism, Theosophy, and the Occult (Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh University Press, 2013). 
31 Wilson, 12. 
32 Ibid., 14. 
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wrote. Stein’s life outside the United States complicates her relationship to these contexts and 
our thinking of her work as performing a kind of magic, like time travel. Stein spoke on her own 
poetic practice in relation to “time-sense” in her 1925 lecture “Composition as Explanation.”33 
She speaks to her well-known use of repetition as an attempt to construct a different temporality 
altogether: “In the first book there was a groping for a continuous present and for using 
everything by beginning again and again.”34 Stein also construes her creative process as 
involving a fractured sense of time: 
The time when and the time of and the time in that composition is the natural 
phenomena of that composition and of that perhaps every one can be certain. 
No one thinks these things when they are making when they are creating what is 
the composition, naturally no one thinks, that is no one formulates until what is to 
be formulated has been made. 
Composition is not there, it is going to be there and we are here. This is some time 
ago for us naturally.35 
Stein’s theory of poetic practice precludes thinking as much as it precludes existing in the same 
time-space as the work itself. But what concepts of self and world would make it possible to 
believe that this is how poetry happens?  
Bringing together various critics’ discussions of literary temporality and primitive 
temporality shows the colonial sense of self and world embedded in Stein’s interest in the altered 
time-space of writing. Fredric Jameson’s “Gertrude Stein and Parts of Speech” explores the 
unruly “aesthetic geopolitics” (his term) of Stein’s lectures by examining her equally unruly 
                                               
33 Gertrude Stein, “Composition as Explanation,” ed. Joan Retallack, Selections (Berkeley, CA: University of 
California Press, 2008) 215-225. 
34 Ibid., 220. 
35 Ibid., 218. 
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grammar.36 Jameson posits Stein’s concept of composition as synonymous with spatialized time, 
a dimensionality that defines American-ness for him at this modern moment. Jameson’s 
discussion of Stein’s aesthetic space-time, its constant redirection to the “actual present” of 
reading and writing, reminds us how, like an imperial power, the text occupies multiple 
dimensions simultaneously, for example, the reader’s space and time and the writer’s. Kelley 
Wagers also suggests that Stein enacts an intersection of the reader and writer’s temporalities by 
writing a ficto-history, The Making of Americans, that calls on and involves the reader who must 
“bear” this history.37 Wagers further offers that, despite the book’s racialist obsession with 
progress, the text’s cross-temporality both counteracts traditional historical linearity and posits 
history as collectively produced.38 This cross- or poly-temporality is critical to how I consider 
Stein’s formal production of primitivity. Considering the racialized dimensions of time, Tony C. 
Brown depicts the primitive as time itself in The Primitive, the Aesthetic, and the Savage: An 
Enlightenment Problematic.39 “Primitive” signals a kind of “before” that captures both the 
imaginable past and the chaos or the nothing that preceded it. Brown’s two kinds of time, a 
historical one and an ahistorical one, which structure our concept of the primitive, give us a 
unqiue way to consider the primitivity of time in Stanzas in Meditation. Thus in reading Stein’s 
difficult, long poem, we must ask, what are geopolitical, historical, and social dimensions of this 
poem’s space-time? How do they relate to magical or primitivist thinking? And how can 
understanding Stein’s aesthetic-political position relative to imperialism help us to reconceive 
the connection between race and modernist poetry?  
                                               
36 Fredric Jameson, “Gertrude Stein and Parts of Speech,” The Modernist Papers (London: Verso, 2007), 345. See 
also Jameson’s essay “Imperialism and Modernism” in the same collection for further discussion of how modernist 
aesthetic experiments co-constituted imperialist space-time. 
37 Kelley Wagers, “Gertrude Stein’s ‘Historical’ Living,” Journal of Modern Literature 31.3 (Spring 2008): 27. 
38 Ibid, 24. 
39 See Tony C. Brown, The Primitive, the Aesthetic, and the Savage: An Enlightenment Problematic (Minneapolis, 
MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2012). 
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Critic David Eng’s discussion of Monica Truong’s Book of Salt,40 which tells the story of 
Stein’s Vietnamese chef, urges us to de-obscure the ghost of race in modernist writing. Eng uses 
Lisa Lowe’s idea of “the violence of…modern humanist forgetting”41 to signal the danger of 
absenting race from critique. Eng’s study examines the relationship between modernist aesthetic 
freedom and the obscuring of race, racialized knowledge, experience, and aesthetics, in work that 
does not explicitly mention race but absents it. The question becomes, how does forgetting what 
words mean, or aphasic writing, become a condition of racial oppression, colonialism, as well as 
the avant-garde?  
In the humanistically titled Everybody’s Autobiography (one might say an attempt to 
recall, not forget, everyone), Stein introduces her Vietnamese cook Trac (one who, as Bình, in 
Truong’s book develops an affair with a male poet). In Stein’s queer depictions of Trac, he filters 
in and out of focus. In each of his roles, as cook and as queer, per the hierarchies of household 
and world, Trac is appreciated but barely seen. While Stein narrates Trac’s appearance and 
disappearance, memory stands in his place: “Trac anybody can remember what Trac is, nobody 
has seen him lately but that does not matter Trac is always faithful to his memory, and his 
memory is being present ever after.”42 Trac is the one who has memory and whom others 
remember. Queerly puncturing Trac’s presence in Everybody’s Autobiography is a visit from 
Van Vechten: “So Trac began the summer with us but really we knew he would not like it…then 
Carl came, just for twenty-four hours and he made ninety photographs…Trac has never forgotten 
him naturally.”43 “Carl,” known for his interracial gay affairs, pressumably photographed and 
                                               
40 David Eng, “The End(s) of Race,” PMLA: Publications of the Modern Language Association of America 123 
(October 2008): 1479-93.  
41 Ibid., 1480. Eng quotes Lisa Lowe’s Intimacies of Four Continents (Duke University Press, 2015). 
42 Gertrude Stein, Everybody’s Autobiography (Cambridge, MA: Exact Change, 2004) 160-161. 
43 Ibid. 
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pursued a romance with Trac. Van Vechten’s close relationship to Stein exemplifies her 
closeness to circles that exoticized and desired difference. Trac appears here as a visible ghost of 
race (roped with sexuality) in Stein’s work and life, forcing the question of what the racial other 
signifies: here, memory not forgetting. We might further ask how the absence, or forgetting, of 
any racial representation in Stanzas in Meditation defers racial difference from a body to a kind 
of feeling or mind sense. 
 
Stein’s Concept of Mind 
 That a new sense of space and time could yield a different consciousness, Benjamin was 
well aware. Noting Stein’s own interest in the mind helps in understanding the interplay between 
concepts of consciousness and her poetics. Steven Meyer argues that Stein’s earlier studies in 
psychology under William James led her to conceive of writing as a process of discovery, an 
experimental science located between “the psychological states of attention, inattention, and 
intention.”44 Meyer, along with Ulla Dydo, Marjorie Perloff, and Joan Retallack, thinks about 
Stein as a creative empiricist altering readers’ minds. Both Dydo and Retallack connect the title’s 
final word “meditation” to Stein’s interest in states of mind. They each speak of how Stein’s 
forms of observation and attention produce a meditative, hyper-attentive mindfulness in her 
readers. Retallack defines Stein’s meditation as an “emptying out [of] one’s sense of identity and 
distinct objects of concern. It is a giving over to what is not self-possession.”45 Dydo also 
describes the experience of reading Stanzas as “clean[ing] out our minds and ears; sometimes it 
                                               
44 Steven Meyer, Irresistible Dictation: Gertrude Stein and the Correlations of Writing and Science (Stanford, CA: 
Stanford University Press, 2001), 258. 
45 Joan Retallack, “On Not Not Reading Stanzas in Meditation: Pressures and Pleasures of the Text,” Stanzas in 
Meditation: The Corrected Edition, eds. Susannah Hollister and Emily Setina (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
2012), 20. 
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gives us access to the virgin territory of the making of poetry itself.”46 Dydo’s references both to 
emptying and to virgin territory, a distant and violently gendered time-space, cast meditation as 
not just scientific but also mystical and colonial. Dydo further suggests that Stein makes possible 
“new, unstable and ambiguous forms and meanings. They sound strange precisely because they 
are new and unfamiliar. They are indeed anarchistic.”47 What Perloff and Dydo call Stein’s 
anarchistic mind-sense48 reflects Doyle’s concept of modernists’ paradoxical, racialized past-
seeking—Stein’s experiments are part of how she “both critiques and colludes in the racial order 
of things.”49 But to what extent do the states of mind discussed by these scholars comprise a 
scientific experience, a poetic one, or a magical one? What’s at stake if we label it one way or 
another? In an attempt to study how such a mindful, reparative poem depends on colonialist 
concepts of experience and otherness, we must first understand the poem’s magical qualities, and 
then deconstruct the racialization of this magic. 
 
The Magic of Stanzas 
We might typically imagine the magician entrancing others, but French sociologist 
Marcel Mauss, in his 1902 General Theory of Magic, speaks of the doubleness of the magician’s 
capacity to both possess and be possessed.50 (This doubling of the possessor as the possessed 
parallels two literary forms of possession: that of the writer writing and the reader reading.) 
Anthropologist W. Lloyd Warner also describes the directionality of voodoo as a double 
                                               
46 Ulla E. Dydo, Gertrude Stein: The Language That Rises: 1923-1934 (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University 
Press, 2003), 505. 
47 Ibid., 17. 
48 Marjorie Perloff, Wittgenstein’s Ladder (Chicago: University Chicago Press, 1996), 31. 
49 Doyle, 256. 
50 Marcel Mauss, A General Theory of Magic, trans. Robert Brain (New York: Routledge, 1972), 30. 
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movement, “first away from the victim and then back, with all the compulsive force of one of its 
most powerful rituals.”51 Mauss also posits the magician or priest as socially doubled. He might 
be “strange” or foreign but also “among us”52—a perfect social caption for Gertrude Stein’s life 
as an outsider.53 I am interested in Mauss’s perception of magic as multi-directional for how it 
corresponds to the complexity not only of Stein’s life but also of the work she left behind. 
Thinking of magic’s double-ness encourages us to contend with the multiple contradictory 
positions she occupied: an American and a foreigner in France, a Jew and a sympathizer with 
Fascist leaders, a lesbian and a critic of femininity, a loner and a socialite, a famed writer and an 
unknown outlier. These compositional fragments of Stein’s identity make it difficult to assess her 
relationship both to the difference of others and to the belief that a poem could magically 
transform her own difference.  
To begin, Stein’s playful treatment of names and numbers both entrances us and wakes 
us up. Stein’s word play depends on the duplicity of language. As magic conducts a double 
movement, toward objects and away, so do jokes or pun turn on a paradox. Stein’s constant 
punning is a form of magic and at the same time a detectable ruse if we pay attention. Mauss 
writes, “pun[ning] and onomatopoeic phrases are…sympathetic magic;”54 they play upon 
likeness and call upon the reader to participate by recognizing the similarity. Much of Stanzas in 
Meditation appears to revolve around a one-word pun: the word may, which also announces the 
woman’s name: May. Interestingly, in Walter Cannon’s writings on voodoo and wound shock, to 
                                               
51 W. Lloyd Warner, A Black Civilization: A Study of an Australian Tribe (New York: Harper, 1937), quoted in 
Walter B. Cannon, “‘Voodoo’ Death,” American Anthropologist 44, no. 2 (1942): 174. 
52 Mauss, 38. 
53 See Maria Damon’s “Gertrude Stein’s Doggerel ‘Yiddish’: Women, Dogs, and Jews,” The Dark End of the Street: 
Margins in American Vanguard Poetry (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1993) 202-235. 
54 Mauss, 68. 
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hex someone is to name them, to call them out from the crowd.55 Mauss confirms the place of 
names in magic spells when he writes, “Mythical spells end up consisting of nothing but a single 
proper name or a common word. The names themselves become unrecognizable.”56 By 
comparing Stein’s handwritten version to Toklas’s typed one, Dydo discovered that Toklas had 
changed countless occurrences of the word (proper name) may to “can.”57 Her discovery 
suggests that Stein was punning on her former lover May Bookstaver’s name through the 
constant use of the word may instead of can. An uproar in the Stein-Toklas household had 
recently taken place when Stein’s unpublished novel Q.E.D.—the one detailing this former 
romance—was outed. In the restored, original version of the poem, Stein writes, 
May be I do but do I doubt it  
May be how about it 
I will not may be I do but I doubt it 
May be will may be (146). 
 
Stein’s punning on the name word (m)May reads like magic, a spell on a name. The lowercase 
“m” limits may’s ability to properly name, while its spacing apart from be also limits its meaning 
as “potential” action. The word may gets played as adverb in the first line, a verb in the third (“I 
will not may”), and a noun in the last (“will may be”). Such ambiguity and failed mimesis make 
the reader doubt the poem’s aboutness. Even the desirous invitation, “how about it,” cancels 
itself on the next line: “I will not.” These doublings and reflections, not to mention the 
quintupling of the word may across four lines, instantiate trickery (may/May) and ambivalence 
(doubt’s mantra: maybe so, maybe not) at the heart of the poem’s logics. Stein’s repetition of 
may succeeds in rendering the word unrecognizable, except, of course, to Toklas. One has to 
                                               
55 Cannon, “‘Voodoo’ Death,” 173. 
56 Mauss, 70. 
57 It should be noted that my knowledge of both the original and the corrected edition and Dydo’s discovery adds 
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wonder, however, whether repetition makes the reader notice may more or less. The text’s 
ambivalent relationship to naming and magic seems to mirror the speaker’s own ambivalent 
relationship to the rejected lover. The poem does and does not name May outright. It does and 
does not conjure the absent person.  
The poem’s ambivalent relationship to naming corresponds with Mauss’s description of 
the oppositional effect of sympathetic magic: “When like evokes like it drives away its 
opposite…In this way, the abstract notion of similarity is inseparable from the abstract notion of 
contrariety.”58 To some extent, Mauss seems to speak to our understanding of the often-invisible 
power of binaries, how invoking one term of a pair conjures or reifies the other term.59 The use 
of a name in such a vacuum of reference brings the unnamed to mind too. Taking this notion of 
contrariety into account, it seems that Stein manipulates the magic of names, both their presence 
and their absence. Stein notes a nominal absence when writing on roses: “That they would have 
been named / Had not their labels been taken away / To make room for placing there” (100). 
These lines make an almost pre-structuralist critique of object-name relationships by noting the 
absence of labels on things we name with language, and then rationalizing this absence with the 
need “to make room for placing them there,” as if to say the object and the word could not 
possibly inhabit the same space or time. When names do appear, they dwindle in a sea of Stein’s 
ambivalence: 
I think very well of Susan but I do not know her name 
                                               
58 Mauss, 88. 
59 Lorna Smedman in “Cousin to Cooning,” echoes this concern with the roles of similarity and contrariety in Stein’s 
work, and understands such binaries in relation to Toni Morrison’s concept of Africanism from Playing in the Dark: 
Whiteness and the Literary Imagination (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1992). Smedman writes, “The 
presence of intractable racialized words and tropes of dark and light in Stein’s early work was probably prompted by 
her aesthetic concerns with similarity and difference at the level of the signifier and an anxiety about the effects of 
binary categorization, rather than any overt desire on her part to comment, one way or another, about racism. 
However, her use of racialized language can also be understood in relation to ‘Africanism’” (570-571). I agree that 
Stein’s fascination with opposing words does not come from a desire to comment on race, but that it reflects a 
racialized system of knowledge-making. 
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I think very well of Ellen but which is not the same 
I think very well of Paul I tell him not to do so 
I think very well of Francis Charles but do I do so 
I think very well of Thomas but I do not not do so. (108) 
 
The power of identification diminishes in opposition to the speaker’s assertion “I do not know 
her name.” Furthermore, while the repetition of “I think very well” establishes the I’s 
dominance, the I names no speaker in particular. Stein’s convoluted grammar—the imperfectly 
palindromic “do not not do so” and the insistently self-contradicting “do I do so”—derails the 
affection we might associate with knowing someone’s name or thinking well of them. Dropping 
last names, the speaker fails to pinpoint specific people and only airs floating labels. The names 
confer no recognition—that which both empowers and subjects.  
 The lack of recognition in this act of naming obscures but maintains the magical thinking 
behind the act of naming in Stanzas. Perhaps through the artificiality of the event of naming, the 
reader finds satisfaction in the sensuous materiality of words themselves, the very words that 
might have previously frustrated. Stein teaches us to re-see words not just as labels but as 
powerful in and of themselves. Benjamin, in his 1933 fragment “Antitheses Concerning Word 
and Name,” calls naming “the mute magic of nature…the communication of matter in magical 
community.”60 He locates this magic in the nonsensuousness of words like names whose looks 
and sounds have nothing to do with their significance and yet can signify as such. This is magic 
for Benjamin—the materialization of meaning in the word, logos. Stein’s deflation of names in 
Stanzas in Meditation is just one way in which she renders word as merely word, and thus 
returns the word to a magical-material state. Of course, to be unnamed, or to lose one’s name, is 
to become a generalized Other, or worse, a subject made object, a commodified being. Obscuring 
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the name may and de-signifying proper names potentially reifies abstraction and 
unrecognizability. It also makes abstraction and unrecognizability into conditions for 
experimental poetics and possibly primitivity too. 
Stein’s use of the pronoun they throughout Stanzas in Meditation raises more questions 
about how the poem, in working through and against the magic of naming, also risks masking 
identity or emptying names of meaning. They has no specific identity, no gender, race, ethnicity, 
or number. In this way, they and pronouns generally disrupt the power of these categories and 
proper names. But while magic might depend on the repetition of a specific name, it seems that it 
could also be magical, or counter-magical, to remove identity markers all together. Still, this 
removal is blind to the significance of identity markers that systematically oppress through the 
mechanisms of colonial or state recognition, the address Althusser61 identifies as the 
interpellative power of the law. To what extent is the abstract, non-referential poem still 
producing a knowledge about the power of names that speaks to racialized, anthropological 
concepts of their magic? 
Thinking about the use of the pronoun they in Stanzas in Meditation reminds us both of 
the magical effect of naming and the poem’s historical context between two world wars, wars 
fought in part to preserve colonialist empires.62 From the beginning, they’s constant comings and 
goings feel like a physical, mental, and material invasion of the poem’s space, its rooms or 
                                               
61 See Louis Althusser, "Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses (Notes towards an Investigation)," Lenin and 
Philosophy and Other Essays (New York: Verso, 1970). 
62 Not only did imperial rivalries between Britain, France, Germany and Russia amplify tensions in the lead up to 
World War I, but many colonial subjects were conscripted to fight in the war as well. Furthermore, Germany’s 
ultimate loss of a colonial foothold, Britain and France’s continued amassment of wealth and power across the 
Caribbean, Africa, and South Asia, from west to east, and brewing political tensions in these regions, all contributed 
to the kinds of alliances that formed during World War II, against the formation of armies, and the desire to cement 
world dominance by colonial Western nations. Of course, the aftermath of World War II, the rise of the Soviet 
Union, and the subsequent spread of communism, also contributed to anti-colonial rebellions throughout the middle 
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stanzas. What does Stein do with the fear of or threat posed by the repeating, invading they? 
Does the poem manage to hex them, and help the speaker (and readers) to cope with being 
targeted for one’s difference (in Stein’s case, her unlawful grammar, gender, Judaism, or desire)? 
Stein writes Stanzas in Meditation from the countryside, a space to which she and Alice 
repeatedly retreated under threat of war, and where they hid during the Holocaust. Her poem 
alerts the reader to apprehending a possible threat while also signaling the difficulty of this 
alertness. Stein writes: 
Coming as it did at one time only 
  For which they made it rather now 
  Coming as well when they come and can 
  For which they like it always 
  Or rather best so they can be alert 
  Not only needed in nodding 
  But not only not very nervous 
  As they will willingly pass when they are restless 
  Just as they like it called for them 
  All who have been left in their sense… 
  Always alike and mind do they come. (58-59) 
 
Repeating pronouns, paradoxical syntax (“not only not very nervous”), and recurring “comes” 
and “comings” might indeed lull a reader to sleep. Rhythmically too, the poem lulls as each 
line’s tone rises quickly up and then steadily falls by the end. What is the significance of they in 
reference to stimulants (that which is “needed in nodding”) or the production of tranquility (“not 
only not very nervous”)? If readers merely let words linger before their eyes like a pendulum, 
they might become entranced by the lack of logic or clarity. Are they/we then all under Stein’s 
spell? However tranquil and likeable the trance might seem, it is not harmless. Participants in 
Stanzas’ rite “com[e] through with this as their plan / Always in arises. / Liking it faintly and 
fairly well” (59). The they comply in common liking or pain. The a-grammatical placement of 
the verb “arises” after the preposition “in” leaves the word free to signify as the verb “to get up,” 
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or as a noun form of the verb, multiple “getting’s up;” or, further, it could refer to the plural of 
“aris,” meaning a sharp edge. This double meaning alters how we see both the subjects’ sociality 
and their collective will to entrancement. The phrase “Always alike and mind,” sounds like 
“always alike in mind,” and hints at a conformist, inattentive nature. It makes us question who is 
not “alike” and minding it.  
The oppressive presence of these others leads the reader to question who they are, what 
they want, and who is the speaker in relation to them. While they’s polysemous appearances 
render these questions unresolvable, they’s multiplicity ends up othering the I, or speaker. 
Against the thicket of theys and the speaker’s absenting, the lyric I thereby must interrogate a 
relationship to the collective other. Is she with them or not? Will she survive them or not? In 
Retallack’s analysis, she counts “forty-seven [‘they’s’]( not counting ‘their’s’ and ‘them’s) in the 
first two stanzas of Part I alone,” and depicts they as “feared patriarchal figures…angry siblings, 
estranged or judgmental family members, stern teachers, scornful peers, a public that ignores 
one’s work—but most of all the unknown in others.”63 They might appear hostile by sheer 
number, or by performing negative, hex-like deeds, but most importantly Stein’s lyric neutralizes 
it. In effect, they becomes a dummy or doll, the site or the victim of the trick. After the speaker 
launches the poem alchemically, “I caught a bird which made a ball,” they critiques the speaker’s 
art, “And they thought better of it.” However, the speaker then strips their judgment of any 
value, saying, “But it is all of which they were taught,” as if their erroneous criticism was due to 
limited inculturation. The speaker’s “But they must not stare when they manage” cancels out 
they’s stare with “must not.” Moreover, the next three lines, “Whatever they are occasionally 
liable to do / It is often easy to pursue them once in a while / And in a way there is no repose” 
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(57), give the unnamed, invisible subject the power to chase “them.” The tone of “caught,” 
“stare,” and “pursue” feels dominating, yet each of they’s actions is either admonished or 
abstracted into non-action. Still, this effort—to compose a poem capable of resisting its own sea 
of others—is continuous; “there is no repose,” Stein announces, ten lines into of her longest 
poem—so exhausting is lyric protection. 
The shiftiness of they’s possible identity draws additional attention to the gendered and 
racial dynamics of spelling and counter-spelling in the poem as well as the experience of passing, 
crossing the borders of identity. They’s viral exhaustion of the poem bespeaks a mostly 
masculinist, white omnipresence (one similar, perhaps, to Stein’s white, spacious, butch 
presence), but in this poem, they’s gender wavers. They occupies the poem’s space in a 
masculine, colonialist fashion, but at times raises questions of “sisterhood” and “color.” They’s 
gender instability draws the attention to the force of contrariety and ambivalence toward 
categories in Stein’s work: 
Secretly they met again 
All which is changed is made they may be merry 
For which they could in any regulation 
Manage which they may have in any case of trial 
Of when they do or sing sisters 
And so much is taken for granted 
In which appointment they color me 
Or leave it as not in a glass or on the grass 
They pass (141). 
 
Change and exchange accompany the altering pronoun’s significance. There is a change toward 
good times despite the threat of a trial, and there is secret living, safely “pass[ing]” and sharing a 
treat—all against the vibrancy of green grass. There seem to be two “they’s”: the “they” that 
comes and goes as it pleases, from earlier in the poem, and a new mysterious “they” who are also 
“sing sisters” who could be witches or “which”-es on “trial.” When Stein writes, “they color 
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me,” it is unclear if she refers to the negative criticism her poetry received or to blushing before 
so many like-minded “sisters.” Furthermore, the phrase “they color me” raises the specter of 
race, the possibility of the speaker’s coloring by her admission into the category of those who 
practice magic, secret merriment, or perhaps lesbianism. Queer sexuality and racial “color” are 
always already intertwined.64 The “they” that “pass” invokes racial passing, social rejection, and 
being saved from a witch-hunt or slaughter, as with the biblical Passover. As a plural, non-
specific pronoun, “they” is a word both open to totalities and utterly bound to the specifics of a 
word like “witches.” Through this doubleness and subterfuge, Stein’s poem theorizes the danger 
and magic of referentiality. 
Numbers, like names, play a critical role in many systems of magic and in Stanzas in 
Meditation, where they fail, like words, to work according to formula or expectation. Mauss 
comments on magic spells that “involve numbers and directions. Movements and words must be 
repeated a number of times. Not any number of times but according to sacred and magical 
numbers, such as 3, 4, 5, 7, 9, 11, 13, 20, etc.”65 Stanzas in Meditation’s use of number-words 
and a numbered structure (five numbered parts broken into stanzas with Roman numerals) posits 
an ambiguous relationship to formula. Sequence is a given logic, not a motivated one. And yet 
sequencing likewise instills a sense of ritual due to its predictability. Through sustained spaces of 
reading with marked times for rest, this text alludes to formality without subscribing to it.  
While Stanzas’ sequencing might make the poem appear logical, its use of numbers and 
words does not add up. Paradoxically, Stein pairs numbers with their mimetic partner in syntax 
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or their homophonic partner in sound. Where Stein avoids representation or typical formula, she 
substitutes the following: 
  I said the difference is complicated 
  And she said yes is it it is 
Or she said it is is it. 
There seems so much to do 
With one or two with six not seven 
Either or. 
Or believe (110-111). 
 
In these lines, Stein presents one pattern, then turns it inside out; “is it it is” (question followed 
by declaration) becomes “it is is it” (declaration followed by question). If the words were 
numbers, computing the two phrases might yield zero, a null sum, but since they are words, the 
“complicated” “difference” is the semantic expression of authority or not, knowing or not 
knowing. Stein seems to parry these contrasting speech patterns (and positions) against numbers, 
as if to call attention to what happens when the expected pattern or the significance of the word 
fails to cohere. If “[e]ither or,” “one or two,” doesn’t matter, or if the meaning of their difference 
depends on “believ[ing]” and not deciding, then poetic language becomes a site of magical 
creativity, a something from nothing, not a predetermined system.  
Stein’s use of numbers reads like spell-inducing mantras in readers’ mouths. In “Stanza 
IX,” Stein riffs on the stanza’s number: 
 How nine  
 Nine is not mine  
 Mine is not nine  
 Ten is not nine  
 Mine is not ten…  
 I am not nine  
 May be nine  
 Mine one at a time  
 Not one from nine  
 Nor eight at one time  
 For which they may be mine. (146) 
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The first four lines of this passage indicate that neither word-sound nor shape produces 
equivalence, despite mine and nine’s similarity. Neither does rearranging word order confer 
equality; thus difference springs from an error not in formula but in semantics. Seizing on two 
words’ similarity, Stein interrogates the arbitrariness of difference. Her repeated iteration of the 
n- and m-sounds, the sound-point of difference, simultaneously merges and opposes “mine” and 
“nine,” both entrancing us and alerting us to this trance. 
The passage above emphasizes the importance of sound to Stein’s meaning, and to how 
her poem alerts readers to their capacity to sense. I, as sound, letter, and Roman numeral one, 
repeats again and again. In the singular possessive “mine” and in the highest single digit “nine,” 
the ay sound multiplies the speaker’s singularity. The sustained ahne sound also invokes the 
German for one, ein, and Stein’s own name. Writing to Lindley Hubbell, Stein insists on the 
tether between sound and meaning: “‘[J]ust how meaning is related to sound and just how you 
must conceive meaning so that sound does not count, is the thing that endlessly holds us…and 
after all the meaning is reliable only if it creates in and by itself the sound.’”66 Stein suggests that 
we rely upon the meaning that compels its own sound onomatopoeically, or materially, like 
names or labels do. She calls on us to sense language and notice the meaning of words’ sonic 
relationships. Additionally, Stein’s multiplication of the self by merging “mine” and “nine” 
enables hearing the poem as a spell of self-protection (more strength in numbers) and 
collectivization (through accumulating singulars). As “the thing that that endlessly holds us,” 
sound turns the individual reader into a self-possessing group—an us who can better attend to the 
sensuous world rather than become entranced by memories of war, factory noises, or political 
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discourse. This counter-spell perverts the numeric signifier, while maintaining enough sonic 
coherence to feel trance-like. These trace-like effects place the poem between the ethnographic 
prescription for magic spells and Stein’s own theory of poetic composition—an inventive, 
meditative space where an ongoing negotiation with the present ensues. 
Stanzas in Meditation further performs a sense-inducing magic through the alchemic 
metamorphosis67 of words. Her metamorphic treatment of words presents shape-shifting as a real 
option for repairing representational damage or escaping too much recognition. However, words 
that sound alike but appear different serve to redirect our attention to how we perceive language. 
We become re-attuned to our senses. Dydo calls Stein’s form of metamorphosis “interlacing.”68 
Stein might have called it “threading,” evoking the gendered difference between an alchemic 
transformation and a woven accumulation, the former masculine, wizardy, and the latter 
feminine, witchy. Below, a man holds Stein’s thread: 
It came very closely but no one was just yet 
Not to be frightened as they meant at all  
I do not care that he should make threads so 
Threads are tenderly heads are tenderly so and so. (71) 
 
These lines might relate to an actual tailor, seamstress, or weaver, but the sonic and visual 
closeness of “thread” to “threat” draws our attention back to the word frightened. If we continue 
to read sonically, the morphed “threat” in “thread” finds its echo in the earlier “yet.” Similarly, 
the word “threads” makes the reader hear what they cannot see: the prick of the needle that 
“sew[s]” a head onto “so and so.” Stein’s “thread” literally binds together these multiple 
meanings into one, while maintaining their difference. Not only does “thread”/threat echo in 
“heads,” but also the repetition of “tenderly” so close to heads produces the image of a small doll 
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laid across a guillotine or stuck with voodoo pins. These “heads are tenderly so and so,” 
unworthy of naming or remembering; they underscore the risk of non-recognition, and undo the 
spell that demands a name. Again, Stein’s lyric seems to ameliorate the looming threat through 
our heightened attention. There will be no mistaking threads for heads, or “so” for “so.” We 
notice each distinctly.  
Most generally, Stanzas in Meditation recalibrates our capacity to notice through the 
relative absence of concrete nouns, adjectives, images, or names; this linguistic void, this 
nothing, calls upon the reader to notice and respond to something. The sudden appearance of the 
specific name of an animal, food, action, or element of nature jolts readers to attention after 
wading through endless unspecific pronouns or recurring uncommon syntax and “erroneous” 
prepositions. When Stein shifts from the vague, “That it is now that it is there / That rain is there 
and it is here / That it is here and that they are there” (80), to the sensory, romantic meditation, 
“It is very often very strange / How hands smell of woods / And hair smells of tobacco / And 
leaves smell of tea and flowers” (81), the reader not only notices the latter’s specificity, but also 
returns to the particular one syllable beats and repeating t’s, th’s, h’s, and r’s in the nonspecific, 
earlier lines, thus relearning to sense without direct reference. Through these sudden shifts, the 
reader experiences the relationship between word shape and sound as novel and flexible, as 
unwrought matter. In this regard, not only does the word become a magical material69 again but 
also the space of the poem works vis à vis a concept of the word’s primitivity. Stein’s extremely 
infrequent specific words maintain an objective thread or line of possession to her readers. 
Chickens, dogs, sheep, raspberries, cake, robins, and nightingales appear fleetingly, and the 
infrequency of detail serves to empty the mind and ready it for meditation. Details are small 
                                               
69 See Chapter 1’s discussion of Benjamin’s writings on alphabetic magic. 
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tokens or rationed candy that make us stay; one “chicken” must last several pages of non-
objective nouns and other non-imagible words. This rarity of specificity forces readers to 
recalibrate their reading or seeing, perhaps to become more aware of what’s inside a word and 
around it, a kind of counter-trance or counter-spell that increases perception.  
Even focusing on Stein’s titular “meditation” as a means of reading the poem’s attention-
producing effects seems to depend on a reader’s primitive imagination. Thinking about Stanzas 
in Meditation as an act of meditation reveals the possible contradiction between the rationality 
attached to empirical noticing and the irrationality attached to magic. Mid-poem, Stein writes, 
“Once again I think I am reflecting” (77). This self-possession in meditation correlates easily to 
the magician who “to a certain extent, can control his possession; he brings it on 
by…monotonous music.”70 Certainly Stanzas’ “monotonous music” possesses us and helps us 
reach a heightened consciousness, but at what cost? Some critics discussing Stein’s conscious-
raising effects seem to fall back on the trope of primitivism. Dydo interweaves her own 
definition of meditative reading with a pre-historic, pre-literate past, a “back-when” naiveté: “To 
read a stanza, we must give up our reading habits, abandon expectations of language behavior, 
and read aloud word for word, literally, I am tempted to say naively, as if we did not know how 
to read.”71 For Dydo, becoming pre-literate or newly-literate, we encounter what she calls “virgin 
territory.”72 However, this critically imagined “virgin territory” of non-sense where we re-learn 
to read is inevitably also the raced, gendered territory of colonization, a space-time imagined and 
idealized by reader and poet in the moment always before destruction.  
 
                                               
70 Mauss, 48-49. 
71 Dydo, The Language That Rises, 505. 
72 Ibid. 
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The Other Time of Magic 
In a primitive time-space with colonialist parameters, a prior moment and a prior location 
just before their disappearance, time appears to stand still. Stein’s own claim that, in writing 
Stanzas, she wanted to make “‘a long dull poem too and a bare one,’” speaks to duration, 
attention and stillness (ibid, 506). Stein poses a relationship between the surface-level “this-ness” 
of meditative thinking and the stopping of time altogether when she writes,  
This that I think is this.  
It is natural to think in numerals  
If you do not mean to think  
Or think or leave or bless or guess  
Not either no or yes once.  
This is how hours stand still. (Stanzas, 149) 
 
Stein’s form of “not mean[ing] to think” could lead one to “think in numerals,” to confuse 
“bless” and “guess,” and to embrace an ambivalent “not-either” ether in life. Stanzas seems to 
argue for the re-attunement to what this experience is; and, from this might come a temporal 
standstill.  
Benjamin’s mystical-messianism posits the standstill as crucial to making people aware 
of the modern emergency. Arresting time occasions a dialectical image that merges the past with 
the present. This image interweaves a primitive temporality with a historicist one, a static sense 
of time with a progressive one. For Benjamin, “[w]here thinking suddenly comes to a stop in a 
constellation saturated with tensions, it gives that constellation a shock, by which thinking is 
crystalized as a monad…the sign of a messianic arrest of happening.”73 Stanzas’ incredibly long, 
monadic, not momentary standstill is Stein’s ultimate act of poetic magic. It stops the parade of 
history, war, and countless visitors through the writer’s life and rooms. As Stein writes in her 
1945 Wars I Have Seen, “Death starts history and fears” (9). Stanzas, maybe, can stop them. “I 
                                               
73 Benjamin, “On The Concept of History,” in Selected Writings Vol. 4 (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 2006), 396. 
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could go on with this” (Stanzas, 160), Stein writes, “I wish to remain to remember that stanzas 
go on” (ibid, 112); the forever of writing (reading) Stanzas is how the poet (reader) steps outside 
of time’s onward slaughter. But this freedom, to skirt time, and the poem’s survival, arises 
through an aesthetics that reconfigures aspects of blackness’s then-there for whiteness’s here-
now. 
 De-obscuring the mechanisms of primitivity and race at work in Stein’s curative poem 
(and the modernist poetic imagination more largely) particularly depends on understanding how 
not just Stanzas’s standstill but its temporal difference works. Johannes Fabian, in his book Time 
and the Other, posits his theory that the conceptual nature of time has changed over time, and, 
particularly, that anthropologists, working in the aftermath of global colonization, spatialized 
time in order to distance themselves from their subjects. He writes, “Primitive, being essentially 
a temporal concept, is a category, not an object of Western thought.”74 By insisting on the 
distinction between the colonial subject’s then/there and the European’s now/here, 
anthropologists’ understanding of their subject was skewed. Unable to believe that two kinds of 
time could coexist, or that the time of ritual and the time of science would ever overlap, 
anthropologists struggled to represent the other accurately. And yet poetic time has almost 
always embraced a fractured time-sense—the time of the writing, the poetic event75—and the 
reader’s reading always seeming to co-transpire in time and space. That Stein’s nonsense, “Not 
either no or yes once,” yields a “stand still” prompts us to question how the poetic event depends 
                                               
74 Fabian, Time and the Other, 18. 
75 See Jonathan Culler’s “Apostrophe” in The Pursuit of Signs: Semiotics, Literature, Deconstruction. (Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press, 198l), 135-154, for his discussion of how the poetic speaker’s address of the subject and/or 
the reader turns the poem, not the narrated event, into the poetic event. Culler’s discussion of poetic vocation and of 
the prophetic qualities of the speaking voice—one that conjures the future event of reading—conveys a rather 
mystical view of poetry. I see Culler’s criticism as a legacy of structuralism that can be traced back to the influence 
of early twentieth century ethnography. 
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on what Fabian theorizes as anthropology’s then-there/here-now colonialist binaries while also 
riskily skirting their limits.  
Working through the history of philosophy, not anthropology, Tony C. Brown’s more 
recent theorization of primitive time helps us to consider anew how a poem’s temporal standstill 
harbors a racialized figure. Brown describes “the problem of thinking the primitive” as a 
temporal problem in his analysis of the primitive’s conceptual influence on eighteenth-century 
aesthetic theory.76 His critique frames primitive temporality as outside of linearity altogether 
rather than “first.” According to Brown, there stands “the inescapable yet infinitely troubling 
figure of the not-quite-nothing, the primitive: the absolutely first or, more significantly, what is 
before the first, beyond any temporal existence.”77 This depiction of the primitive speaks directly 
to the temporality of Stanzas in Meditation. Time in Stein’s poem does not accumulate in 
reading, but ceases to count at all—it enacts the nothing. Stein’s no-time is ultimately neither 
here nor there. Stanzas’s temporal standstill is not just due to the poem’s magical characteristics. 
The poem’s temporality also stems from the trouble of “thinking the primitive,” or rather its 
reliance on a racialized, colonial concept of pre-colonial time. In The Autobiography, Stein 
herself paints a relationship between people of African descent, primitivity, and nothingness: 
“Gertrude Stein concluded that negroes were not suffering from persecution, they were suffering 
from nothingness. She always contends that the african is not primitive, he has a very ancient but 
a narrow culture and there it remains. Consequently nothing does or can happen.”78 Despite 
saying “the african is not primitive,” Stein racistly represents him as narrow, inconsequential, 
                                               
76 Brown, The Primitive, the Aesthetic, and the Savage, xii. 
77 Ibid. 
78 Stein, The Autobiography of Alice B. Toklas, 292. 
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and existing in the same temporality that Brown claims defines as primitive, in a space outside of 
time where “nothing does or can happen.”  
Not only does Stanzas in Meditation’s primitivistic temporality suspend time, but it also 
collides multiple grammatical times,79 and therefore produces a no-time “before the first.” 
Coinciding tenses evoke a chaotic sense of time beyond knowability, making the poem another 
“thing that endlessly holds us,” an ongoing possession. In the poem’s final lines, subjunctive, 
imperative, past conditional, future, progressive, and perfect tenses crystalize into all-time and 
no-time: 
 Let them be mine therefor. 
 Everybody knows that I chose. 
 Therefore if therefor before I close. 
 I will therefor offer therefore I offer this. 
 Which if I refuse to miss may be miss is mine. 
 I will be well welcome when I come. 
 Because I am coming. 
 Certainly I come having come. 
  These stanzas are done. (249) 
 
Here the imperative “Let” commands future action while “chose” stresses pastness. “Before” 
beckons to a past before that past or before the present about to become past. “[I]f” and “may be” 
evoke conditionality and promise, while the end-stopped lines deliver a finality extremely rare in 
the rest of the poem. The last line ironically bears the present tense “are,” despite the poem not 
just ending but announcing (and accomplishing) this end with the finality of “done.” Still, Stein’s 
penultimate “come having come” sitting above “done” smites any doneness or accompli: 
everything is already. For Brown, the temporal nothing frames the concept of the primitive, but 
                                               
79 One might say that Stein allows for the coexistence of more than one time, what Fabian, in Time of the Other, 
cited previously, claims that past anthropologists have failed to allow due to centering Europe and observing through 
European frameworks. Fabian writes, “Western rational disbelief in the presence of ancestors and the efficacy of 
magic rest on the rejection of ideas of temporal coexistence implied in these ideas and practices” (34). He implies 
that belief in the coexistence of different temporalities allows for belief in magic.  
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suspending time also produces duration, not no time but an extended time, one that feels 
messianic in Agamben’s sense of the word, an end-time that feeds on its own unendingness.80 
Certainly any reader of Stanzas has felt this version of apocalyptic time in the poem’s apparent 
eternality. Inside this temporal suspension on the page, the reader, speaker, and larger, imagined 
social body of the between-the-war era achieve a material-mystical connection. 
 Stanzas in Meditation’s poetic parallels to a magic spell and the poem’s abstracted sense 
of a threat produce highly attentive readers, ones hungry for the reparative effects of attending 
closely to experience. Perhaps these readers would rediscover their ability to, as Adorno and 
Horkeimer wish, “hear with their own ears what has not already been heard.”81 Reading the 
poem in response to post-world-war psycho-social contexts—fear, shock, anaesthesia, and 
nonsense—allows us to think more broadly about how colonial concepts of otherness effect the 
conditions through which reparation is imagined or thought possible. Since the collective trauma 
wrought by World War I was also the result of global colonialist competition, it becomes a 
colonial, racialized phenomenon when poets in an American-European context employ a poetics 
of magic—a poetics retheorizing the forms of time, space, and consciousness associated with 
those colonial realms—in order to restore post-war consciousness. The aesthetics of Stein’s 
“avant-garde” whiteness arises through believing anthropological generalizations about how a 
non-specific group of non-white others experience the world, and through desiring that the 
colonized world deliver some kind of cure for modern malaise. 
                                               
80 See Giorgio Agamben’s chapter “The Fourth Day: Apostolos” in The Time That Remains, trans. Patricia Dailey 
(Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 2005), 59-87, in which he draws a parallel between the recursive 
structure of the sestina, particularly its condensed repetitions in the final stanza, and his conceptualization of 
apocalyptic time as containing a sense of both infinity and an approaching finality—a temporality unique to the 
experience of an end-time. 
81 Theodor Adorno and Max Horkeimer, “The Concept of Enlightenment,” in Dialectic of Enlightenment: 
Philosophical Fragments, ed. Gunzelin Schmid Noerr, trans.Edmund Jephcott  (Stanford, Calif: Stanford University 
Press, 2002), 28. 
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 I have sought to demonstrate how Stein’s Stanzas in Meditation is shot through with 
racialized forms of occultist thinking, through the poem does not avow any belief in occultism. 
This kind of writing is a product of knowledge-making about race, poetry, and magic that came 
into prominence during her lifetime. Stein’s composition, regardless of her intentions, theorizes 
the poetic through techniques resembling the characteristics of magic as rendered by 
anthropologists studying “primitive” cultures in colonized spaces elsewhere to Stein’s world. 
The same poetic events that recall Mauss’ theory of magic—punning, naming, repeating, 
counting, and merging two into one—double back on themselves in Stein’s work, indicating a 
desire not to trance but un-trance, to produce a meditative alertness to the disenchanting spell of 
technologized Late Capital. This paradoxical position on magic complicates my claim that the 
poem appropriates a racialized form of ritualistic transaction. Still, the poem’s temporality 
underscores how primitivity structures the poem’s thinking. Stanzas’ production of primitive 
time reflects a conception of time that depends upon and reproduces a racialized, primitive, pre-
literate other: it is this time that structures our82 experience of Stein’s avant-garde work. Because 
time is ultimately conceptual and ideological, not just aesthetic or linguistic, Stanzas in 
Meditation’s temporal difference attests to the theorization and work of racialized concepts in 
modernist avant-garde poetry. Stein remarks, “To think how birds spell and do not spell well” 
(164)—so too do poets. 
 Nonetheless, how do the stakes of this ambiguous position look differently when that 
poet is an American black poet in post-war Harlem? In the next chapter, I will explore Amiri 
Baraka’s 1969 collection Black Magic, a collection that traces his journey from downtown to the 
                                               
82 Surely many different kinds of readers might experience time in Stein’s Stanzas differently, still I suggest that the 
structures of this time might indeed produce a cross-temporal readership, such that there exists an entranced 
univocal “we the readers.” 
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“heaven” of Harlem, the one Van Vechten glorified. Baraka shows how the concept of magic 
works to define not only white but also black avant-gardism. Similarly, I examine the role of 
magic in the belief that the poem both avenges and repairs. 
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Chapter Three 
Unstuffing the Doll: Defiguring Magic in Amiri Baraka’s Black Magic 
 
The West is an insane asylum, a conscious and 
premeditated receptacle of black magic… Scat 
black magic, but to scat or scatter is not to admit 
formlessness. The aftersound is more than a bridge. 
It ruptures interpretation even as the trauma it 
records disappears.1 
  
—Fred Moten  
 
         We need magic  
now we need the spells, to raise up 
return, destroy, and create.2 
    
—Amiri Baraka, “Ka ’Ba”  
 
When I die, the consciousness I carry I will to 
black people. May they pick me apart and take the 
useful parts, the sweet meat of my feelings. And 
leave the bitter bullshit rotten white parts alone.3  
 
       —Amiri Baraka, “leroy”  
 
 
 
 Like countless other widely canonized modernists or other experimental heroes of New 
American Poetry, Amiri Baraka’s free expression of now unpopular political views of gender, 
race, religion, and sexuality can be troubling for critics who wish to grant his life’s work critical 
value. I suspect that the distance which many critics keep from Baraka, as opposed to say, Stein 
or Pound or Williams, concerns both his “radical” racial politics and the continued, guarded 
whiteness of the English discipline.  
                                               
1 Fred Moten, In The Break: Aesthetics of the Black Radical Tradition (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 
2003), 39. 
2 Amiri Baraka, Black Magic: Sabotage – Target Study – Black Art (New York: Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1969) 
146.  
3 Ibid, 217. All subsequent references to the poems in the collection Black Magic, the principal object of this 
chapter’s analysis, will be cited parenthetically by page number. 
  106 
Critic Werner Sollers and biographer-critic Jerry Watts both discount Baraka’s Black 
Magic (1969), the focus of this chapter. While twenty-one poems from this two hundred and 
twenty-five page compendium of three short books were anthologized in Transbluesency (1995), 
the large bulk of this collection has never been reprinted and has been barely discussed except in 
some remarkable early Baraka scholarship included in Donald Gibson’s Modern Black Poets.4 
Jerry Watts writes that the poems in Black Magic represent Baraka’s “attachment to a dying and 
destructive white ethos,”5 despite the myriad ways in which these poems chronicle Baraka’s 
spiritual and political formation across the 1960s. While Aldon Nielsen calls Baraka’s work of 
this time “spirit writing,”6 Sollers describes the collection as “merely a transcription of a Dadaist 
scream.”7 However, the first poems to seem at all Dadaist8 or scream-like do not appear until the 
last sub-section, Black Art, and further, the scream thematized there is an urgently referential, not 
nonsensical, scream9 against anti-black racism and capitalist oppression, more in line with the 
Marxist politics of Dadaism that its anarchistic aesthetics. 
 So why has this collection been mostly ignored? To make the collection, Baraka self-
anthologized three smaller books10 from 1961-1967 (Sabotage, 1961-1963; Target Study, 1963-
1965; and Black Art, 1965-1966), turbulent years for Baraka, romantically, creatively, and 
                                               
4 Donald B. Gibson, editor, Modern Black Poets: A Collection of Critical Essays (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1973). 
See three essays attuned to Baraka’s early career by Lee A. Jacobus, “Imamu Amiri Baraka: the Quest for Moral 
Order;” Clyde Taylor, “Baraka as Poet”; and Arthur P. Davis, “The New Poetry of Black Hate.” 
5 Jerry Watts, Amiri Baraka: The Politics and Art of a Black Intellectual (New York: NYUP, 2001), 228. 
6 See Aldon Nielsen, Black Chant: Languages of African Post-Modernism (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
1997). 
7 Werner Sollers, Amiri Baraka /Leroi Jones: The Quest for a "Populist Modernism" (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1978), 197. 
8 Likewise, Sollers misses the relevance of any Dadaist echo in this text, one that resounds the Marxist 
underpinnings of both movements—Dada and Black Arts. 
9 Fred Moten might call this scream the maternal scream of the Middle Passage, a scream he analyzes in the 
newspaper photograph of Emmett Till in his casket, in “Black Mo’nin in the Sound of a Photograph”, In the Break, 
192-210. 
10 The individual collections are in fact not that small. Sabotage was forty-one pages; Target Study, sixty-five pages; 
and Black Art, one hundred. Clearly Baraka could not find or did not seek a publisher at the time.  
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politically. He released them as one book under the curious title, Black Magic. The book went 
out of print shortly after its 1969 publication. None of the poems were reprinted until the 
Transbluesency in 1995. Despite the absence of critical attention to this collection in the decades 
that followed, it seems that the cover designer Quentin Fiore had some idea of the title’s 
significance. 1969 was a contentious historical moment. By the time Black Magic appeared, 
Emmett Till, Martin Luther King Jr., John F. Kennedy, Robert Kennedy, and Malcolm X had all 
been killed. The Black Panthers had already released a revised, Marxist version of their ten-point 
plan. And here comes (then named) LeRoi Jones with a book of poems about looting Jewish 
storefronts, killing white devils, and raising black consciousness.   
The Fiore cover features a white Play-Doh-like voodoo doll with black-inked teeth, sky-
blue eye-blotches, and a blond cap of painted hair, stuck all over with pearl-headed pins. The 
section titles “Sabotage – Target Study – Black Art” run small across the bottom. The title, the 
doll, and the details of the sub-sections spell out content ill-suited for white readers not ready to 
be held accountable for their complicated complicity in the actual sabotage of black life in the 
United States. The representation of the target as a white voodoo doll seems to accept that Black 
power might find recourse in mythical “black arts” or magic. Picturing “black magic” this way 
makes readers think of magic as germane not only to the occult practices of a primitive past but 
also to the black vernacular, one that includes the racial drama of American history and its 
present.11 The image aptly centers the contradictory status of magic as straddling a long-ago past 
                                               
11 To conceive of the primitive as past is to eclipse the history of contact between colonists and indigenous peoples 
and to further eclipse indigenous people’s continued life upon and claim to the land I live on. My reference to both 
the vernacular and to American history here intends to foreground as much that the history of magic in African 
spiritual practices is synonymous with American history as much as the presence of magic in indigenous religious 
practices is. 
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and what Tony C. Brown calls the continuous present of blackness that the concept of primitivity 
invokes.12 
In the years leading up to Black Magic’s publication, Baraka sought a new sense of 
community, home and self, particularly spiritually. He begins by abandoning the bohemian, 
downtown New York scene, which had been his home-away-from Newark. Diane di Prima, self-
fashioned magician, features front and center in this early phase of his journey, as his once lover 
and co-publisher of the Beat poetry newsletter The Dancing Bear. His experiments and 
associations post-Downtown with Yoruba and Black Islam evoke a desire for a kind of religious 
belonging that would transcend “Black American” and re-suture him to an originary, African 
spirituality. This spiritual journey should be seen as a strategic move to combat the effects of 
racism and the effects of colonialism. As Spivak notes, American slavery and racism have 
constituted a form of internal colonialism which has included but has not been limited to the 
secularization of African cultures.13 Against this context, Baraka’s spiritual journey14 sought 
self-possession, community belonging, a way to make sense of the material world, and a set of 
beliefs about the unforeseeable world beyond. On the back cover of his later book of poems 
Hard Facts, from 1975, he writes, “Earlier our own poems came from an enraptured scream 
against whites as the eternal enemies of Black people, as the sole cause of our disorder + 
                                               
12 See Tony C. Brown, The Primitive, the Aesthetic, and the Savage (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota 
Press, 2012) for his theory of primitive time as operating outside of linear chronology, and composing the nothing of 
time, which I interpret as kind of eternal, continual present. While Brown is thinking through the primitive’s 
operations in eighteenth century thought, I argue that this racialized figure still influences 1960s Euro-centric space-
time, whereby colonial space-time is deemed “black” and magical, as a foil to “white,” “rational” space-time of 
colonizer cultures. 
13 See Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, “Teaching for the Times,” The Journal of the Midwest Modern Language 
Association 25, no. 1 (Spring, 1992): 3-22. Spivak’s call for critics to investigate the “sublation of internal 
colonialism,” which she cites as the secularization of African spirituality and magic, is based on her reading of Jack 
Forbes, Black Africans and Native Americans: Color, Race and Caste in the Evolution of Red Black Peoples (New 
York: Blackwell, 1988). 
14 This questing does not end for Baraka in the sixties—by the mid-seventies he turned away from a strict separatist 
and Black Islamist view, dropping Imamu from his name. He also did not abandon white community upon returning 
to Newark, where he ultimately was a pall bearer for William Carlos Williams. 
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oppression. The same subjective mystification led to mysticism, metaphysics, spookism, &c., 
rather than dealing with reality.”15 
Despite Baraka’s reflective criticism of his spiritual poetics, I read Black Magic as an 
attempt to address the real disorder of his present moment and the particularities of these 
conditions through a strategic racial, spiritual, and political essentialism.16 In Black Magic, I see 
Baraka not only navigating away from drug-addled, white bohemia and toward Black Islam and 
black radical politics, but also devising a cultural and aesthetic theory about black resistance in  
conversation with past and present movements, including white modernist primitivism, the 
Beats, Négritude, black Marxism, and idealist and metaphysical philosophies. In this chapter, I 
bring the anticolonial historical moment during which Black Magic appears to bear on the text’s 
relationship to race, magic, and linguistic form, particularly the ways in which these poems enact 
a poetic theory about the materiality of sound. To this extent, my reading of Black Magic’s 
formal qualities departs from Nielsen’s own thinking in Black Chant about the important 
inseparability of orality and textuality. In this way, working both on and off the page, the poems 
not only contain the space-time of pan-African politics, the rise of Black Islam in the United 
States, and post-Marxist protests across the globe but also provide a space in which such political 
contestations against racism, colonialism, and capitalism can be engaged at lower stakes. The 
book also reflects contestations at the level of Baraka’s identity, shifts in name, family 
allegiances, and aesthetic and religious creeds as well as a changing relationship to “the Black 
aesthetic tradition.” Nathaniel Mackey, in his analysis of what he calls Baraka’s “changing 
                                               
15 See backcover of Amiri Baraka, Hard Facts (Newark, N. J.: People's War, 1975). 
16 See Gayatri Spivak, “Subaltern Studies: Deconstructing Historiography,” in The Spivak Reader: Seleected Works 
of Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak. ed. Donna Landry and Gerald MacLean (New York: Routledge, 1996), 203-236. 
Spivak reclaims ethnic or racial essentialism from its critics as a possible willed, strategic response contingent upon 
specific material, political conditions of a historical moment in the process of decolonization. 
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same,” or his restless aesthetics and politics, reads this indeterminate positionality as containing 
both alienation and resistance.17 
Through this indeterminacy, Black Magic inverts what might usually be called 
appropriative, primitive aesthetics and subverts the racialized Manichean dialectic of pure 
whiteness and evil blackness upon which such aesthetics rest. My analysis thereby complicates 
earlier arguments in this dissertation about linking aesthetic experimentalism and magic by 
raising questions about how the poet’s racial position shifts the political stakes of invoking magic 
in poetry. A close analysis of the whole of Black Magic reveals the significant work this 
collection achieves, including: its theorization of good and bad magic; its interrogation of the 
materialism of sound and the immaterialism of text; its manifestation of the violence a text can 
perform; and its improvisational iteration of “rebeginning.” Black Magic negotiates 
contemporaneous critiques of barbarism and primitivistic depictions of blackness alongside 
diasporic Africana thinkers such as C.L.R. James, Aimé Césaire, and Frantz Fanon. It also posits 
the material poem as a crucial site for improvisational resistance, collectivity and political 
transcendence though what Moten calls “interanimation,”18 or the re-presentation of the original 
contradiction between subjective and objective being. Through its critique and improvisation, 
Baraka’s work problematizes poetry’s relationship to magic, replaces magic with a spiritual-
dialectical consciousness, and reveals “magic” as the false art underpinning real obstacles to 
black mattering: whiteness, the American dream, and the false promises of capitalism. In sum, 
Baraka’s poetry suspends or interrupts the capacity of the black figure of primitivity to figure as 
                                               
17 Nathaniel Mackey, “The Changing Same: Black Music in the Poetry of Amiri Baraka,” boundary2 6, no. 2 
(Winter 1978): 358. 
18 Moten, In the Break, 22. 
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doll, magic object or poem.  In its place, Baraka writes the figure of whiteness and liberates 
blackness from figurality, through sound, spirit, and dialectics.  
 In closely (and distantly, wholly) reading Black Magic amidst contemporaneous 
discourse on magic, race, poetry and primitivity, I aim to give this part of Baraka’s lifework 
proper critical attention in line and in collaboration with Mackey and Moten’s thinking on 
Baraka. In analyzing specific aesthetic markers of Baraka’s work—Dadaist nonsense and 
neologisms, chant-like invocations, broadside-like formatting, slang, and jazz elements—I offer 
readers a new way to understand magic’s place in his poetics. Also, by attending to the book’s 
metaphysical investigation, I open up a new critical discussion of Black Magic’s emphasis on 
violence and its possible relationship to the poetics of magic. My work calls on critics to rethink 
the violent underpinnings of Baraka’s work (the main cause of its dismissal) first as primary to 
black American experience, and secondly as textual; I read the anti-white violence in Black 
Magic as taking effect through the space between the material and the mystical. Inside this 
liminal space, one not inherently bodily, violence is real but survivable. This violence, like a 
knife that passes through but leaves no hole, reflects a belief in the magical qualities of language 
and text. These observations lead me to view the poems’ linguistic attack on the white majority, 
including its more and less accepted minorities (the bourgeoisie, Jews, and queers) as not just a 
response to centuries of anti-black oppression, but rather as a strategic destruction meant to 
occasion a new construction. Baraka’s poems reject and destroy the American dream of class 
mobility (a.k.a. white magic) and manifest a different black magic of Pan-African consciousness.  
This black magic of improvisational, political communion through music, speech, and 
bodies transpires inside a black, magical space-time, and imagines a return to Africanness, a 
return reminiscent of what historian Reiland Rabaka calls a critical, dialectical return in 
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reference to Aimé Césaire’s poetry.19 In this vein, Black Magic can be seen as a reformulation of 
Négritude through a strategic engagement with anti-colonial thinkers Césaire, Fanon, and C.L.R. 
James. Since this construction occurs in the wake of destruction, Baraka’s “re-beginning” 
depends on imagining an alternative, Africana space-time infused with primitive pastness and 
local vernacular too. Through Baraka’s “unfocused” or diasporic aesthetic and his persistent 
dialecticism, his poetics refuses the modernist trap of nostalgic nativity20 and restores praxis to 
magic. 
 
The Spells, To Raise Up 
 The doubleness of magic—the bad and the good of it—undergirds Black Magic. Direct 
references to magic abound in contradictory forms, at times as “white evil” and at other times as 
the long-lost spiritual strength of African-roots. More often than not, magic for Baraka lies in the 
guise of the artificial, material, thing-obsessed world, the wave of a capitalist hand that makes 
you want (more) stuff. In the poem “After the Ball,” in the first section, Sabotage, Baraka 
describes “the magic dance / of the second ave. ladies, / in the artificial glare / of the world” (17). 
Here magic seems to lure the speaker, and yet the dancing women form a ground against which 
the constructed quality of the world gets reflected, unwelcomingly, back to us.  
 Baraka repeatedly posits magic as tangled with the way language works, from its 
alphabetic constituent parts to its capacity to sound and to make others make sound. The 
speaker’s relationship to the magic of letters coincides with his articulation of the selfhood he 
                                               
19 Reiland Rabaka, The Négritude Movement: W.E.B. Du Bois, Leon Damas, Aimé Césaire, Leopold Senghor, 
Frantz Fanon (New York: Lexington Books, 2015), 191. 
20 See Laura Doyle, “The Flat, the Round, and Gertrude Stein: Race and the Shape of Modern(ist) History,” 
Modernism/modernity 7, no. 2 (April 2000): 249-271. While Doyle argues that modernist anachronism is racialized 
by its narrative of progress, her analysis largely centers on white modernist writers. Therefore, it may be useful to 
explore further the significance and methods of Baraka’s resistance to such nostalgia.  
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desires. “Among things with souls, find me,” Baraka writes in his poem “Success,” producing a 
self that is both material and spiritual (21). (This line also ventriloquizes Marx’s speaking 
commodity, a concept Moten theorizes in his In the Break in order to articulate the grounds out 
of which black subjectivity speaks the conflict of being both subject and object.) In this same 
poem, Baraka writes, 
   Picking thru the alphabet 
          or leaning out the window. (Lives 
                          and magic.) (21) 
 
It is tempting to read a kinship between the poet-speaker, sifting through his materials, and the 
parenthetical magic. Still the ambivalent “or” between the two activities, letter picking and 
window watching, makes them equivalent and swappable. A question arises about the difference 
between writing and living. Is one just ambivalently picking letters or actually experiencing the 
world and striving to change it? The parenthetical phrase “(Lives / and magic)” seems to decode 
the scene that precedes it, replacing ambivalence with deliberate togetherness: and. So too, the 
parentheses seem to mark the phrase as a complete set, and to contain it. Magic appears to have 
leaked out; however, by the end of the poem: “The proportion of Magic / has seeped so low. / 
For the 1st person plural / American, then, / Atlantis / in blind overdose” (21). The poem depicts 
America as a lost, drowned city, one that perhaps was once magical, but now faces low supply 
due to addictive consumption. In this poem, magic seems positive when correlated to the 
alphabet or writing and to the mythic promise of America; but, in noting how such a promise is 
only ever afforded to whites, Baraka contradicts magic’s positive portrayal. So how to 
understand magic’s slipperiness as a concept at play in Baraka’s thinking? 
 In the first section of Black Magic, Baraka’s experiences with drugs complicate the 
reader’s ability to locate his sense of magic. In “Houdini” (no accidental reference to magic), he 
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writes, “Poured/ white powder / on the back of a book / … Feeling / the change, the bag-like 
quality / of ease” (7). However, by the time Baraka becomes the sober, self-realized poet at the 
end of his collection, these drugs come to embody white supremacy’s systemic destruction of 
black life. Reflecting on drugs, Baraka theorizes white magic as that which dulls the senses, 
empties the soul, and replaces the spiritual self with a wholly material one.   
 While throughout Sabotage and Target Study, references to magic make it appear dull, 
pitiful, ghostly, and escapist, some poems fashion it otherwise. Following “Witches and Devils,” 
a mostly drug-centric poem in which “Steel insects / fill us with madness” (51), “Friday” 
continues the theme of a drug-induced reverie. It also confronts what might come of praying for 
or playing with “magic,” whether believing in it or shooting it in your veins. Perhaps the 
perceptual difference on drugs21 would help you distinguish good magic from bad, the one you 
wield against others versus the one others wield against you. The poem “Friday” begins like 
scene directions:  
   And so we leave. Hurrying. The bags packed, 
   minds in halfzoom position. One kit I carry, 
   contents: 3 knives, a revolver, 1 ½ ounces of 
   bush. Then get in 
   the wind. (52) 
 
It then continues like a poem born of getting high: “the sun follows, in its quick breath, / 
matching our own I am rising. The air is still” (52). Getting high leads to a scene of becoming, a 
makeover, wherein we find the speaker mid-stride between seeming suicidal and musically 
combatting despair: 
When you are dead Good. And let the crying cease. Baroomed off a ship 
   where the ghosts of magic fucking conduct their pitiful search. 
                                               
21 The speaker’s drug-use could be thought as a kind of self-violence, in line with that which Fanon theorizes as the 
colonized black person’s aggression against himself as a result of the colonizer’s aggression against him. (The 
Wretched of the Earth). 
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   The social butterflies have turned to Pterodactyls. A poetic bird of the  
   second measure. The measure of the rhythm, hear me, stretching  
   past Your eyes. (52-53)    
 
Death in these lines brings a certain reckoning. The speaker calls for an end to despair: “let the 
crying cease.” “Magic” is dead despite being resurrected as a team of phantoms who will never 
find you no matter how hard they look. But here begins the transformation—the lostness 
necessary to occasion one’s re-discovery. Death wins you no magical return, but the 
Pterodactyls—the extinct, treacherous dinosaurs that live only in the imagination—become 
“poetic bird[s]” and produce a musical sound that expands, scream-like: the screech of a trumpet. 
The poem suggests that the capacity to sound offers a kind of escape or better magic because it 
begins in the material and has the ability to move beyond material and visual limits. The speaker 
calls, “hear me,” emphasizing his presence through sound, just before he flees “past Your eyes,” 
escaping their scopic trap. 
 The formal aspects of “Friday” also depart from typical appearances, seeming to abandon 
their identity as a page in a book, or their formal textuality. Like other poems in the book, this 
one is oriented horizontally across two pages, making the reader rotate the book to read it. This 
unconventional format could be a product of Baraka’s irregular and long line-lengths. Turning 
the page to fit these long lines draws attention to the fact that these are lines of poetry, not prose, 
lines of a determined, not accidental, length. Given this purposefulness, the uneven line lengths 
and especially the extremely short lines that tend to finish each stepped-stanza give the sense of a 
leaving-off, a sudden break, a run-for-it. The poem ultimately lands on the speaker’s departure, a 
departure which began with “One kit”:  
   Your mind and eyes are open. You are strong. Leave  
  them Leave 
  them. (53) 
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These final lines reduce the poem’s subjects to “You” and “them,” drawing a clear line between 
social groups.22 The speaker addresses himself, “You,” despite using “I” earlier in the poem. By 
breaking the line after “Leave,” the speaker and leaver is visually and materially split off from 
the “them.” Likewise, by positioning the two “them”’s above each other, Baraka highlights their 
sameness, their union, and the speaker’s necessary separateness. If the poem’s speaker 
overcomes despair and articulates a determined, possible selfhood despite magic, then where 
does the potential for self-preservation and escape (be it from drugs and/or the Village) come 
from? If it doesn’t come magically, but does come poetically, musically, then, how can these can 
be kept separate? 
 “Friday” is not the only poem where Baraka points to a weak magic. However, in his 
poem “The Visit,” Baraka begins to acknowledge how he separates some forms of magic from 
others. In some senses, “The Visit” is a brief poem about holding onto some parts of one’s past 
despite needing to break away from it: 
  What I never wanted, came back  
  for me to love it. (Above the sirens 
  and the bogus magic of the laughably damned) Came back, 
  there light struck me, social songs, racial songs, 
  and love, like a versified cliché, came down on me. (40) 
 
When Baraka points to “the bogus magic,” he implies the presence of a not-bogus magic. There 
is the magic of the impure, the “damned,” but also the magic “light” of “songs, / and love;” 23 the 
former rains down like a reprimand, the latter a heavenly missive, and a musical one.  
                                               
22 One might note the echo here of “they”’s omnipresence in Stein’s Stanzas in Mediation as discussed in Chapter 2. 
23 It is tricky to separate my analysis of Baraka’s conceptualization of poetry from his thinking on music. Blues 
People was published just prior to writing of much this book, in 1963. There is a particular tension between the 
rootedness of his musicology and the fleetingness of his poetics. It is crucial to consider that Baraka is working out a 
theory of black consciousness across these two texts that is as much grounded as it is full of flight.  
  117 
Many early moments in Black Magic like “brujo explosions could free you” (51) make it 
hard to tackle magic’s status. Is brujo the drug, the dealer or an actual wizard? However, notions 
of magic and of the poem as spell resurge in a more self-convinced form in the last and longest 
section of the book, Black Art. Here, an alphabet capable of being picked through (as imagined 
earlier) comes alive through rampant capitalization. Black Art, written during Baraka’s 
conversion to the Nation of Islam, often turns the poem into an animated chant, a speech with 
mana.  “Ka ’Ba” reads as a poetic invocation, a call to fellow Africans of the diaspora to know 
their beauty, profess their suffering, and break off their literal and metaphorical chains: 
We have been captured,  
brothers. And we labor 
to make our getaway, into 
the ancient image, into a new 
correspondence with ourselves 
and our black family. We need magic  
now we need the spells, to raise up 
return, destroy, and create. What will be 
 
the sacred words? (146) 
 
The title of the poem refers to what is considered the most holy site in Islam,24 the giant black 
and gold-painted, cube-like monument in the center of Mecca, the ultimate destination in a 
Muslim’s hajj. Yet Baraka seizes the blackness of this iconic object and image as a portal 
through which he can commune with black ancestors from a lost place and time. The “We” of 
the speaker’s here and now needs “the” [definite, particular] “spells” that could enable a 
“getaway” from the state of captivity, spells thought to belong to “black family.” Magic here is 
not just needed because, as written earlier, “the proportion… has seeped so low” (21), but now 
magic is the deeded right and possession of the speaker’s newly recognized community of 
                                               
24 It should be noted that neither the Nation of Islam nor most contemporary Islamic sects ascribe to belief in magic 
per se, but Baraka did briefly explore a mystical version of Islam. 
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belonging, one whose beliefs stand in sharp contradistinction to white supremacism. This 
instantiation of magic clarifies how Baraka’s “good-black magic” opposes “bad-white magic.” 
This positive magic, appearing largely in Black Art, is intrinsic to Baraka’s newly forming Black 
aesthetics and community of black artists.  
 The next poem, “The Spell,” answers “Ka ’Ba”’s call by materializing spells on the page: 
The Spell The SPELL THE S P E L L L L L L L L L L ! 
Away and sailing in warm space. The eyes of God-our on us 
In us. The spell. We are wisdom, reaching for itself. (147) 
 
Repeating the title phrase three times in the first line, Baraka uses capital letters to emphasize 
spell’s sound and its materiality. He further proves the word’s sonic-material capacity by 
stretching it, a material test, reproducing the last letter L like a stuck key, a visual stutter, or a 
held note, the “UHL”-sound of “lull.” In the same sense that the poem becomes more object-like 
through the capitalization of “spell,” the credibility or force of the spell gains weight through its 
sonic, visual, and material presence. Baraka turns word into object through repetition and 
capitalization, mirroring the self-reaching seen in “wisdom, reaching for itself” (as if a word after 
completing its task of signifying reaches back into its own thingliness).  This reaching for oneself 
implies a kind of dysphoria or “obsession,” a sense of sitting (sessere) outside (ob-) oneself. One 
might ask, why would anyone need magic in order to be what one is? But if the subject at hand is 
Baraka, or a fellow member of his “black family,” then attaining a sense of really being inside 
oneself, a sense of self-possession, would be critical to opposing colonial captivity and surviving 
racism.   
  Several pages after “Ka ’Ba,” the poem titled “Trespass Into Spirit,” shows how part of 
Black Magic’s magic (and its spirit) is the materialization of the sonic in the collaborative space 
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between the page, readers, and beyond. As lines of non-linguistic sound stretch across the 
horizontally-oriented page, the poem claims its latitude:  
  aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaahahaaneene  ahahaahneene  neeeeneeaahaaahneeeahhh 
 
  woooooouhhhahhhheeehhhhhhhhhh  ohhhhh  ahahahahahahauahuahuah. (151) 
 
The chant continues, non-semantically, with long, breathy tones across high E- and low O-
pitches. After five lines like this, the speaker switches codes: “A Chant to rise with all.”  Yet 
right after this prayer-like summation of the preceding part of the poem (one that sounds and 
looks like a chant), the poem swerves suddenly into three lines of non-sonic, non-chantable 
nonsense, heavy on unpronounceable consonant combinations, and mixed with random, non-
functioning punctuation: 
  diry  jsolekks   eoo  fjoel  fjkks  ei   OO  dkkle;pspekl”melks;;a;;sll. (152) 
 
After this utterly broken, nonsensical alphabetic chain, the diction of the poem again swerves 
into consistently recognizable words but barely sensible syntax: “the machines head is gone // 
red noise dirty fanning hurt love test run love and” (152). If we consider the title, the distinct 
linguistic modes throughout the poem could be steps in the process of this illicit journey, this 
trespass into the non-rational, non-empirical, nonsensical world of spirit.  
 So what power or effect does each mode serve, or what is achieved by their co-presence 
in one poem? The vowel-centric, soundable lines at the beginning invite a choral reading, a 
communal response. Meanwhile, the almost Nordic, prohibitive consonant-centric second section 
might quell such a chorus, permitting only a lone struggler to parse each individual letter, one at 
a time. Still, these difficult, unassimilable lines could also exemplify a bebop jazz aesthetic, and 
the fact that this solo remains of a piece with the improvisational group and scene only 
emphasizes the jazz element. Finally, the word-by-word semantic unity of the final section, 
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paired with its syntactic disunity, calls on readers to pay close attention to the sounds they speak 
while letting go of sense. It tells them to focus on sound rather than meaning, on materiality not 
message. Authorship transcends the speaker: “wake wake moisture and sun, describe me, 
angels!!” (152). Language is given over to spiritual bodies and the animated natural elements of 
water and light. Words will come back from these elements to give the speaker of the poem 
materiality. “[D]escribe me.” In other words, assure my presence. Baraka produces an animistic 
poem, bestowing words with spirit along with thingliness. The poem’s effects far exceed 
communication within the material world. There is no hint in this poem that magic is low, bogus, 
or evil. We arrive at the other side of Baraka’s magic dialectic, the side of Afro-centric spiritual 
power.  
 Like “Trespass into Spirit,” Black Art’s subsequent chant-like poems negotiate the 
materiality of “world” and the spirituality of words. Baraka’s poetry becomes what we might call 
“extra-material” by altering the directionality of the page, emphasizing sound not meaning, and 
resorting to mostly capital letters. Through the aliveness of these words (and the poem), he can 
reckon his present reality with his dream of black liberation. This materialization of the poem 
seems deeply tied to Baraka’s formulation of both a good magic and a retributive one that 
together can defeat white magic and white mythology. To some extent both this counterpoint to 
racism and this opening toward mysticism necessitate magic as a form or process through which 
the poem can continue to matter—both exist and have meaning—despite the belief that the non-
material world does too. The poems “Vowels 2,” “Sacred Chant for the Return of Black Spirit 
and Power,” and “Part of the Doctrine” all amplify their thingliness through capitalization, while 
poems such as “Race,” “Tele / vision,” and “Human to Spirit   Humanism to Animal” speak 
more directly to the overlapping space between material and immaterial forms of being: “the 
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reality of the spirit” (223). These poems show that Baraka cannot satisfy a profession of faith by 
merely stating it as such, but that through the sonic and visual manipulation and materialization 
of text, Baraka forces a link between the poetic and the mystical. These moves also emphasize 
the centrality of process, not product, to his poetics. This mystical-material link is intensely 
formal and performative, not just topical. This linking is also ultimately how Baraka reclaims a 
poetics of praxis, a use for poetry as a tunnel between worlds. 
   
Mystical-Material Sound 
 Working under the presumption that questions of objective reality and being relate 
differently to black lived-experience than to my own white lived-experience, I think it is crucial 
to underscore the intersection of Baraka’s position as a person of color and his ongoing 
interrogation of metaphysical questions. I draw attention to these differences on both lived and 
theorized planes, not with the intention of reifying racial difference, but with the desire to remind 
readers that structures of racial consciousness have from the beginning depended on differing 
relationships to the idea of being a subject or an object in the world. Furthermore, the black 
subject’s position relative to the history of racialized oppression is life-threatening in ways not 
true for white subjects (though of course, as James Baldwin repeatedly argues, white supremacy 
debases its perpetrators too). Baraka’s arrival at a celebration of a spiritual self through a poetics 
of hyper-materiality bespeaks his insistence on the inseparability of the material and the spiritual. 
This conjunction forces our attention back to the precariousness of the black subject within a 
white supremacist social structure that banks on the purity of either form of being: the material 
always at risk of slipping into objecthood (commodity) and the immaterial always at risk of a-
materiality, or literal not mattering. Poems like “Vowels 2” and “Sacred Chant for the Return of 
Black Spirit and Power” vividly portray the concrete materiality of Baraka’s poetics in Black 
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Magic, while other poems such as “Hegel” and “Cant” negotiate the philosophical truth of a form 
of being that straddles the material and the mystical. In this way, his poems stage a dialogue with 
the idealist thinking of long-past white European philosophers like Hegel as well as the 
dialectical materialism and post-colonial marxist critics like C.L.R. James.  
 In “Vowels 2,” Baraka visually stretches the word “free,” often in all capitals, across a 
horizontal page. The word takes up space and fills our gaze, while its sound fills our mouth and 
ears. 
Freeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee 
 
Freeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee 
 
Freeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee 
 
EEE EEE EEE 
EEE EEE EEE 
 
EEE EEE EEE 
EEE EEE EEE 
 
Freeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee  (189) 
 
The capitalized, repeated “EEE” punctures the free-flowing, extensive “frees,” as if a falsetto 
trumpet were cutting up one long note into blips of sound. The sound calls to mind the image of 
a trumpet, or rather, the sound is trumpeting. The word “BURST” interrupts the careening 
“frees,” like a punch of new breath at the mouth of a horn or a word breaking open from a closed 
mouth, its contents spilling onto the page. Certainly “freedom” is a term philosophers struggle to 
define, and some doubt it exists, but in all capitals the word “FREE” resists any doubts as to its 
substantiality and potential for self-dispersal, bursting through whatever skepticism or literal 
bondage hems it in. More importantly, Baraka’s attention to the physicality of sound and its 
mirroring in textual formatting begins to perform a theory of sound’s materiality. Brent Edwards 
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tracks a similar phenomenon in Baraka’s “jazz” poem “AM/TRAK,” wherein Baraka’s “shit” 
becomes sound,25 as in scat, as in creative ideas, taken at the literal, the most material 
transformation into the immaterial. 
 As we see here, not just the physicality of the mouth-instrument but the whole body is 
critical to the poem becoming material, actual, and useable shit; and movement is how we track 
this becoming. After the first “BURST,” “FREE” stretches even further like sheet music or the 
movement of “BODYS” across a stage: 
   Bodys moving in the light 
 
        BURST 
BODYS MOVING 
BODYS MOVING 
 
FREEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEE  EEEEEE (190) 
 
The introduction of the concrete image of “Bodys moving,” or dancers, transforms the poem 
from chant-like reverie into a scene of physicalized freedom-making. The curious plural spelling 
of “BODYS” as opposed to “bodies” forces us to see each particular letter and person, as 
opposed to an anonymous, universalized crowd. “BODYS” also retains the integrity of the base 
word, “body,” as if to say, you cannot destroy this “body” in order to reproduce it or multiply it 
into “bodies.” “[B]odys” becomes multiple26 through accumulation. It retains its past self and 
gains some more. Baraka attains this effect through his radical error, this empirical flaw, 
peopling the poem and imagination of the reader. The material-visual construction of the word 
(its spelling) and its sound co-exist despite their difference. We could say they collaborate but do 
                                               
25 Brent Hayes Edwards, Epistrophies: Jazz and the Literary Imagination (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University 
Press, 2017), 24. Edwards also cites Ronald Radano’s Lying Up a Nation: Race and Black Music (Chicago, IL: 
University of Chicago Press, 2003). Radano’s concept that black music’s poem comes from the instability between 
sound and text—from the resonance between these unique forms.   
26  This conflation of singularity in plurality reminds me of Kamau Braithwaite’s use of the pidgin Jamaican 
pronoun “IandI”—a first person plural that retains the specialness of the person, the one, inside the people, the we, 
the whole. 
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not merge, do not disappear in each other. This collaborative effect is mirrored by poem’s motif, 
the “bodys”’ collective dance.27 
 The word “BURST,” not “FREE,” dominates the rest of “Vowels 2,” as if freedom now 
must disperse itself like an exploded seed or breath. But this dispersal, or diasporization, is 
countered with instructions to remain in place.  
   BURST 
      (& stay 
   BURST 
      (& stay 
BURST 
BURST 
BURST 
      (& stay   (190-191) 
 
While the speaker might disperse his particulate self and spirit through explosive breath, he 
remains in place, stays connected to earth. The capital letters reach out, but the lowercase letters 
root down, protect the home. Black Magic thematizes this tension between rootedness, 
earthiness, and flight. This representation of burst sound dispersed far, speaks to what Jessica 
Teague describes as Baraka’s stereophonic poetics.28 Working from Paul Gilroy’s concept of 
stereophonic consciousness and the real contemporaneousness of stereo technology development 
and the writing of Baraka’s It’s Nation Time (1972), Teague provides a metaphor for thinking 
through the simultaneous materiality and mysticality of the way we experience the spread of 
sound. Stereo technology not only reproduces sounds recorded in the past, transposing one time 
on top of another; this device also presents us with the invisible and thereby occult logic of 
                                               
27 In Mackey’s “Changing Same,” he quotes Baraka’s point in Blues People that the arts which yielded no product 
were impossible for Eurocentrism to destroy in black culture, both magic and dance being among these arts: “Only 
religion (and magic) and the arts were not completely submerged by Euro-American concepts. Music, dance, 
religion, do not have artifacts as their end products, so they were saved. These nonmaterial aspects of the African’s 
culture were almost impossible to eradicate” (qtd. in Mackey, 367). 
28 Jessica E. Teague, “Black Sonic Space and the Stereophonic Poetics of Amiri Baraka’s It’s Nation Time,” Sound 
Studies 1, no. 1 (Winter 2015): 22-39.  
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music coming from both a plastic disc and seemingly elsewhere too. To listen to music in stereo, 
we feel it to be coming from everywhere, but no matter where, the true sources, the bodies, the 
instruments, are hidden from us. The concept of stereo fuses the material and the mystical 
together, be it in for music or poetics. For Baraka’s own mystical-material production of sound, 
he seems to carve a sterophonic sound into the surface of the page—a seemingly impossible 
trick, like the presence of music in the minute groove of a record. 
 Despite the physicality of the poem’s capital letters, repeated words, and extended 
visualized sounds, “Vowels 2” confuses the location of actual being, or which being matters. 
Perhaps this confusion results from the lack of any end-point to Baraka’s poetic spiritual quest. 
Rather, as Mackey notes, process is central to Baraka’s product-less arts of music and dance: 
“These ideas concerning process are important to an understanding of the synonymy of 
blackness with spirituality during Baraka’s nationalist phase.”29 Baraka’s “Bodys moving mind 
is soul is spirit is is the place” presents his reader with an animated image of consciousness, and 
consciousness as in process, not in place (191). The mind is moving because the body is moving, 
and the mind is inside it—a logical induction. If “mind is soul,” then this movement transcends 
“body” and, with it, static physical limits. “Soul” slips into “spirit” which Baraka then spatializes 
into “the place,” and, despite his pluralizing “spirit” with the double iteration of “is is,” these 
become unified by the singular “place.” But why slip from the physical “body” to the mystical 
“spirit” to the delimited “place”? Why would Baraka need both categories of existence to 
mingle? What are the political stakes of this admixture? That Baraka’s “bodys” are both here and 
not here, physical and not, means that they occupy two kinds of space at the same time and 
                                               
29 Mackey, 367. 
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therefore possess a magical, diasporic bi-spatiality, perhaps akin to Duboisian double 
consciousness. 
 An invocation based on the words “free” and “burst” can be easily read as political. There 
is perhaps no greater political question than whether freedom is attainable for all or whether 
freedom for some always depends on unfreedom for others. However, the political nature of 
“Sacred Chant for the Return of Black Spirit and Power” becomes more evidently political in 
Baraka’s dialectical engagement with materiality: 
Ohhh break love with white things. 
Ohhh, Ohhh break break break let it roll down. 
 
Let it kill, let it kill, let the thing you are destroy 
let it murder, and dance, and kill. Ohhh OhhhOhhh break 
the white thing. Let it dangle dead. Let it rot like nature needs. (192) 
  
The racialized violence of this “sacred chant” draws immediate attention. Yet the power 
dynamics at play complicate categorical assumptions about who is subject and who is 
subjectivized. The first line reads as a directive to black readers to separate from white 
supremacist ideals, which includes middle-class values that traditionally rank blackness as 
inferior. However, there appears utility in the white objectification of black being30: “let the thing 
you are destroy / let it murder.” This body, this material thing, can be (must be?) an instrument 
of violence against the force that makes it a thing, not a person. In the shift from breaking “with 
white things” to “break / the white thing,” white things change from indirect to direct objects of 
breaking, a breaking punctuated and formalized by the broken line. The speaker depends on this 
relationship to materiality and thingliness in order to resist the structures and people that have 
limited his agency. The end of the poem moves from the onomatopoeic violence of “Aggggggg. / 
                                               
30 See Aimé Césaire, Discourse on Colonialism, trans. by Joan Pinkham (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1972) 
for his theory on how colonization produces the thingification of the colonized. Baraka seems to claim counter-
agency in response to his own thingification.  
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MMMMMMMM / OOOOOOO,” to an acknowledgement that this violence is a reversal, a 
retribution: 
Death music reach us. 
Bring us back our strength. 
 
 
To turn their evil backwards 
is to 
live. (192) 
 
These final lines feel calm in comparison to the commands to break and kill. The last word of the 
poem, “live,” might suture black survival to violence against whites, but it also suggests a form 
of being beyond thingly behavior.  
 The central idea that white people have enacted a violence against black people that must 
and can be stopped, if not reversed, overlaps with Baraka’s poetic navigation of the differences 
between mere being and conscious or spiritual being. But what draws together Baraka’s radical 
stance on racial politics and the intensity of his ontological investigation? C.L.R. James calls for 
a similar reversal when he calls post-World War II Europe “barbaric” in his 1947 “Dialectical 
Materialism and the Fate of Humanity.”31 At the time of James’s essay, global colonialism, 
American racism, and the Nazi genocide were nothing if not barbaric for their cruelty and 
brutality: the West considered the still colonized global South primitive and barbaric; Jim Crow 
was rampant in the United States; and the Nazi Holocaust had killed or dislocated most of the 
Jews of Europe. When James uses the term “barbaric” to talk about Europe, he opposes the 
black/white dialectic upon which rests not just white supremacy but also its Manichean system of 
stereotypes that racializes goodness as white and evil as black, and that supposes whiteness 
                                               
31 C.L.R James, “Dialectical Materialism and the Fate of Humanity,” Marxists.org, 
https://www.marxists.org/archive/james-clr/works/diamat/diamat47.htm 
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should triumph. Baraka’s repeated reference to “white evil” achieves a similar, oppositional 
effect. 
 Baraka and James are also tied32 by James’s critique of mystical materialism, although 
Baraka’s poetics seems to restore a praxis to mysticism, one that James declares absent. What 
does the poetic form allow Baraka to see differently about the relationship between the mystical 
and the material that the Marxist theorist can’t afford to see? James embraces dialecticism as a 
way to defeat mysticism, which he claims supports barbaric rulers. While Baraka (and W.E.B. 
DuBois and James Baldwin) might refer to the bankruptcy of the white soul, C.L.R. James 
describes “the bankruptcy of its thought,”33 where “it” is the white supremacist, Euro-centric, 
capitalist “civilization” that enabled slavery, the Holocaust, and the atomic bomb. He describes a 
world given over to barbaric irrationalism in which “[t]hought has abdicated. The world is 
rudderless. All illusions have been destroyed.”34 James eschews “shallow empiricism” in favor 
of discovering truth through dialectical thought, not material evidence. He embraces the 
dialectical law of contradiction at the heart of Marxism (via Hegel). For James, it is imperative to 
think the disappearance of civil society in order to know its existence. James also insists that 
change is the inevitable product of any dialectic: “At a certain stage a developing contradiction, 
so to speak, explodes, and both the elements of contradiction are thereby altered. In the history of 
society these explosions are known as revolution.”35 Is it possible to read the “BURST” in 
“Vowels 2” as Baraka’s own performance of a dialectical explosion? We could, but certainly the 
poem wants more than just a materialist explosion. 
                                               
32 C.L.R. James was the keynote speaker at the 1972 Congress of African Peoples in San Diego organized by Amiri 
Baraka, who then became chair of the congress. 
33 James, “Dialectical Materialism and the Fate of Humanity.”  
34 James, Ibid. 
35 Ibid. 
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 The literal, material burst of sound across the page of “Vowels 2” does not spell socialist 
revolution; however, Baraka’s dialectical investigation of the mystical-material poem does break 
open the finitude of such categories, a different “developing contradiction.” The language in 
“Vowels 2” achieves what Moten calls “animateriality”36 or a kind of animated speech, a state 
between words on the page and in the mouth. Moten uses this term to talk about a word attaining 
materiality through anacrusis as “a note or beat or musicked word improvised through the 
opposition of speech and writing before the definition of rhythm and melody.”37 Moten sees 
Baraka’s improvisatory performance as a form of resistance to playing a set role within a system 
that turns certain racialized subjects into objects. Thinking through Marx’s commodity that can’t 
speak but does (as Marx speaks for it), Moten argues for an inseparability of black mattering 
from black spirit, or aesthetics. He privileges the object’s sounding (in the poem’s case, the 
word’s sounding) as the very instantiation of how material/meaning refuses to separate from 
spirit/sound. Here the contradiction is subsumed, not resolved. As if to regain a racial past, one 
also claimed by Négritude, Moten sees Baraka and others’ poetic performances of blackness 
producing a “prefigurative rematerialization.” 38 This sound of blackness repeatedly materializes 
due to the constant reach for (not attainment of) the maternal. Further, this sound is pre-
figurative because it is the voice of the object before subjectification under capitalistic systems of 
exchange and valuation. Moten further posits that “writing’s description of sound (the literal 
representation of aurality) is also a de-scription of sound, a writing out of sound, that 
corresponds…with a denial, both conscious and unconscious, of the very idea of whole.”39 The 
                                               
36 Moten, In the Break, 26. 
37 Moten, ibid. 
38 Ibid, 16. Note that Moten contextualizes this concept and scream in his discussion of Frederick Douglas’s 
narrative, particularly the scene in which he witnesses his Aunt Hester being raped and beaten.  
39 Ibid, 180. 
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“de-scription of sound” in Black Magic, the aurality represented by the elongated, stretched out, 
capitalized words and non-linguistic diction in poems like “Trespass Into Spirit” enacts this 
denial of wholeness, this fragmentation of mattering. The poem builds an improvisational bridge 
across the break, one marked by the visible or material sonic, a break40 that not only signals the 
failed divide between material and mystical being, but also premises Baraka’s access to “black 
magic” and his own racial, spiritual and political becoming. In this sense, his experiments with 
text and sound comprise a platform for theorizing black ontology.  
 It is important to note that Baraka does not just perform the materiality of sound in order 
to test or manifest the metaphysicality of his own being. Rather, in almost an inverse move to 
Fanon, who maps “blackness” through Négritude poetry in his Black Skin White Masks,41 
Baraka’s performance de-scribes (or writes out of sound) the black experience as a philosophy of 
mere being. In the first section, Sabotage, in which magic appears low and evil, Baraka rejects 
rationalism and redefines the value of objecthood as “things with souls” (21). One might say that 
language becoming sound is like things gaining their souls. The stereophonic capacity of 
language to make sound undergirds Baraka’s interrogation of being’s contradictory fusion of 
material and mystical experience. In his poem “Death is Not as Natural as You Fags Seems to 
Think,” denaturalizing death, with language, is one step in addressing this hybrid sense of being:  
  Language spread into darkness. Be Vowel 
           and value 
        Consonant 
                                               
40 This break is multi-layered in the historical and methodological sense.  My project speaks across the periodic 
break between Modernism and New American poetry, a break that absents a proper location for Baraka’s Black Arts 
movement and other significant Black writers whose works does not fit neatly into the literary historical 
compartmentalization of aesthetic schools in time. I also make a large gesture across this dissertation to the break 
between the rise of nineteenth-century anthropology and ethnography and the subsequent rise of twentieth-century 
linguistics and literary theory, the latter drawing from the earlier’s conceptions of the primitive, and from Social 
Darwinist, progressivist views of linguistic and cultural development. Likewise, in moving from earlier chapters to 
this one, we are spanning a break between structuralist thinkers like Saussure and Durkheim, and post-structuralist 
Lévi-Strauss’ theories of primitive culture.  
41 See Frantz Fanon, Black Skin, White Masks, trans. by Charles Lam Markman (New York: Grove Press, 1967).  
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           and direction 
  Rather the lust of the thing.   (18) 
 
Language here needs to venture into the shaded unknown in order to transcend thingliness and 
know its own value, its own path, its internal systems. This is how words resist adhering to the 
things they name. Baraka calls for language to detach, de-scribe, to sound out from itself, not the 
object. In a kind of inverted animism, language intensely possesses itself and disavows the too 
easily labeled commodity. 
 Through this subtle critique of name-ability and language and objects’ interdependence, 
Baraka extends his critique of capital. The speaker of “New World” seems to welcome objective 
knowledge but also acknowledge its risks: “Empty me for all knowing, and will the danger of 
identification” (22). Knowledge might hem him in, capture him inside a word. The very next 
poem, “Hegel,” targets the literal emptiness of “New World” knowledge. As opposed to settling 
into identification, the speaker enters “the nightmare of economics” wherein you are ever either 
master or slave. Still, Baraka aims beyond this dialectic: 
  This is turning. As a man 
turns. Hardened or reconceived  
sometimes the way we wish our lives 
would be. ‘Let me do this 
again, 
another way.’  (23) 
 
Here is what we could call Baraka’s theory of improvisation through reiteration, sounding and 
resounding. Each line break allows the poet a chance to do it again “another way.” The visual 
break materializes the existential break between “this,” becoming, and becoming’s others, their 
reiterative, phantasmal plurality of possibilities. Strangely, “Hegel” begins with the abstractly 
harsh image of “Cut out / the insides / where eyes / bungle their silence,” and proceeds through 
the crude decree “that no fag go unfucked,” but lands on the very scream that Moten theorizes as 
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always maternal, and always symbolic of the pain of lost kinship. Pairing Baraka’s violent fear 
of queers with his fear of capitalist cruelty seems to underscore the speaker’s vulnerability, 
especially its taboo per masculine codes. To let one’s guard down for a minute, to ask to be seen 
as human, or to attack an enormously powerful ideology might seem to necessitate naming a 
perceived common enemy: 
 I am trying to understand  
the nightmare of economics.  On the phone,  
through the mails, I am afraid. I scream  
for help. I scream  
for help. And none ever comes, has ever  
come. No single redeeming hand  
has ever been offered,  
  even against the excess  
  of speech, no single redeeming  
  word, has come  
  wringing out of flesh  
with the imperfect beautiful resolution  
that would release me from this heavy contract  
of emptiness.   (23-24) 
 
The speaker’s fear or despair seems as much internal as external, as much belonging to him as to 
a system or a contract. Neither the material nor the linguistic, neither hand nor word redeems him 
in his despair. Yet the speaker seems to believe that flesh and words are imbricated in each other, 
such that wringing one might produce the other, even if it hasn't yet. If it could, this procurement 
of language from the body, from matter,42 would ensure the speaker’s self-possession, and 
invalidate the nightmarish contract of capitalism through which the body contains nothing and is 
named from without, made commodity, utterly alienated from labor and sense.  
                                               
42 The Christian overtones of such concepts merit acknowledgement, word from flesh, etc. However, it is important 
to emphasize that my reading of Baraka’s work at this phase in his life is aimed at understanding his intellectual, 
aesthetic, political project and what it has to do with known concepts of magic. Baraka’s own shifting spirituality at 
this time are also pointedly a shift away from traditional white, Christian ideology. See Jerry Watts’s biography for a 
more complete description of Baraka’s religious affiliations during the 1960s. 
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 In this superreal, commodified world, attempts at understanding the world through mere 
sensing are nearly impossible outside of an aesthetic form like poetry. (Lévi-Strauss43 draws 
attention to the poem as a modern example of primitive sensitivity to perception when he depicts 
the art of the bricoleur who pieces together one image at a time as “savage”). Baraka’s poem 
bemoans this loss of sense. The title, “Cant,” signals despair, but, it also announces Kant’s name. 
The poem opens onto a city with “walls / of scattered paper, and autographed photos / of 
Hobbes,” peopling the book with yet another long past, European philosopher (33). Baraka 
expands the dystopic premise: 
Thread of reason 
whipped against the walls. New winds, 
of complex weather. The naked seek clothes, 
the holy, a faster God, to keep the known 
in line. (33) 
 
Magic and mysticism underlie reason’s unraveling. The “known” floats out of reach, and the 
only thing in line, is “line” itself, the presence of the poem. The “holy” one(s) seeking a god of 
speed miss(es) Baraka’s point that “Mystery // loves company” (33). In the break between the 
sensed and the known, where Kant theorizes that intuition thrives,44 we become collectivized, 
joined.  
 While courting the kind of intuitive presence Kant theorizes, Baraka avoids making a 
purely metaphysical leap. In the poem “Blank,” the speaker seems utterly caught in a space 
between material and mystical existence, between body and spirit. He catalogues the world 
                                               
43 Claude Lévi-Strauss in his 1966 The Savage Mind compares primitive perception and cognition to that of a poet 
and a collage artist, emphasizing the operations of juxtaposition and collection as the earliest modes of scientific 
inquiry. I cite Lévi-Strauss here due to his contemporaneity with Baraka and his widespread influence on thinking 
about and obsession with “primitive man,” especially in the hippie movement, and also due to his reinforcement of 
the link between poetic practice and primitivity. 
44 See Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason (1781), https://www.gutenberg.org/files/4280/4280-h/4280-h.htm 
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around him, “shit world, iron world, wood world, fire world,” only then to question the 
parameters of world and his concept of it:   
where is time and who  
flies speeding in the sun, is why I’m here in time, my thought  
to have never had a chance to be finite, or anything but live meat 
and image, live sound and image, thought, live shit, flying through the 
universe, there’s no body  
here, all body, we try to figure this out, and fail, how cd it be 
otherwise. (95) 
 
The speaker’s figuring ends up in the body/“meat” and its making (sound or shit), but it gets 
there curiously through the spatialization of time—he is “here in” it. Being’s lack of finitude in 
the above lines, its ultimate indeterminacy in space and time, underscores a mystical-material 
concept of self and a desire to embody, not resolve, these contradictions. Again and again, 
Baraka admits to not knowing or not being able to determine the outcome of his inquiry. As if to 
ensure we do not think he is the magician at work here, in “Bumi,” Baraka writes, “don’t say I 
can heal / or bring back / the dead” (196). The poem’s failure either to determine the self or 
literally to enact the magic of resurrection raises of the question of what, for Baraka, is the magic 
of this book. Baraka’s writing reworks our typical concept of magic as the capacity not just to 
contain contradictions but to repeatedly “practice” them, like tricks or riffs, the jarring 
asynchrony of two notes, the word and its sound, pulling against each other. 
 We might further consider whether Baraka’s magic is the liminal space he creates inside 
his metaphysical dialectic or the materialization of the sounds and images produced by text. 
Indeed, the instability of categories such as matter and spirit, or language and body, maintain a 
space of possibility and imagining in Black Magic, through which thoughts, visions or spells can 
be tested without hedging the actual risks of their consequences. The body can be wrung dry to 
yield a single word, and then the body returns. The body can be used to commit violence, and the 
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spirit returns. The improvisational, sonic, indeterminate aesthetics of Black Magic, an aesthetics 
of doing it again, another way, underscores how I attempt to read its violence. This scattered, 
non-finite poetics makes possible the destruction of the white aesthetic ideal and the creation of 
an affirmative black poetry. 
 
Imagining Violence, Textual Destruction 
 
Not only have critics presumably distanced themselves from Black Magic due to its anti-
white, separatist violence and overall morbidity, but Baraka himself has disavowed the dystopic 
aspects of the violent politics of Black Magic and earlier work in the preface: 
You notice a preoccupation with death, suicide, in the early works. Always my own, 
caught up in the deathurge of this twisted society. The work a cloud of abstraction and 
disjointedness, that was just whiteness. European influence, etc., just as the concept of 
hopelessness and despair, from the dead minds the dying morality of Europe. There is a 
spirituality always trying to get through, to triumph, to walk across these dead bodies like 
stuntin for disciples, walking the water of dead bodies Europeans call their minds. (front 
matter) 
 
However, Baraka’s riotous negativity serves a real purpose in Black Magic. While the early 
Baraka critic Arthur P. Davis sees this “new poetry of Black hate”45 as a dead end for racial 
politics, I see the same poetry as an opening. The directly violent imagery in the book’s realistic 
poems and the violated, nonsensical language of the abstract ones don’t just end in violence but 
become pathways to a spiritual and political uprising. Indeed, despite the thread of despair 
throughout Black Magic, upward forces intensely compete against these downward ones, a 
tension visible in Baraka’s poem, “Part of a Doctrine:” 
RAISE THE RACE RAISE THE RAYS THE RAZE RAISE IT RACE RAISE 
…WE…ARE RAISED ABOVE OUR BODIES AND MACHINES…(200) 
 
                                               
45 Arthur P. Davis, “The New Poetry of Black Hate,” ed. by Donald Gibson, Modern Black Poets: A collection of 
Critical Essays (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1973), 147-156. 
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This simultaneous, sonic collusion of consummation (razing) and assumption (raising) reflects 
Baraka’s negative aesthetic, as it premises the creation of a black aesthetic on the destruction of a 
white one. 
The violence in Black Magic becomes urgent and non-negotiable when we read it as a 
form of anti-colonialism, anti-capitalism and anti-racism. Furthermore, reading Black Magic as 
strategically in conversation with Césairean and Fanonian Négritude leads us to understand the 
textual violence in Baraka’s poems as mediating the reading experience between poet and reader. 
For example, applying Fanon’s theory that violence is a form of mediation between the colonizer 
and colonized to the reader-writer relationship shifts how we might interpret Baraka’s textual 
violence.46 Critic Reiland Rabaka’s consideration of the violence in Césairean Négritude is also 
useful in considering Baraka’s work, especially due to Baraka and Césaire’s shared interest in 
surrealism. Rabaka calls Césaire’s writing “fighting words, words, literally, used as weapons; 
weapons that bring political praxis, social revolution, and cultural renewal.”47 This violence in 
language is always already driven by the violent conditions of black life. As Rabaka asserts, 
“Césaire’s violent self-defensive and anti-colonial coupling of words as weapons was also 
symbolic of the ubiquitous violence of black lived-experiences and black-lived endurances in an 
anti-black racist and white supremacist world.”48 When we consider word weapons in light of the 
vibrational qualities or material effects of Baraka’s stereophonic poetics, we must ask if this 
treatment of words also carries forth a view of the poem as magic spell. Perhaps the violent 
repurposing of language is critical to understanding the relationship between Baraka’s 
materialization of language and his concept of magic. Violence in conjunction with theorizing 
                                               
46 Fanon, “On Violence,” trans. Richard Philcox, in The Wretched of the Earth (New York: Grove Press, 2004), 44. 
47 Rabaka, The Négritude Movement,184. 
48 Rabaka, 184-185. 
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good and bad magic pushes us to value magic, like poetry, as a performative, improvisational, 
ephemeral practice, capable of staging aggression. 
Baraka’s use of language has determinate effects on some levels, on imagination, 
ideology, and the senses, but no hazardous effect on the body. These poetic effects comprise a 
survivable violence and an ephemeral one. Baraka’s depictions of violence, calls to violence, and 
enactments of violence transpire at the linguistic, not corporeal, level. By thinking of reading as 
an event, we can understand reading Baraka’s poems as decolonizing or anti-racist events, ones 
Fanon calls always violent.49 Homi Bhabha describes Fanon’s psycho-affective or violent 
writings as a strategy for mobilization and “a performance of agency in the present tense.”50 
Bhabha implies that writing and the reception of that writing proposes a space and a time that 
can accommodate political action. Surely, Baraka’s various instantiations of violence possess a 
certain threatening or transformative power over his readers. Put another way, the violence of 
these poems achieves a felt but unseen effect, what I would reframe through Baraka’s poetics as 
an agentive, poetic magic.  
Interestingly, Fanon depicts magic, and its incumbent rituals, as a pacifying tool used by 
colonizers to keep the colonized afraid of both the unknown and colonizers’ knowledge. He 
claims that calls to liberation “throw [the colonized] into disarray” because this politicization 
forces a break from magical belief systems.51 And yet, the final poem of Black Magic, Baraka’s 
ultimate call to liberation from whiteness and capitalism, conflates magic and revolt. “Black 
People!,” the title, calls out:  
…You know how to get it, you can  
get it, no money down, no money never, money don’t grow on trees no 
way, only whitey’s got it, make it with a machine, to control you  
                                               
4949 Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth, 1. 
50 Homi Bhabha, “Foreward: Framing Fanon,” in Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth, xix. 
51 Fanon, 19. 
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you cant steal nothin from a white man, he’s already stole it he owes 
you anything you want, even his life. All the stores will open if you 
say the magic words. The magic words are: Up against the wall mother 
fucker this is a stick up! Or: Smash the window at night (these are magic  
actions). (225) 
 
While commands to take a white man’s life or steal the goods of a white man’s store (most often 
figured as Jewish), proliferate in this book, Baraka equates this violence with magic: “magic 
words” and “magic actions.” Revenge against racism either is or requires a kind of violence that 
is magical. The question remains, how so? What effect does Baraka calling this kind of violent, 
direct political action “magic” have, especially when written into a poem? Certainly this is not 
the same magic that Fanon claims keeps colonized peoples terrified of the colonial state.  
This magic emboldens Black people to “make our own World, man, our own world, and 
we can not do this unless the white man is dead” (225). There are various ways to read Baraka’s 
violent ultimatum. In the former case of “RAZE THE RACE,” the divisive, destructive concept 
and category of race is burned down; perhaps similarly, in the phrase, “the white man is dead,” 
the thinkability of the phrase “white man” is obliterated. One could read “the white man is dead,” 
as meaning that all white men must die; however, this is not what Baraka writes. The singular 
phrase, “the white man,” stands in emblematically for the social group—a symbolic dummy 
perhaps akin to the doll pictured on the cover. But for the present event of this poem, the phrase 
“the white man is dead” gives its speaker agency because he (“the white man”) “is” each time 
the line is read. Such imagined or symbolic violence in the space of reading might produce a 
cathartic effect. The physical body of a sympathetic reader experiences a release of anger and 
despair through this immaterial process, the performative effect of the text.  
These violent poems perform the process of arriving at a new Black aesthetics. “Black 
Art” suggests that this new aesthetics can magically contain and manage this violence. 
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Repeatedly in “Black Art,” violent revenge against white supremacy seems synonymous with the 
poem or art itself: 
Poems are bullshit unless they are 
teeth or trees or lemons piled 
on a step. Or black ladies dying 
of men leaving nickel hearts 
beating them down. Fuck poems 
and they are useful, wd they shoot 
come at you, love what you are, 
breathe like wresters, or shudder 
strangely after pissing. We want live 
words of the hip world live flesh & 
coursing blood. Hearts Brains 
Souls splintering fire. We want poems 
like fists beating niggers out of Jocks 
or dagger poems in the slimy bellies 
of the owner-jews. Black poems to 
smear on girdlemamma mulatto bitches 
whose brains are red jelly stuck 
between ‘lizbeth taylor’s toes. Stinking 
Whores! We want “poems that kill.” 
Assassin poems, Poems that shoot  
guns. Poems that wrestle cops into alleys 
and take their weapons leaving them dead 
with tongues pulled out and sent to Ireland.  (116) 
 
The poem shows multiple instances of “poems” animated as weapons, and it reveals a complex 
range of targets toward which these daggerish lyrics lurch: black assimilationist “jocks,” Jewish 
storeowners, light-skinned black women, and Irish-American cops. The speaker himself seems to 
fear violent texts, saying, “Fuck poems,” for it seems they just might come back at “you” (insert 
anyone). At the same time, he claims their usefulness toward imagining a reclaimed sense of self 
and a fully realized black aesthetic. The speaker admits that such poems are “bad” but necessary 
in order to “Clean out the world for virtue and love, / Let there be no love poems written / until 
  140 
love can exist freely and cleanly” (117). As if part of a cycle of renewal—“destroy, create”—the 
violent voice in the poems literally makes room for love.52 
 Beyond positing the poem as violent action, Baraka also treats the poem as a portal into 
person and world. “Black Art” concludes: 
…Let Black People understand 
that they are the lovers and the sons 
of lovers and warriors and sons 
of warriors Are poems & poets & 
all the loveliness here in the world 
 
We want a black poem. And a  
Black World. 
Let the world be a Black Poem.  (117) 
 
A legacy of love and a legacy of struggle intertwine just as poem and world do. Blackness 
adheres as much to “people” as to “poem” as to “world.” It is significant that the litany of violent 
images, the poem’s doing, ends with this image of a restorative, loving, Black world, one figured 
as a poetic cosmos. If the poem can be a space-time or world unto itself, then it has the power to 
contain events, including violence, and other forms of resistance necessary for making this poetic 
vision of a “Black World” a more material-mystical reality. It is arguable that in staging this 
violence within the space-time of the poem and the event of reading, Baraka’s poem achieves a 
magical state. It produces immaterial effects without material, explainable causes. These harsh 
images mark readers, invisibly, but the poem also cleanses or restores them to wholeness with its 
closing evocation of love.  
Differently from the actual imagining of violent acts, Dadaist aesthetics or the 
representations of destroyed language could also affect an immaterial violence on a reader. 
                                               
52 See Jeremy Glick, "All I Do Is Think about You": Some Notes on Pragmatist Longing in Recent Literary Study of 
Amiri Baraka,” boundary2 37, no. 2 (July 2010): 107-132, for his discussion of how Baraka interweaves the 
revolutionary with the romantic as a means of producing a poetic Marxist praxis.   
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Returning to “Trespass into Spirit,” we recall Baraka’s various performances of nonsensical 
language. Extreme nonsense, lines like “diry  jsolekks   eoo  fjoel  fjkks  ei   OO  
dkkle;pspekl”melks;;a;;sll” could be seen as violence done to language (152). Critic Won-hu 
Kim thinks through the usefulness of Dadaist aesthetics to Baraka’s expression of anti-white 
Black Nationalist violence at the level of the text itself.53 We might think that the brashness of 
both capitalization, “THE LONE RANGER / IS DEAD. / THE SHADOW / IS DEAD” (103), 
and the non-normative, ninety-degree rotation of certain poems destroy textual and linguistic 
convention. These moves declare: no more neat couplings like text and reader, or word and 
meaning.  
Certainly, this destructive aesthetics not only strategically aligns with a Black Nationalist 
agenda to break away from white cultural hegemony, but also illustrates the deliberate 
indeterminacy that Mackey argues is the connection between Baraka’s textual art and the 
tradition of black music detailed in Blues People. Music, according to Baraka, presents a unique 
site of Black aesthetic formation that does not get assimilated into whiteness. Black music 
refuses, while of course white music insists on appropriating everything from Black folk music 
to the blues to hip-hop in the ongoing re-“invention” of white rock and pop.54 Nevertheless, 
through the Black Arts movement and the poetry of Black Magic, Baraka sculpts a negative 
poetics that refuses assimilation through its slipperiness. He traces the roots of the indiscernible 
in the African tradition (what Mackey calls Baraka’s strategic disunity or “‘difficulty in 
focusing,’”55 and what I would call a diasporic aesthetic): 
                                               
53 See Daniel Won-hu Kim, “In the Tradition: Amiri Baraka, Black Liberation, and Avant-Garde Praxis in the U.S.,” 
African American Review 37, no. 2-3 (Summer-Autumn 2003): 345-363. 
54 It could be useful to parallel white appropriation of black music with white appropriation of magic (from 
colonized and enslaved people of color across the globe), both being tied to a romantic desire for non-rational 
experience and expression. 
55 Mackey, “The Changing Same,” 372. 
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In language, the African tradition aims at circumlocution rather than exact definition. The 
direct statement is considered crude and unimaginative; the veiling of all contents in 
ever-changing paraphrases is considered the criterion of intelligence and personality. In 
music, the same tendency toward obliquity and ellipsis is noticeable: no note attacked 
straight…The denying or withholding of all signposts.56 
 
In “Trespass into Spirit” and other instances of diffused sense, veiled contents, the reader and 
speaker’s access to transcendence depends on accommodating the un-assimilatable sound. 
Readers must deny a straight path from speech to meaning. To call these circumlocutive 
moments in Baraka’s work merely Dadaist or Surrealist would be to miss his Afro-centric 
grammatology and his attempt to know and wield a magical, veiled speech.  
 In each instance, the directly violent imagery and violated nonsensical language become 
pathways to spiritual enlightenment or uprising. A truly black magic arises through decline or 
death. In his poem, “Death is the beginning of a new form,” conceptualizing death allows the 
speaker to imagine becoming plural through collaboration (“you are the total jazzman…”) and 
through extreme particularity (“…a note on the horn”) (180). Grey is the dominant color of this 
new form of being. Echoing this blurry ethos, dichotomies coexist in single lines: “ascending, 
falling, being murdered, receiving enlightenment” (180). Most significantly, while “you,” the 
transcendent subject of the poem, appears featureless, “a shadow substance a portion of all / of 
every thing / simply / god / a whole,” this same “you” then arrives at a sensuously particular 
place, “african shores with cool blue waves / graham cracker sweet sand and sun to lay out in / 
thinking of colors bathing in the essence of hot green / hot blue hot / brown hot shore odor / 
perfume of blackness” (179). The violent loss of selfhood imagined in death is rewarded with 
eternally present experience: “an endless picture scroll / of doing thinking feeling being / forever 
endless in the instant” (180). Baraka’s feeling and image of Africa, held at a distance, structures 
                                               
56 LeRoi Jones, Blues People (New York: Harper Collins, 1963), 31. 
  143 
the paradisiacal space-time of this after-life, “death form.” This image begins at the “shores,” 
implying the speaker’s arrival from elsewhere, from afar. The destructive, negative aesthetics in 
Baraka’s Black Magic coincides with his “negative” or recursive imagining. Out of this new 
aesthetics, it is possible for his poetry to constitute (and critically return to) the space of Africa as 
the space of “the reality the existence of reality,” one only possible after the destruction of a 
prior,57 colonial, white world.  
 
Magical Critical Return 
 
 One can trace connections to the aesthetics and politics of Négritude across the entirety of 
Black Magic. Baraka’s poems not only express a desire for a transatlantic return to “native land,” 
figured as Africa; they also formulate an Africana cultural theory that differs from that of other 
Négritude poets, like Senghor, by beginning in Harlem,58 then moving outward through the 
Caribbean, Western Europe, West Africa, and finally returning to Harlem, and ultimately New 
Jersey. The poems make a recursive thought journey. This recursivity—starting and ending in 
situ, in America—is part of what differentiates the criticality of Baraka’s gestures at return59 
from those of Senghor or Césaire, poets whose theories of return land in Africa.  
                                               
57 The Black future imagined through Black Magic depends on a past before colonization, and a concept of primitive 
time that exceeds historical time. In this way, it is always accessible or present. See Brown, The Primitive, the 
Savage and the Aesthetic. This imagined African space-time is also utopic in the Blochean sense—no-longer-present 
and not-yet-here. 
58 For more discussion of how W.E.B. Du Bois’ Souls of Blackfolk and the poetics of the Harlem Renaissance factor 
into subsequent Négritude movements, see Reiland Rabaka, The Négritude Movement, cited previously, and 
Africana Critical Theory: Reconstructing The Black Radical Tradition, From W. E. B. Du Bois and C. L. R. James 
to Frantz Fanon and Amilcar Cabral (New York: Lexington Books, 2010). It is also important to note that the 
history of African-American thinking and history does not begin in Harlem but has formed over time, starting in the 
American South through the history of slavery.  
59 Baraka’s desire is ultimately not to go anywhere but to root down, re-root, in the Black tradition of being here. 
This staying-put counters the kind of internal colonialism Spivak discusses in “Teaching for the Times,” cited 
previously. 
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Baraka’s evident investments in the concept of black magic and spirituality in Black 
Magic relate to the poems’ references to a primitivist and Afro-centric space-time. Some poems 
represent the notion of a return to Africa as a way of constituting a mental-spiritual space for 
Black consciousness to exist within (albeit Baraka also entertained the territorial option in Africa 
and elsewhere). Baraka appears to make use of certain essentialist imagery and concepts of 
blackness and African-ness, including magic60 and ritualistic spirituality, in order to re-imagine a 
positive black identity. Both his improvisatory ethic, which draws on jazz and values beginning 
again, and his commitment to the space of the poem as a trans-temporal space-time of ongoing 
happening, futurity, and world-making, rely on essentialist concepts of blackness.  
Some of this essentialism surfaces in his poetry as the product of rejecting American 
nationhood and seeking some other “nation.” Baraka attempts poetically to shift readers’ 
consciousness toward a Black nationhood, one figured through this other (outer) space, a space 
much more mental and mystical than terrestrial.61 “Race,” a poem near the end of Black Magic, 
calls the reader to imagine an African elsewhere that is always more a feeling than a physical 
location, an essence, not a marker: “There is an Egyptian feeling come back / to cleanse us” 
(223). The reader is asked to transport herself mentally or to stay put and wait for Egypt to come 
to her, and to believe that this Egyptian feeling can purify. “Race” mixes notions of a material 
and spiritual place, and critiques modern development for its needless materialism: 
Magic Cities 
begin to re/form. Our strength is in the drums, 
the sinuous horns, blow forever beautiful princes, touch 
the spellflash of everything, all life, and the swift go on 
go off speed. Blow forever, like the animals and plants and 
sun. Forever in our universe there is beauty and light, we come 
                                               
60 Magic, at this point in the 1960s, could be seen as American as much as African, evidenced through not only Zora 
Neale Hurston’s record of indigenous and Black-creole magic traditions in her Mules and Men, but also through the 
history of witchcraft among settlers. 
61 Key here also is the idea that America has always been black, that slavery pre-existed the American nation.  
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back to it now. Throwing off tons of dumb metal the beast  
has strapped us in. Those Things. These refrigerators, stoves, 
automobiles, airships, let us return to the reality of spirit, 
to how our black ancestors predicted life should be, from the 
mind and the heart, our souls like gigantic kites sweep across 
the heavens, let us follow them, with our trembling love for 
the world. Let us look up at each other’s spirits zooming, and 
enter the cities of Gods.  (223) 
 
The return depicted here eschews modern technology, not just its disenchanting services but its 
“dumb metal,” its dead material of bondage. As much as references to animals, plants, and 
sunlight conjure a pastoral, African somewhere, Baraka locates the reader in the generalized 
space of “our universe” and “the reality of spirit.” Space is structured through the senses called 
upon: ears perking up to the sound of horns, eyes tracing kites in the sky, skin feeling the drums’ 
vibrations. Importantly, this magic space, “Magic cities,” is composed of and known through 
sound (“drums,” “spellflash of everything,” “horns”), that which is always at once material and 
immaterial. Baraka positions himself as mythmaker through the generality and shiftiness of 
motifs like sky and universe. He breathes into a lost or distant history: “Our lot / is vacant. Bring 
the twisted myth / of speech” (25).62  
Still, such mythmaking risks reifying essentialist notions of blackness, both of America 
and of Africa. Titling his collection Black Magic, one might say, plays upon a subordinating 
essentialization of blackness as that placeholder for the irrational, the spiritual, the backward, and 
the pre-industrial. In his critical biography of Baraka, Jerry Watts remarks on the futility of 
Baraka’s and Karenga’s attempts to use the religion Kaiwada to political ends: “[T]heir racial 
essentialism created a severely constrained future. In a world in which blacks and whites could 
not evolve or change, the potential for viable social transformation was minuscule…an 
                                               
62 This quote comes from an earlier poem in the collection, “Leadbelly Gives an Autography,” about the noteworthy 
blues musician Huddie William Ledbetter. 
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apocalyptic intervention by God would be necessary for social change.”63 Critic Donna Jones64 
also calls attention to the essentialist and racialist tendency in Césairean Négritude. Jones argues 
that Césaire’s valorization of a return to racial roots and subsequent theory of black creativity 
stems from the Bergsonian idea of élan vital. Her critique seeks to question whether Négritude’s 
conceptual link to a Euro-centric concept of creativity risks reifying race as a biological-
historical organizing principal. However, Rabaka suggests that we think of innovation not as a 
passive process but an act of intellectual agency.65 In this vein, not only might Jones explore how 
Césaire’s engagement with Bergson models the deliberate, authoritative and strategic use of 
racial essentialism for a specific political moment, but we also might consider Baraka’s 
borrowings from Négritude as deliberate and political. 
For various reasons, it is possible to read Baraka’s essentialism or nostalgia as shot 
through with criticality. Interestingly, Baraka critiques Négritude thinkers like Senghor for 
confusing “socialist realism and surrealism,”66 while he praises Césaire’s poetry and politics for 
departing in important ways from others. Baraka accuses Senghor of using mystical values and 
magic for “bootlicking French Colonialism” but celebrates Césaire’s awareness that “Blackness 
is not a static, mystical, ‘eternal’ quality; it is concrete consciousness and with that, concrete 
struggle.”67 For these reasons, Baraka’s invocation of a utopic African space can be best be 
called a “critical return,” Rabaka’s term for describing the anti-colonial political dimensions of 
                                               
63 Watts, Amiri Baraka, 322. 
64 Donna V. Jones, The Racial Discourses of Life Philosophy: Négritude, Vitalism, and Modernity, (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2010). 
65 See Rabaka, Africana Critical Theory: Reconstructing The Black Radical Tradition, From W. E. B. Du Bois and 
C. L. R. James to Frantz Fanon and Amilcar Cabral, for further discussion of how Africana theory, such as Amilcar 
Cabral’s advovacy for an active form of “return to the source” (285), critically engages with influences from the 
past. 
66 Amiri Baraka, “Aimé Césaire,” in Daggers and Javelins (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1984), 
194. 
67 Baraka, “Aimé Césaire,” 197. 
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Césaire’s Notebook of a Return to the Native Land. Césaire does not advocate for a direct return 
to French-ruled West Africa but to an Africa and African diaspora radically, materially and 
ideologically reformed.68 Baraka’s American-ness, unlike like Césaire’s Afro-French-ness, 
makes imagining returning to French colonial Africa nonsensical. However, like Césaire, whose 
identity affords him consciousness of the Afro-French diaspora, and who locates “return” in that 
diasporic feeling, not in a literal place, Baraka’s “return” also calls for a massive shift in 
consciousness and a shared Black American concept of the Africana. This difference can be seen 
in the mystical qualities of place invoked in his poem “Race,” quoted above. Those who criticize 
political reliance on essentialist identities may detect assertions of a natural or universal 
blackness in Baraka’s Black Magic, but I would argue that these poems are more invested in 
essentialized states of being, not essentialist political categories. 
Gayatri Spivak might add that this kind of essentialism was a strategic part of mobilizing 
global anti-colonial movements and a Black Nationalist movement in the United States.69 
Baraka’s temporary spiritual formation under Ron Karenga, who introduced him to Yoruba, 
certainly relied on dislocated, translated, and generalized notions of the ancient West African 
religion. Baraka adopted Kaiwada (Karenga’s form of Yoruba) to forge a more affirming 
relationship to blackness. We might question how these internalized racial narratives about 
African primitivity surface in Black Magic. It could be argued that Baraka bares these 
essentialist, potentially reductive dimensions of his racial discourse as a way to stage his 
negotiation of a political and aesthetic transition. Baraka toys with what could be called a “jungle 
                                               
68 Rabaka, The Négritude Movement, 191. 
69 See Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, “Subaltern Studies: Deconstructing Historiography,” ed. by Donna Landry and 
Gerald MacLean, in The Spivak Reader: Seleected Works of Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (New York: Routledge, 
1996), 203-236. 
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aesthetic” or “jungle ambivalence,” writing “Pay me off, savages. / Build me an equitable human 
assertion. // One that looks like a jungle, or one that looks like the cities of the West” (26). In 
these poems, Baraka theorizes a critical, not idealist, notion of return, while still relying on a 
general notion of African-ness as a pre-industrial, natural state of being: “We want to disappear 
except for our essence, which / is rightness. / We want to be nature and a natural thing” (100). 
Even Baraka’s use of the word “nature” confuses its essentializing qualities. We are forced to 
consider the difference between being “nature,” a big abstract thing, and being a thing like 
nature, “a natural thing.” 
 In light of this ambivalence, Baraka’s discourse of a return (to “nature” or Africa or…) 
appears strategic. Cynthia Nielsen’s analysis of Fanon70 helps us to imagine Baraka’s conceptual 
use of magic, despite being essentializing, as a strategic shift away from the oppressive white, 
Beat aesthetic toward the affirming poetics of Black Arts. Contrary to expectation, stereotypical, 
primitivist language in Black Magic often inverts the black-white binary, rather than reifying it, 
much in the same sense that Nielsen claims that Fanon subverts the Manichean binary of 
colonialism:  
A Fanonian strategic essentialism recognizes Négritude’s positive reinvention of 
“blackness” as a social reality, constructed by the oppressed for specific socio-
political, emancipatory, and therapeutic aims. In light of the historical situation 
into which blacks were thrown, Négritude begins within the Manichean frame; 
however, the social identity it produces through discursive practices and political 
acts transcends this white-imposed frame and creates something new.71 
                                               
70 Cynthia Nielsen, “Frantz Fanon and the Négritude Movement: How Strategic Essentialism Subverts Manichaen 
Binaries,” Callaloo 36, no. 2 (Spring 2013): 342-352.  
71 Nielsen, 350. 
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Baraka too turns away from Western civilization, positing it as the uncivil, poisonous, “allergic” 
space of the past: “But we have gone away / from you, one-eyed man, cannibal, / o slickest 
weapon of the romes / we have left you to come back / to ourselves. We have gone away from/ 
the dead forests of your allergic kingdom” (89). Like Fanon, he reinvents blackness but does so 
through the essentializing concept of magic. Furthermore, Baraka’s historicization of Black 
American life and aesthetic production, perhaps most clearly seen in Blues People, serves to 
ground his aesthetics in an American tradition of black innovation rather than in the spatial 
fantasy of a return to African “roots.” So how does Baraka’s sense of the depth of black roots in 
America square with his rhetoric of return? And how is magical thinking part of the praxis of a 
return in situ, not a literal return to Africa? No doubt Baraka’s poem, the page, and the poetic 
experience springing from it, are the where, the when, and the how of a performance of magic 
that bodes transportation in place.  
 Baraka’s shifty definition of the site of return composes part of his criticality, or the 
magic of his static movement, his staged improvisation. We wonder, repeatedly, if the “we” of 
“we come / back to it now” is going anywhere or not (223). Both Baraka’s present-future poetic 
space-time, where “doing it again, another way” remains possible, and the recursivity within his 
concept of return, underscore the centrality of improvisation to Black Magic. Even just the 
phrase “we come / back to it now” posits an unheard “here” through the present tense of “we 
come” and “now,” meaning we’re already here—the coming is done. Baraka’s ongoing present 
of a place that begins to “re/form,” his now-time of “we come / back to it now.” His readerly 
invitations (“let us return,” “let us follow”) instantiate a new and different return every time the 
poem is read. This present-ness echoes the contemporariness that Nielsen situates in Fanonian 
Négritude, which she calls “a non-repetitive translation into contemporary society of those 
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sociopolitical principles, cultural values, and ancestral practices lacking in Western ‘enlightened 
civilization.’”72 Baraka’s improvisational returning to the beginning is similar to Fanon’s 
gesture. His “non-repetitive translation” of something old into new terms signals his re-
formulation of Black aesthetics. 
 Baraka’s poems “Return of the Native” and “EveryBody Out” exemplify the 
simultaneous here-ness and newness of improvisation (I am imagining the situatedness of the tap 
dancer’s place on stage in contrast to the feet’s constant movement). “Return of the Native” 
begins, “Harlem is vicious / modernism. BangClash” (108). The title and the mood of Harlem—
Baraka’s then home—collide, or merely refuse to mix. It is easy to read the title as implying that 
Baraka finds an “aboriginal home” in Harlem, his having recently moved there from the Village; 
yet, it is important to trouble the idea of this move as a return, since Baraka’s actual home was 
across the river in Newark. The very violence of such a paradox—this not being the only one—
seems to grip the speaker of the poem: 
  Vicious the way its made. 
  Can you stand the beauty? 
  So violent and transforming. 
The trees blink naked, being 
so few. The women stare  
and are in love with them 
selves. (108) 
 
This is not a pastoral return but an urban one to a place lacking much peace, greenery, or 
community. The perceivable beauty is the bodily and ethereal beauty of black self-affirmation, 
not communal. The landscape here is psychological, unstable, and full of contradictions. 
 Not only does viciousness get paired with beauty, in almost Futurist fashion, but also 
place loses its substantivity and becomes action: “The place, and place / meant of / black people. 
                                               
72 Cynthia Nielsen, “Frantz Fanon and the Négritude Movement,” 348. 
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Their heavy Egypt” (108). The poem signals Harlem and Egypt as places, but also the words 
“place” and “meant” separated only by a line-break sonically produce “placement,” the action of 
being put in place. And still, as if to claim agency in this action, to avoid making black people 
the objects of someone else’s (dis-)placing them, Baraka breaks the sounded suffix “ment” onto 
the next line and spells it “meant,” past tense of “mean.” Placing hereby gains historicity, past 
meaning, or original intentions—what was meant to be, an almost native sentiment. The phrase 
“heavy Egypt” appears in the same cluster of these lines about “place / meant” drawing the two 
places, Egypt and Harlem, together like overlapping film frames: the first symbolizing a 
celebrated ancient root of African civilization, the second the rebirth of Black culture in 
America. However, Baraka’s poem invokes a certain slipperiness when he refers to “Egypt / 
(Weird word!)” in a line about the black people of his “here and now” in Harlem where “We 
slide along in pain or too / happy” (108). The poles are more imagined than real; indeed, Egypt, 
Baraka tells us, is real to the reader merely as a “weird word,” not a material place. The ultimate 
here or the ultimate there cannot accommodate the complex dimensions of Baraka’s unsettling 
aesthetic, one that needs the point of return to keep moving in place, to hold on to contradiction. 
 The centrality of contradictions—happiness and pain, Harlem and Egypt, new and old—
continue more loosely in the neighboring poem “EveryBody Out.” This one reads as an answer 
to the vicious beauty of Harlem (indeed, Baraka was hardly easily welcomed there73): “What 
                                               
73 See Jerry Watts’ discussion of Baraka’s move to Harlem and how his concept of himself as a revolutionary poet-
reader was off-putting to other long-standing political organizers: Amiri Baraka: The Politics and Art of a Black 
Intellectual (New York: NYUP, 2001), 56-57. By Baraka’s own account, he had success in establishing Black Arts 
in Harlem despite some unwelcoming reactions. He somewhat ironically expresses his critical stance on middle-
class Afro-centrism, writing in Autobiography of LeRoi Jones (Chicago, IL: Lawrence Hill Books, 1984), “The 
arrival uptown, Harlem, can only be summed up by the feelings jumping out of Césaire's Return to My Native Land 
or Fanon's The Wretched of the Earth or Cabral's Return to the Source. The middle-class native intellectual, having 
out-integrated the most integrated, now plunges headlong back into what he perceives as blackest, native-est. 
Having dug, finally, how white he has become, now, classically, comes back to his countrymen charged up with the 
desire to be black, uphold black, &c. . . . a fanatical patriot!” (202).  
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kind of voice     wd come to // this” (109). The poem’s contradictions displace itself except for 
the presence of voice or sound. Voice in these lines arrives at “this,” a general finger pointing at 
nothing or a desire for a future that can’t yet be imagined. “This”’s generality points back to 
itself, its shape and sound on and off the page: 
the shape was 
this way 
reveal a new 
thing, a 
new place for feeling, all 
together 
any 
way 
 
Sounding BELLOWING (109) 
The poem’s call for newness, for revelation, for a kind of coming out, lands on the word 
“BELLOWING,” whose meaning and capital letters signal the “Body” of the title and the shape 
of the body before its sound comes “Out.” We imagine the extending belly and chest as the site 
of this sounding, and yet at the same time the sound bears no objective, specific language, or 
meaning, just the feeling of release and communion: “all / together.” The poem’s lack of 
pointing outward and insistent, inward affirming of its textual existence—what I call the poem’s 
thisness—bolsters the poetic text’s immanence, or the completeness in its own being.  
Baraka’s particular concept of return involves the ways in which the poem itself becomes 
the space, the time, thing, and the movement of returning. The poem, as an immanent object, 
instantiates return as an occasion for constant reinvention. The thisness of Baraka’s poetics—the 
way the poem continually points back to itself—makes his call for a return to the African, 
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primitive, or Black sense of things seem achievable within the space-time of the poem, its 
composition, performance and consumption. Part of Baraka’s criticality is born of this insistence 
on the here and now of the writing. Through his belief in the poem’s material effects, “returning” 
does not require the further translocation, dislocation, diasporization or alienation of Black 
peoples. In some ways, following Kathy Schultz’s description74 of Baraka's Wise Why's Y’s as an 
Afro-Modernist epic, it becomes possible to see Baraka’s poem as a transhistorical space 
containing all times. Through Schultz’s frame of the epic, it could be said Baraka transforms 
trans-temporality into trans-nationality in his effort to build a trans-national Black consciousness. 
Baraka’s trans-temporal and trans-spatial poetry performs the return as a rhetorical gesture and a 
poetic effect.  
 Indeed, considering Gary Wilder’s concept of freedom time75 makes it possible to link 
Baraka’s trans-temporality to his desire to decolonize and liberate black consciousness. Wilder 
argues that decolonizing movements depend on imagining a different future in relation to the 
past and present, and that the decolonization process is in fact trans-temporal as opposed to linear 
and progressive. This different approach to the relationship between time and change suggests 
that anachronistic or “naïve” attachments to a colonial past might actually be radically promising 
for a decolonized future. When Baraka refers to Africa or Egypt or writes in “Black People: This 
Is Our Destiny” of  
  a rhythm a playing re-understood now by one of the 1st race 
  the primitives the first men to evolve again to civilize the   
  world, 
 
                                               
74 See Kathy Lou Schultz, “Amiri Baraka's Wise Why's Y's: Lineages of the Afro-Modernist Epic,” Journal of 
Modern Literature 35, no. 3 (Spring 2012): 25-50. Citing the text’s transnational consciousness, collectively-voiced 
hero, and use of the griot figure, Schultz considers Wise Why's Y's an Afro-Modernist epic. The epic’s convention of 
making the past present drives her evaluation of the text through the genre of epic. 
75 See Gary Wilder, Freedom Time: Négritude, Decolonization, and the Future of the World (Durham, NC: Duke 
University Press, 2015). 
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 it is possible to reconcile his references to first-ness, originality, and primitivity with the futurity 
of the phrase “to evolve again” (emphasis mine) and the new definition of “civilize” he is likely 
imagining (199). Because the poem gives us “a rhythm” and “a playing,” something sounded, 
something felt, something performed from the page, we can understand how historicity and 
futurity both depend on not just this poetic experience but the experience of sound materializing. 
The static print, sound’s vessel, contains its past, present, and future readings all at once. 
 Perhaps the most magical effect of Baraka’s particular aesthetics is the reader’s 
experience of immanence through the trans-temporal, trans-spatial poem; readers imagine 
exceeding their typical boundaries. The poem not only imagines a place, but the space of the 
poem becomes that space. The time of the poem draws the past and the future into its already 
present being. Baraka performs this magical gesture of immanent space and time through 
repeated invocations of breath or “blown flight”: all / existing forms of life, the gases, the plants, 
the ghost minerals / the spirits the souls the light in the stillness where the storm the nothing in 
God is complete except there is nothing / to be incomplete the pulse and change of rhythm, 
blown flight / to be anything at all” (199). The poem contains and enables these forms of life 
through its being breathed, spoken, blown into flight. With the literal reference to “gases,” we 
are reminded that breath is literally a recycled material, old gas, spit back out as the potential air, 
future food for the nearest plants. These particles, “ghost minerals,” are the seeming “nothing” 
that is in fact not only something but the form of life, and likewise, the poem’s form and life-
force. 
 In understanding Black Magic as magic, we must think specifically not just about how 
the poem contains the experience of returning to another time, or contains all time, but also about 
how the poem occasions the experience of primitive time, what we might call no-time or 
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ahistorical, or what Baraka refers to as this time. Inside of “this time,” incompleteness is 
impossible because there is nothing to complete, no-thing-ness, just ghosts and shadows. I 
understand the raciality of this call for a return to a different time—one that is, in fact, not any 
kind of time at all—through Tony Brown’s theorization of primitivity as the figure of the 
nothing, or the figure of the primitive that grounds our imagining of the nothing. In examining 
eighteenth-century historicism, Brown traces how “the exotic figure tends to be deployed at 
moments when the [white] theorist encounters the uncertainty that inheres in that shadowy lining 
of the self produced by the otherworldly insistence of a relation with something not quite 
temporal.”76 Primitivity, its nowhereness and no-when-ness, interrupts historicism’s attempt to 
mark and order a clear progression of mankind. The very dialectical attempt to verify the thing 
through the not-thing, means there has to be a no-time, or a time before time. In some ways, the 
irruption of the figure of the primitive into eighteenth-century thought resembles a precursor to 
what David Eng calls the irruption of race and coloniality into modernist aesthetics.77 We might 
ask, how does Baraka’s recursive reach back (and forth) to a before of blackness perform belief 
both in the figurality of this primitive time and in the power of the poetic figure to produce this 
a-temporal experience? Brown questions  
what is at stake in the appearance of a figure that expressly imparts knowledge as it hides 
knowledge. Can such a figure be controlled so that the knowledge it hides does not in fact 
disturb the knowledge it imparts? That control is even at issue underscores my deeper 
sense that figural language, and exotic figures in particular, have a certain energy or force 
about them.78 
                                               
76 Brown, The Primitive, the Aesthetic, and the Savage, 6. 
77 See David Eng, “The End(s) of Race,” PMLA: Publications of the Modern Language Association of America 123, 
no. 5 (October 2008): 1479-93. 
78 Brown, 224-225. 
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His description of the primitive’s simultaneous revelation and obfuscation of knowledge 
resembles Paul Ricœur’s own correlation between a metaphor and a veil,79 that they are both 
things that hide and show meaning at the same time. Thus, figurality both hides and shows. This 
always-already, racially-determined brown figure of the poetic is always both here and sensible, 
detectable, and nowhere, no when. At the same time, the very atemporality of this poetic 
experience, the one that arrives through black magic, an experience outside of white time and 
white space, posits an immanent poem, one that is capable of operating beyond the now, while 
sticking to the present. 
 This magical doubleness or multiplicity (in terms of time-space and meaning)80 is critical 
to the political gesture of Black Magic. When Baraka theorizes the poem as a site of process not 
fixity, of multi-directionality not progression, he furbishes the text’s capacity to effect change. 
To say that Baraka attempts magic at the level of text is to say that he attempts magic below and 
above it too. Above, he imagines future renditions, improvisations; below, he gestures toward the 
deep record and feeling of history. Mackey’s concept of Baraka’s aesthetic unfixability81 could 
situate his poetry’s effect in a space between, the one between the realms of textual meaning and 
the one between the magician and the bewitched object or person. In a sense, Black Magic’s 
resistance to conventional structures of space, time, and body occasions this inventive, 
improvisatory poetic experience. Such unfixity feels emblematic of what many call the 
transitional moment of Baraka’s life (although I would argue this transitionality was emblematic 
                                               
79 Paul Ricœur, Rule of the Metaphor: The Creation of Meaning in Language, trans. Robert Czerny et al. (New 
York: Routledge Classics, 2003), 140. 
80 See Marcel Mauss, A General Theory of Magic, trans. Robert Brain (New York: Routledge, 1972), 30, for his 
discussion of how the magician is both possessed and possessing, and W. Lloyd Warner, A Black Civilization: A 
Study of an Australian Tribe (New York: Harper, 1937), quoted in Walter B. Cannon, “‘Voodoo’ Death,” American 
Anthropologist 44, no. 2 (1942): 174, for his description of taboo wherein the community moves both toward and 
away from the hexed figure. 
81 Mackey, “The Changing Same,” 372.  
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of Baraka’s life generally). Walton Muyumba ties together what he reads as the improvisatory 
quality of Baraka’s work and concurrent shifts in his sense of self, politically and aesethtically.82 
Calling Black Magic Baraka’s “transitional vision,” Muyumba argues that “Baraka draws poetry 
and jazz improvisation together so that he can simultaneously exercise the culture’s ‘diverse and 
mutually contradictory elements’ while presenting a performance of the self-in-transition and 
flux.”83 The significance Muyumba places on Baraka’s being in transition, or in media res, 
pushes against an essentialist or linear notion of return. Thinking about Baraka in transition 
repositions this “return” as a restlessness, a liminal position. The transitional self is literally one 
between bodies, between worlds, between identities. It is the nowhere of being, a trans- or trance 
state we might associate with willingly giving oneself over to some other power. For Baraka, this 
power was Black consciousness. 
 
Toward An Immanent Poem, Immanent Self  
 In the preface to Black Magic, Baraka writes that “we must see our selves again, as black 
men, as the strength of the planet and rise to rebuild what is actually spiritual, what is actually 
good…Black Art was a beginning, a re-beginning, a coming in contact with the most beautiful 
part of myself, with our selves.” He prepares the reader for poetry that identifies and neutralizes 
the forces of despair through the reconstruction of not just a spiritual self but the multiplicity and 
limitlessness embedded in “our selves”—our many versions and revisions of self. At the heart of 
any magic is the desire to transform, or a belief in transformation as a condition of being. Baraka 
materializes the poetic experience and instantiates the poem as the place and time of destruction, 
                                               
82 Walton Muyumba, "Improvising over the Changes: Improvisation as Intellectual and Aesthetic Practice in the 
Transitional Poems of LeRoi Jones / Amiri Baraka," College Literature 34, no. 1 (Winter 2007): 23-51.  
83 Ibid., 25. 
  158 
reformation, and continual reiterative recreation of new and more beautiful selves. Poetry is not 
just a beginning, but a re-beginning. 
 Black Magic occasions both this multiple becoming and the possibility for becoming 
again and again. Indeed, despite Baraka’s immersive relationship with Hegelian dialectics and 
Marxist politics, his poetry’s notion of immanence differs from Hegel’s, most importantly in 
terms of how he imagines a non-universal self. Inside Baraka’s concept of immanence, it is 
possible to plot the self, the particular, while staying oriented toward and connected to a sea of 
other particulars: these points, “our selves.” Baraka’s poems preconceive a more Deleuzian 
concept of immanence84 by both reaching beyond any one particular space and time and 
premising Black futurity on this reaching. In Deleuze’s Pure Immanence, “Absolute immanence 
is in itself: it is not in something, to something; it does not depend on an object or belong to a 
subject….When the subject or the object falling outside the plane of immanence is taken as a 
universal subject or as any object to which immanence is attributed, … immanence is distorted, 
for it then finds itself enclosed in the transcendent.”85 Deleuze’s resistance to universality and 
insistence on particularity, not subjectivity, provides a helpful means by which we can 
conceptually defigure, de-subjectivize and de-objectify magic. Baraka’s “unstuffing the doll,” as 
I call it, is a critical part of his poetic praxis. He imagines a collective relationality that disavows 
subjectivization while instilling agency in both material and spiritual selfhood, a union of useful 
souls.   
 Moten counters this resistance to universality, pointing to a transcendent or universalizing 
force in the sonic mystical-materialism of a poetry like Baraka’s: “Here lies universality: in this 
                                               
84 See Giles Deleuze, Pure Immanence: Essays on Life, trans. by  Anne Boyman (New York: Zone Books, 2001). 
85 Deleuze, Pure Immanence, 26-27. 
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break, this cut, this rupture. Song cutting speech. Scream cutting song.”86 “[B]ut to scat or scatter 
is not to admit formlessness,” Moten admits, contradicting his claim about universality.87 
Dispersal is not disappearance. In Black Magic, we get to lose the body, rescind the doll, and 
rediscover or reappear in the form of the page, the poem, the word itself. This language both 
scatters and holds its shape, its matter. Ultimately the question becomes, how does Baraka make 
use of this aesthetic rupture and all of its incumbent contradictions? The poems are material and 
spiritual, violent and loving, political and pastoral, nostalgic and inventive, magical and not. 
Magic, above all, spills over the container of the black-white binary.  
 While the cover of the book imagines a retribution and a reversal, the poetry itself 
maintains a willingness to exist beyond temporalities that merely seek to close the loop. Magic, 
for Baraka’s poetics, performs a political-aesthetic refusal to abide physical law. Magic is 
necessary, as a concept and an experience, not just for imagining a world beyond the unfreedom 
of white supremacism, but for making that world sensible in the no-time and thisness of reading 
(seeing, hearing, feeling, thinking) the poem. (The thisness of reading may well be a long 
tradition in the genre of poetry, a genre that so often formally refers back to itself or to the 
mechanisms of reading,88 but I want to emphasize here that Baraka re-tools this aspect of the 
poetry reading experience for his anti-racist and marxist praxis.) “We need magic / now we need 
the spells, to raise up / return, destroy, and create” (147), and Black Magic manifests an answer 
to this need.  
Black Magic reinvests in magical thinking and practice; troubles the dialectical barrier 
between material and spiritual being; performs anti-white, anti-colonial violent, textual 
                                               
86 Moten, In the Break, 39. 
87 Ibid. 
88 It might be worth further research into how, in the history of reading, the scene of the reader or the interactions 
between text and reader have or have not been represented as inflected by magic. 
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resistance; and reconfigures a non-teleological “return” to blackness, resulting in, ideally, an 
improvisational, immanent poetics of praxis. Through each of these gestures, Baraka sturdies 
magic against epistemological or racial category or body. Magic might remain inextricable (still) 
from the knot of poetic innovation and race, and yet Baraka resituates it as useable for a radical 
Black politics. Liberated from needing to figure as black or as magician or as the object of 
voodoo pins, poetic magic or the magic poet assumes the complexity and indeterminacy 
necessary for imagining revolutionary outcomes or worlds sufficiently otherwise than present 
ones. The path to the future and to the magic imagined through Black Magic proceeds inevitably 
through “circumlocution rather than exact definition” (31). Right when you think you know the 
rhythm, it breaks; right when you think you read the word, it flies away, scatters free. 
  161 
Conclusion 
Rethinking that Magic Feeling 
 
When I set out to write this dissertation, I was deeply paranoid about the claims being 
made by me and poets around me about poetry as a kind of magic. This paranoia formed in a 
response to a pattern I observed in the work of modernist thinkers and critics—the founders of 
the disciplines as we know them—a pattern of primitivistic and magical thinking about poetry. 
Simone White is one poet in my community making claims to the contrary. As I conclude, I will 
try to close the arc from my research into fin de siècle and modernist thought to my enmeshment 
in poetry and criticism now.  
At a recent reading by White, in which she read from her new book Dear Angel of Death, 
she paused mid-reading to ask the DJ to play “Powerglide” by Rae Sremmurd. White let the intro 
play—a combo of instrumentals plus one of the hip-hop duo not speaking or rapping but wailing, 
ohhhh-ing—and then suggested that maybe Rae Stremmurd’s moans were the only real way to 
(not) talk about the black experience, about the pain of descent. Her comment immediately made 
me think of Baraka’s “ohhhh, break with white things,” the sound of the desire to survive, the 
sound of living close to death. It also made me think of Benjamin’s earliest writings on magic, 
his belief in the sensuousness of the alphabet, our capacity to make sounds and detect letters 
without the need to delimit meaning, or speak logos.  
When I arrived home from the reading I dug out White’s 2017 NY Times essay 
“Exploring the Sources and Consolations of Poetry, in Prose” in which she reviews and responds 
to two books making grand claims for the downtrodden genre: Why Poetry? by Matthew 
Zapruder and Poetry Will Save Your Life by Jill Bialosky. Standing in contradistinction to the 
books’ claims, White writes,  
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Poetry isn’t magical or removed from dirty, compromising political and personal 
acts, pettiness, racism, sexism, suffering. Absent the intervention of many other 
sociopolitical acts, poetry won’t save your life. To suggest otherwise is a kind of 
offense against poetry’s insistence on complexity, the multidimensionality of 
understanding. Taking it seriously as a carrier of information about the real matrix 
between language and power, which is truly upsetting — mind-blowing — when 
we come near to it, changes the way you live. Believe it.1 
Returning to White’s essay made me realize just not just how complex my view of magic is after 
this study, but also how magic continues to be such a risky moniker and category of thinking. 
For White, to call something magic is to reduce its complexity, and so to call poetry magic 
would be antithetical to any efforts to buoy or save the genre. And yet, after my historical and 
cross-disciplinary analysis of the ways critics and poets have thought about or sought to embody 
magic, I wonder if part of what both Benjamin and Baraka’s work suggests is that magic 
occupies a critical category of thought that resists the possible simplification at stake in 
dialectical and pragmatist analysis.  
Years before Benjamin’s ambitious Arcades Project, in which he wrestles with and 
modifies Adorno’s dialecticism, Benjamin returned to past work of his own. He collaged and 
revised it in his 1933 “Antitheses Concerning Word and Name,” a piece often cited in this 
dissertation. Benjamin posits magic in the animistic communication between things:2 “In the 
things from which it shines back silently and in the mute magic of nature, God’s word has 
                                               
1 Simone White, “Exploring the Consolations and Sources of Poetry, in Prose,” New York Times, August 4, 2017, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/04/books/review/poetry-will-save-your-life-jill-bialosky-why-poetry-matthew-
zapruder.html 
2 Contemporary thing theory frequently behaves as if to invoke a belief in animism, or rather, its tenets depend on 
history of animistic thinking. 
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become the communication of matter in magical community.”3 Yet I question the silence and 
muteness of Benjamin’s nature; instead, I hear branches creaking, feet hitting the ground, birds 
crying, Rae Stremmurd moaning. Benjamin later locates magic in the alphabet’s “nonsensuous 
similarity with the enduring semiotic ground on which it can appear.”4 He locates this 
nonsensuousness as much in the Saussurean gap between words’ spellings and their meanings as 
in names’ innateness or originariness, their distance from our perception. I have to return then to 
Simone White’s declaration that poetry isn’t magic and her simultaneous claim that poetry be 
“tak[en…] seriously as a carrier of information.”5 If I read White’s commentary through 
Benjamin’s theses, poem as carrier becomes poem as thing, poem as mute messenger, poem as 
naming the destruction wrought by power. 
Benjamin is often beheld as the philosopher-critic-prophet for war-torn Europe, for the 
displaced intellectuals, queers, and Jews who either fled or ended their own lives in fear of 
fascism and genocide. His criticism works toward a theory of loss. His mammoth Arcades 
Project takes its name from the defunct Parisian shopping arcades, and also explores the more 
symbolic disappearance of pre-war Western, European attachments—history, spirituality, and 
aura—losses often called disenchantment.6 Dead Poets Society likewise depicts a period of great 
political anxiety and post-war conservative backlash. The film’s own making coincided with the 
popular rise of neo-Nazism and the multi-culti-revolutions across the academy. I continue to 
wonder: how does the widespread feeling of cultural, political loss predicate a rise of intellectual 
and creative interest in magic? And yet I also want to continue to delink magic’s role in a poetics 
                                               
3 Walter Benjamin, “Antitheses Concerning Word and Name,” in Selected Writings Vol. 2, ed. Michael Jennings et 
al., trans. Edmund Jephcott et al. (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 2005), 717. 
4 Ibid. 
5 White, “Exploring the Consolations and Sources of Poetry, in Prose,” ibid. 
6 See Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, ed. and trans. H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1946) 129-156.  
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of loss from magic’s role in colonial modernism or racially appropriative aesthetic 
experimentation. We can think of both Stein and Baraka as responding to different kinds of 
enormous loss. Stein writes Stanzas in Meditation after World War One and anticipating World 
War Two. Baraka completes Black Magic at the close of the Civil Rights Movement and the 
passage of the Voting Rights Act, considered by many to mark a defeat, a loss of critical 
momentum.  
This pattern moves me to attempt to understand today’s surge of magic-philia in the 
context of the current state of political anxiety, ecological, economic, and democratic instability, 
and the fear of mass loss. This magic-philia includes contemporary fascination with occult rituals 
and beliefs, the vampire and Harry Potter literary craze, the mainstreaming of astrology in 
popular print media, #blackgirlmagic, and continued widespread interest in magic and the occult 
among contemporary poets from CAConrad to Precious Okoyomon. Amid this group is poet 
(and, ironically, data scientist) Katy Bohinc who claims magic for poets of all time on the 
webpage for her new book Trinity Star Trinity, published by the self-proclaimed occultist 
London-based press, Scarlet Imprint:  
Arguably the first use of poetry was witchcraft. Artists know a poem's birth can 
be magic. 
Trinity Star Trinity re-invents the rhythms of the ancient ode as "three cubed," 27 
poems of 27 words each. 
Dedicated to Hera, the last of the earth goddesses before a 2,500 year reign of 
male deities, Trinity Star Trinity envisions a four-dimensional faith (trinity-cubed) 
where spirit and muse are in dialogue and devotion on mutual terms.7 
                                               
7 See Katy Bohinc’s personal website, http://www.katybohinc.com/trinity-star-trinity. 
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Bohinc’s description of her book makes easy kinship between magical formula and poetic form, 
and likewise beckons to a lost mythical past of feminine deistic rule. CAConrad’s Ecodeviance: 
(soma)tics for the future wilderness8 stages rituals that aim to stop the time of ecological 
destruction, to conjure an “extreme present” where all that is, stays. The title of Okoyomon’s 
first book, Ajebota,9 is the word used by Nigerians to refer to the Nigerian who isn’t Nigerian 
any more. In other words, her work centers on the common but always unique experience of 
cultural loss in the wake of immigration. Each of these poets plays with the notion of magic in 
different ways while contending with some form of loss. 
The problem with which I began feels more complicated than when I started. The object 
has more notches now, more places for fingers to latch on. If magic is a conceptual marker that 
enters the secular when there is a strong cultural feeling of loss, a lost point of origin, or the loss 
of an unrequited dream, then magic seems continually to promise reparation, or restoration of 
what has been lost, yet always at the expense of its occluded colonial history. Still to critique this 
desire for magic as a mis-aimed simplification, a primitivistic desire for the past, a colonial 
desire for “mute nature” and pre-linguistic space-time, might in fact miss the accumulated 
meaning of magic in this current moment, not to mention magic’s long history as a disruptor of 
rationalist systems and desires or the Enlightenment’s fierce grip on contemporary thought and 
culture. 
In Benjamin’s essays, letters, and fragments on knowledge and history in The Arcades 
Project, he theorizes the dialectical image, a concept central to the early formulations of this 
                                               
8 CAConrad, Ecodeviance: (soma)tics for the future wilderness (Seattle, WA: Wave Books, 2014). 
9 Precious Okoyomon, Ajebota (Missouri: Bottlecap Press, 2016). 
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inquiry. (In a sense, my project has always attempted to work in the style of Benjamin’s 
capaciousness, his ability to hold the incongruous together, to not oppose it to itself.) In trying to 
distill the dialectical image, Benjamin quotes Adorno: 
“Dialectic comes to a stop in the image, and, in the context of recent history, it 
cites the mythical as what is long gone: nature as primal history. For this reason, 
the images—which, like those of the interieur, bring dialectic and myth to the 
point of indifferentiation—are truly ‘ante-diluvian fossils.”10 
Notice how when dialectics stops, the primal begins (again); it re-enters the scene. Also, when 
Adorno comparatively refers to the interieur, we cannot help but wonder how this interior is both 
domestic and colonial, a Conrad-like interior. In response to Adorno, Benjamin explains this 
“indifferentiation” (what Musgrove might have paralleled to the mixing of cause and effect), this 
inability to tell apart dialectic from myth, logic from passion, knowledge from magic, as a 
product of temporal collision, time’s refusal to stand still, or stay put. Benjamin explains, “It’s 
not that what is past casts its light on what is present, or what is present its light on what is past; 
rather, image is that wherein what has been comes together in a flash with the now to form a 
constellation. In other words, image is dialectics at a standstill.”11 I would add, in that standstill, 
poets work their magic. And that standstill, I have argued in chapter two, is a concept premised 
on a colonial concept of the space and time of the world. 
 Throughout this dissertation, I have sought to show how a magical concept of poetry 
troubles the dialectical, much in the way that the image (which often meant film—motion 
pictures—for Adorno and Benjamin) also does. Throughout magic’s description by early 
                                               
10 Theodor Adorno quoted in Walter Benjamin, The Arcades Project, trans. Howard Eiland and Kevin McLaughlin 
(Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1999), 461. 
11 Ibid, 462 
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anthropologists as well as its invocation by other social scientists, literary critics and cultural 
critics, magic in the literary context almost always implies that some past sensorial experience 
interrupts a present moment, a dialectical eruption of sorts. Adorno and C.L.R. James’s 
criticisms of the barbaric present, and the barbaric poetry of their present, further exemplify how 
the presenting of pastness, a colonial cross-temporal mixing, poses a stumbling block to the 
smooth logic of dialectical materialism. Dialectics depends on the tension of an opposition or a 
contradiction to lend absoluteness to its ultimate resolution. Applied to Marxism, it means that 
socio-material contradictions will or should be resolved through revolution; and yet, progress 
stumbles on magic. Through my own analysis, I have attempted to show how the concept of 
magic, thinking magic, might offer a way out of the lacunae of dialectics—its linearity, binarism, 
and resoluteness, if not absolutism. Poetry always has, and always should, both excavate our 
lacunae and dream inside of them. 
Thinking this way is the only way I can even begin to tolerate contemporary woo.12 
Maybe my own and others’ desire to think beyond the is/is not-ness of dialectics partly explains 
the trenchant phenomena of contemporary woo among not only my poetry community but my 
queer one too. It is not supposed to strike me as weird at all that my poet friend and fellow queer 
Gala Mukomolova also writes horoscopes for Nylon Magazine; or that poet Ariana Reines not 
only offers astrological birth chart readings through her website LazyEyeHaver but also a 
combined birth chart-poetry writing consultation (The Birth Rites Intensive), a “1-on-1 workshop 
…where [she] do[es] stereo vision on your birth chart & your creative work.”13 I wonder where 
                                               
12 See UrbanDictionary.com for the following definition of woo-woo, otherwise shortened to woo: “adj. descriptive 
of an event or person espousing New Age theories such as energy work, crystal magic, Reiki, bizarrely restrictive 
diets, or supernatural/paranormal/psychic occurrences; often has studied in an authentic religious tradition such as 
Hinduism or Zen Buddhism, but now practices an Eastern-influenced yet severely watered-down and Westernized 
pseudo-mysticism,” https://www.urbandictionary.com/define.php?term=woo-woo. 
13 See Ariana Reines, http://lazyeyehaver.com, under “Offerings.” 
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Ariana’s sense of herself as a poet comes into play when she is stereo-visioning—amplifying her 
sight—into another person’s work and astral history. Almost all my queer poet friends have had 
an astrological reading at least once, if not yearly; and countless ones I know have or plan to try 
ayahuasca, a hallucinogen important for spiritual ceremonies of many indigenous Andean 
cultures. A friend of mine posts to Instagram a set of photos of themself with the long caption, “I 
did a performance piece curated by @CocoDolle @catincatabacarugallery fusing blackness, 
transness, the pop culture of my childhood, Black girl magic, my body, with my voice I 
attempted to cast me a spell. In Magic the Gathering, it takes most creatures a full turn to be 
ready for battle: Ever the late bloomer… #transville #milkandnight #art #FtoAwesome 
#transbody #blackexcellence #blackkidmagic #transmagic #blackmagic…”  
I would like to have a student author I know, Judy Fordjuoh,14 talk to my friend about 
why invoking #blackgirlmagic might not be as empowering for trans people of color as it sounds. 
In her essay, Fordjuoh dissects the problem of figuring blackness as magical. Under the moniker 
and concept of the magical, she argues that we normalize the disappearance of black girls; we 
consider black mothers superhuman for providing for their families and teaching their children to 
survive in a racist world; we ultimately discredit the intellectual, emotional, and physical feats of 
black women every time we call them magic. In Precious Okoyomon’s poem “BLACK GIRL 
MAGIC,” she too refutes the conflation of magic and blackness: “Blackness doesn’t move it stay 
still holding steadfast she is abstracting comfort to reinforce the idea that she is not a magical 
negro_ she can break_ she breaks_angel eyes.”15 Perhaps White was also feeling this knee jerk 
                                               
14 Judy Fordjuoh, “Magic or Reality” (2017), pdf. Fordjuoh was a student of my poet friend Matt Longabucco, who 
teaches in the Liberal Studies program at NYU, during the Spring of 2017. Her essay has been one of my writing 
students’ favorite readings for a couple semesters in a row. 
15 Precious Okoyomon, “BLACK GIRL MAGIC,” Hobart: Another Literary Journal, September 27, 2017, 
http://www.hobartpulp.com/web_features/3-poems--50 
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dislike for calling anything strong, like poetry, also magic. Perhaps this is also why Ta-Nehisi 
Coates eschews magic in his passionate address to his son, Between the World & Me: “…some 
time ago, I rejected magic in all its forms. This rejection was a gift from your grandparents, who, 
never tried to console me with ideas of an afterlife and were skeptical of preordained American 
glory. In accepting both the chaos of history and the fact of my total end, I was freed to truly 
consider how I wished to live—specifically how do I live free in this black body?”16 Later in the 
essay, Coates equates accepting magic with becoming a commodity: “your blood was as precious 
as jewels and it should never be sold for magic.”17 You can sense a kinship between Baraka’s 
sense of white magic as synonymous with racist capitalism and Coates’s idea of magic as a kind 
of raw deal that spells the end of your personhood and thereby your freedom. 
It could be said that the queer call for magic should be seen as a form of resistance to 
homonormativity—capitalistic norms, class norms, relational norms—in the same sense that 
#blackgirlmagic claims to resist white supremacist norms. But it could also be critiqued along 
the same lines, perhaps depending on the racial positionality of the person claiming queer magic. 
Both the broad popularity of magic among queers at this moment and the inevitably colonial 
figure of blackness and brownness that this call for magic signals seems riskily to ensnare queer 
whiteness and brownness. I say ensnare because if we acknowledge the coloniality and raciality 
of the way we think about magic, then the particularly white queer grasp at magic proposes a 
troubling perversion of Jose Esteban Muñoz’s idea that brownness is queer,18 implying that 
queerness is brown. When white queers think or even imply that they are differently racialized 
                                               
16 Ta-Nehisi Coates, Between the World and Me (New York: Spiegel & Grau, 2015), 12. 
17 Coates, 35. 
18 See José Esteban Muñoz, “Feeling Brown: Ethnicity and Affect in Ricardo Bracho's ‘The Sweetest Hangover 
(And Other STDs),’” Theatre Journal 52, no. 1 (March 2000), in which he argues that queerness is the “social that is 
predicated on a break from the structuring logic of white normativity” (76). 
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by performing, speaking, believing, desiring magic, or that they make themselves more outsider, 
more radical, more brown through magic, I detect of an out-of-whack symptom of a much larger, 
longer phenomena. 
Given all the trouble surrounding magic, its socio-political dismissals and reprisals, it is 
only natural to ask again, if, as White suggests, calling poetry “magic” also discredits it. I also 
continue to wonder if a genre formulated through the concept that language is as magical as it is 
figural can ever undo that definition, ever de-figure itself or shirk the doll of its own demise? 
Perhaps it is this desire to exceed the body that draws some queers, some people of color, some 
poets (some all three) to magic’s promise.  
Down in New Orleans, I fall into one of magic’s infamous backwaters. I call it research, 
and head to the Voodoo Museum.  I should have anticipated the incongruity of these two words 
naming the institution, but I did not. The Western museum-goer in me expected an 
anthropological, ethnographic portrayal of the history and mechanisms of voodoo—voodoo 
museum-ified, disciplined—and yet, of course, it was anything but. You can’t discipline spirits. 
One of the first lessons we get is the very meaning of the word voodoo, which we are told means 
spirits, so our thoughts are drawn immediately to the gulf between the practice and the matter, 
and feel reminded that the word is the matter.  
The museum is not quite a museum but an installation accruing like sedimentary rock—
its materiality rising up as if to challenge the spirits that float above. There is plenty of old shit 
here: one bone labeled two thousand years old, tawny small dolls, a pile of crumbling dried 
juniper.  Then the new stuff: cigarettes, pennies, dollars—crisp ones. It is dark inside. It is 
disorganized. Instructions on how to get a good man paper the wall—follow these steps in order 
(like I tell my students). The exhibit teaches outward, not about itself but about what you should 
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do to change your life. Eschewing anthropology, the Voodoo Museum works biographically, 
showcasing the people who could contact and control the voodoo. Marie Laveau was the most 
famous among these and native to New Orleans. (Her grave, supposedly empty, lies in the city’s 
oldest cemetery, St. Louis Number One.) 
Multiple versions on Laveau’s portrait dot the walls, as well as the images and stories of 
other priests and priestesses, some wrangling snakes, others extending potions in the palms of 
their hands, eyes lit up against the dark background of the painting. The people around me stick 
tightly rolled dollar bills or cigarettes into the eye sockets of skulls. Most of the written messages 
stuck to wall art or skeletons convey the wish for either sex or money. No one seems to want to 
hurt or help anyone but themselves. When I read that Laveau was most known for love spells, it 
is difficult not to balk at the New Orleans voodoo queen’s seeming lack of seriousness. I think of 
White’s desire to part the waters between poetry and magic. I think of Zora Neale Hurston’s very 
serious study of magic in Lousiana, elsewhere in the American South, and in Haiti. However, if, 
as I claimed earlier, the desire to think magic is a predictable response to loss or anxiety, then of 
course someone would pay, would work, to return the missing beloved.  
A new installment of Laveau’s legacy might be situated in contemporary poet (and 
friend) Danielle Vogel’s life and work. Her Instagram feed casts an endless spell of writing and 
magic intertwined. It is full of images of ritual at a standstill: a collection of shells and crystals 
on a white tablecloth with a candle, a scene of handwriting with a crystal ball nearby, “spring 
magic,” “Geranium magic,” “carnelian rose quartz,” moments to honor the seasons, the moon, 
the writing process. In one recent post, a picture of a burning candle, a geranium on a white 
plate, and surrounding it are selected leaves and flowers fanned out, and a small marble 
sculpture, a feminine body, and uncapped miniature urn.  In the caption: “a little Beltane magic.” 
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Interestingly, Vogel’s caption fixes her ritual in a pagan history and tradition. But I also read 
Vogel’s photo as a bit of queer magic. The Beltrane times and festivities carry the aim of 
fertility, and there is always something queer about lesbian fertility. (A friend recently told me 
that I might consult a queer they knew who is a womb witch—that her services might help me 
conceive.) 
I am unresolved with what to do about disarticulating the desire of some poets to root 
their creativity in European paganism from the desire of others to root their creativity in a magic 
that is inextricable from colonialism. It is possibly less useful, then, to categorize poetic intention 
or provenance than to observe and describe the field of effects that these desires produce 
together. In the similar sense, Muñoz wanted us to be able to conceive of racial and ethnic 
identity and sociality as forms of thought, experience, and performance that exceeded 
categorization. It feels more apt to think of magic’s various manifestations across poetic practice 
and critique, what I call contemporary aesthetic forms of thinking magic, as magic’s structure of 
feeling, after Raymond Williams’s conceptualization19 and Muñoz’s application of this concept 
to queerness.20  I want to leave my reader with this suggestion: that magic is a structure of 
feeling, and that, to this extent, it exceeds both the poet’s intention and its historical lineation. 
Regardless of how we position our invocation of magic—in an explicitly European tradition, an 
African one, a Native American one—its relationship to the colonialist production of knowledge 
remains. A new structure of feeling proceeds from this dissertation—new in name and 
conceptualization, not new in practice—one wherein poetic consciousness includes an 
                                               
19 See Raymond Williams’s A Preface to Film (London: Film Drama, 1954) where Williams first coined this term, 
which, while it speaks structurally to the sensed experience of a specific time and place, I am invoking the term here 
to refer to intersection of times and places that references to magic embody. 
20 Muñoz, “Feeling Brown.” 
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understanding of how queerness, brownness, blackness, the ongoing desire for an impossible 
reparation gets caught up in the drama of poetry’s relationship with magic.  
We can turn again to Fred Moten’s lyrical theory of black magic to understand how to 
restructure the way we think and feel magic. I quote Moten at length, again, for us to experience 
the breadth, the paradox, and the jazz of his thinking and sounding: 
Here lies universality: in this break, this cut, this rupture. Song cutting speech. 
Scream cutting song. Frenzy cutting scream with silence, movement, gesture. The 
West is an insane asylum, a conscious and premeditated receptacle of black 
magic. Every disappearance in a recording. That’s what resurrection is. 
Insurrection. Scat black magic, but to scat or scatter is not to admit formlessness. 
The aftersound is more than a bridge. It ruptures interpretation even as the trauma 
it records disappears. Amplification of a rapt countenance, stressed portraiture. 
No need to dismiss the sound that emerges from the mouth as the mark of a 
separation. It was always the whole body that emitted sound: instrument and 
fingers, bend. Your ass is in what you sing.21 
What would it mean for us all to scat black magic, to both dispel it, rid ourselves of it, and to 
emit its sound? Would it mean to mourn the violent separation that sits at the root of American 
blackness and coloniality—the maternal separation wrought by the slave trade, the cultural, 
linguistic and spiritual separation wrought by colonial rule—and to feel one’s whole self still 
there? To desire the reparation of a trauma, and to encounter the record of its disappearance, an 
ephemeral mark, but a mark all the same, slicing the silence?  
                                               
 21 Fred Moten, In the Break: Aesthetics of the Black Radical Tradition (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 
2003) 39. 
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 Poetry, certainly, carries much: small sounds, big ones, important visions, petty woes. 
Certain kinds of poetries, at times just some moans or palpable nonsense, have been what its 
mouthers have needed to face the proportions of loss. Poetry’s entanglements with magic—its 
funky mysticality, its animated material, its trancy spells—have offered not just a way out of 
despair but more importantly a strategy for disrupting the delusion of dialectics: its impossible 
forward momentum, its absolute truth, its inoperable negatives. We have seen the negative space 
of dialectics which refuses to resolve. This is the space of magical thought. Here is where we get 
to perceive magic’s structure of feeling. This resistance to dialectical norms, and other norms of 
whiteness, has made magic particularly attractive to groups wanting to unsettle the status quo, to 
find a different relationality to self, to each other, to power, and to the world. And yet magic’s 
structure of feeling reveals the trouble with associating the aesthetics of poetry and identity with 
magic, how the snares of a colonial and racist past and present continue to fleck the field of this 
feeling. Moten’s way of imagining the both-and-ness of scat gives us something to riff on as we 
plod along with poetry in one hand and magic in the other. In this manner of both-and-ness, we 
might learn as poets to think magic in ways that always marks the record of its colonial 
banishment, and that harnesses its material presence even while we watch it fly, like a bird, off 
the page and away. 
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